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HISTORY OF THE 398TH INFANTRY REGIMENT



RHINELAND

15 September 1944 - - 21 March 1945




CENTRAL EUROPE

22 March - - 11 May 1945

History of
The 398th Infantry Regiment
In World War II



Edited by
BERNARD BOSTON



WASHINGTON
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TO THOSE SOLDIERS OF THE 398TH INFANTRY
WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES
THAT THE WORLD MIGHT LIVE

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FOREWORD

This is the history of a regiment—the 398th Infantry—born under a Carolina sun in December 1942. Actually, it is only a partial history of the unit, for the text does not describe the early life of the Regiment. It is only in combat that a regiment achieves the full maturity and complete expression that gives it everlasting distinction, and we have accordingly limited our narrative to the combat life of the 398th.


To cover the birth of the Regiment, we must go back to 24 June 1921, when the 398th Infantry was first activated as a Reserve regiment assigned to the 199th Infantry Brigade with headquarters at Charleston, West Virginia. The crest that was given the new regiment was a blue shield crossed diagonally by a wavy silver band, representing the Kanawha River which flows through West Virginia, the Regiment's birthplace. Below and parallel to the silver band is a diamond-backed rattlesnake, symbol of many of the early West Virginia military organizations. The Regimental motto is "On the Alert."

The 398th was actually mobilized for war on 15 December 1942 at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, as a regiment of the 100th Infantry Division. Its first commanding officer was Col. Robinson E. Duff. After months of training, it took part in the Tennessee Maneuvers, after which it returned with the division to garrison at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the unit was at Fort Bragg, Colonel Duff was promoted and transferred to the 10th Mountain Division as assistant division commander. Col. Nelson I. Fooks assumed command and took the Regiment overseas.

On 25 September 1944 the 398th packed up and moved to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, where it was readied for overseas shipment. On 6 October it embarked on the USS *General William H. Gordon*; after fourteen days on the high seas, in which the convoy was buffeted by a hurricane and generally strong winds, the weary troops were put ashore at Marseille, France.

From there on, the history which appears in these pages is the rich contribution of every soldier who helped mould the Regiment in its youth and who helped shape its course in battle. To these men, the world is forever indebted.

For the printed expression of that story the Regiment extends its appreciation to the following persons: Col. Robert M. Williams, Regimental Commander; Cpl. Herbert Lanza, for the writing; Cpl. Gene Belden and Cpl. Albert A. Vidmar for the art work; M/Sgt. Nicholas Kislak and T/5 Clarence Langer for the research. Capt. Bernard Boston was the officer in charge of publication.



HEADQUARTERS 398TH INFANTRY

Office of the Regimental Commander

APO 447

US ARMY .

1 March 1946

To the Officers and Men of the 398th Infantry:

Throughout the period of more than three years of our existence as an active combat unit, you established a record and set a standard unsurpassed in the history of our Army. This was accomplished through hard and intelligent work during the period of training, great fighting spirit, complete devotion to duty, and supreme self-sacrifice during the period of combat duty in France and Germany, and fine spirit, pride and discipline throughout the long months of tedious occupation duty after the cessation of hostilities. Tempered and strong, the Regiment has become a living thing which will remain in our hearts and memories forever.


I should like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for the unselfish and faithful cooperation I received from all ranks. You accomplished the vital tasks placed before you with honor and distinction.

At this time, near the end of the period of active service of the Regiment, it is most fitting to record its history, with particular emphasis on its period of combat.

This history is the story of many brave men, of individual deeds of sacrifice and heroism, of the vital role of a smoothly running and efficient team in World War II.

This is your story.

This is the story of the 398th Infantry.



ROBERT M. WILLIAMS
Colonel, 398th Infantry
Commanding




MAJ. GEN. WITHERS A. BURRESS
Commanding General, 100th Infantry Division

Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress is one of the few general officers of World War II who commanded his division from activation to inactivation. He was born in Richmond, Virginia, on 24 November 1894. He graduated from Virginia Military Institute with the degree of Bachelor of Science in 1914. On 30 November 1916 he accepted a commission as second lieutenant of Infantry in the Regular Army. As a captain he went to France with the 23d Infantry (2d Division) in 1917 and took part in actions at Chateau-Thierry, the Aisne-Marne Offensive and the St. Mihiel Offensive. Returning to the United States in 1919, he became instructor at the Infantry School, and in 1922 Professor of Military Science and Tactics at his Alma Mater, VMI. He graduated from the Infantry School's Basic Course in 1925 and from the Advanced Course in 1928. He was promoted to major on 7 July 1929.

General Burress graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1931, and remained there as an instructor. After graduating from the Army War College in 1935 he returned to VMI as PMS&T. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 18 March 1939. Following his promotion to colonel in 1941 he became Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School. In 1942 he was assigned to headquarters of the Puerto Rican Department and while there was promoted to brigadier general. On 9 August 1942 he was promoted to major general, and assumed command of the 100th Infantry Division upon its activation, 15 November 1942.

General Burress was decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal and the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster. From the Republic of Panama he received the Order of La Solidaridad.



COLONEL ROBERT M. WILLIAMS
Commanding Officer, 398th Infantry

Col. Robert M. Williams was born in Greenville, Texas, on 29 November 1916. He graduated from Texas A&M College in 1938, and on 1 July 1939 was commissioned second lieutenant in the Regular Army and assigned to the 20th Infantry at Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming. In August 1940 he was ordered to the Panama Canal Department and assigned to the 5th Infantry at Camp Paraiso. While serving there he was promoted to first lieutenant and captain.

Returning to the United States in the summer of 1942, he took the New Division Course at the Command & General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and upon graduation was ordered to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, as Headquarters Commandant of the 100th Infantry Division, soon to be activated. His promotion to major followed.

In early 1943 he was again ordered to Leavenworth, and upon graduation was assigned to the 399th Infantry, whose 3d Battalion he took over in August of that year. During January-March 1944 he attended the Canadian School of Infantry at Vernon, British Columbia. In March 1944 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In October 1944 Colonel Williams sailed to France with the 100th Division. His battalion relieved a battalion of the 45th Division near Raon-l'Etape on 1 November 1944. On 17 December he was transferred to the 398th Infantry, and assumed command of the Regiment on that date. On 12 June 1945 he was promoted to colonel, and remained in command of the 398th until December 1945, the month the 100th Division left Germany for return to the United States for inactivation.

Colonel Williams' decorations include the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Combat Infantryman Badge.

1: MARSEILLE

After a comparatively rough Atlantic crossing the 398th Infantry Regiment, together with elements of supporting units, disembarked from the Army transport *General William H. Gordon* on 20 October 1944 at Marseille, France.

To call Marseille a port, at the time, would give the impression our landing operations were without difficulty. It was scarcely two months before that the American Seventh Army smashed into this area. Ours was the first convoy to land at Marseille from the United States. The debris and litter of amphibious assault operations were in evidence—and in our path. Blown-out installations and facilities hampered our operations and the Germans conveniently scuttled ships in the harbor and alongside docks before being driven out. But little time was lost in getting the men, equipment and supplies on land.

The *Gordon* nestled alongside a gutted and keeled-over hulk of what was once a ship. Following a few coarse shouts and commands from the bridge of the *Gordon*, motors roared, wheels turned, heavy chains clanked and fell, and the transport was made secure. Bridges were laid from shore across the sunken hulk to the *Gordon* and the men of the Regiment poured on to French soil.

Ashore, the men for the moment lost contact with thoughts and ideas, springing from doubt as to their disposition. They were silently obsessed with a seemingly rapid confusion of activity. Other regiments were disembarking; landing craft darted around in the harbor, shuttling to and from the newly arrived ships; small freight-carriers on the pier moved about in no apparent controlled lanes of traffic. It was all a colossal race against time. Work had to be done in the daylight hours. The Germans frequently flew over at night, compelling blackout regulations to be rigidly enforced; darkness hampered our operations. No activity that required the aid of a light could be carried on at night.

With it all came not the words but the feeling "This is it." This peculiar sensation rose from the pit of the stomach and lodged uncomfortably somewhere in the throat, making swallowing a trifle difficult and causing the Adam's apple to bob noticeably.

Our reception was homespun. Bent from the load of our equipment, we filed from boat to shore. Coming fresh from the States made us the target of ribs and taunts from the port battalion men. They swept the paths before us and ceremoniously doffed their caps and made a low bow in a welcoming gesture. We were quick to catch the spirit of the occasion and generously heaped them with a like amount of, if not more, rubs. This good-natured mud-slinging buoyed our spirits and soon everyone was wise-cracking and laughing.

That same night with full field packs, rifle, and helmet we started to march inland. Being in Europe, the sights we strained our eyes to see in the darkness took our minds off the march and weight, but soon our steps became shorter, our pace slackened.

The road to the staging area was long, dry and dusty and, for the most part, uphill.

Motor convoys were constantly rolling past in both directions and not slowly despite the darkness. Many times we were obliged to get off the road as big amphibious DUKWs and trailer-trucks changed gears and swept by, kicking up clouds of dry dust. We couldn't see it but felt it rush into our nostrils with every breath we took.

Then it came—our first taste of enemy action. "Air Raid!" Sirens screamed and star shells flew into and lit up the sky leaving heavy wisps of blue smoke in their wakes. We kept marching with our necks craned but didn't see or hear any planes.

Early the next morning, extremely tired after marching all night with full field equipment, hungry, and thinking the march would never end, the men started to mount the last hill before reaching the staging area. Leg muscles pulled, ached, and burned. The men no longer shifted their packs to more comfortable posi-

tions with a twist of the body as they had been doing earlier. They just let them lie. The burden felt more like a part of the body, and to hike the weight into an easier riding position meant extra effort which just wasn't there to be spared.

The hill came to an abrupt ending. Although we couldn't see where we were going we knew the descent was at a much sharper angle than that of coming up the hill. Reaching the bottom we at last heard the words that meant finish to a gruelling march, "Fall Out!" We had reached Septemes, the staging area.

All over the area men gave a tired groan as they worked themselves free of their packs and let them fall. We dropped to the ground, huddled up in blankets, and slept hard. We woke up once when it started to rain but, being too tired to pitch tents, just pulled the shelter-half over our heads. Daybreak came and it was still raining. We crawled from under the shelter-half and blankets—wet, cold and muddy—and started to pitch our tents. Now we could see exactly where we were. Our encampment was in a huge basin surrounded by an even-height range of hills. The rain washed down from the high ground and settled in and around the tents.

What next? Details were immediately formed to return to Marseille to uncrate and assemble the equipment that was put ashore. Vehicles and heavy weapons were left at the port and had to be distributed to units without delay. It was a difficult job and one which entailed twenty-four-hours-a-day labor. As fast as wheels could be put on trucks and jeeps they were driven to our area. Machine guns, antitank guns and other crated weapons were cleaned, assembled and distributed.

While at Septemes we got our first glimpse of the foxholes, gun emplacements and fortifications the Germans built on surrounding hilltops. We were impressed and found it hard to imagine how this territory was taken in view of the over-all commanding positions of the enemy. Occasionally, a piece of German equipment was spied, but we dared not wander too far into the woods as fields of mines and booby traps had not been fully cleared.

Too, we picked up our first bits of French from the children—"Chocolat" and "*Cigarette pour Papa?*" From the elders we got wine and bread for cigarettes. They had no compunction or reservation in their dealings. Many times the men and women would approach us with wine as we were in the act of relieving ourselves in our open-air toilets.

At the chow line we got a good idea of the food situation in France and Europe. Groups of children and grownups would dash for the scraps and leavings we had intended to dump into the garbage pails. Each one had a can into which everything including coffee was put. Later we found one little French boy first drinking and draining off the coffee, then gingerly picking out and stuffing himself with what he thought were choice bits.

Passes to Marseille! We had not seen a city like it in the states. Cosmopolitan and clouded in a Singapore atmosphere, its winding dark streets gave one an uncomfortable and lonely feeling in the blackout of night. But if a door was opened from which a slight shaft of light leaked out, one was certain to find a smoke-filled cafe jammed with people of many creeds and colors.

From the soldiers and sailors of many nations we got what we thought was first-hand information on combat. They told us of the hardships, misery and sacrifices of campaigns. Later we were to find that some of the things they told us were true—others grossly exaggerated. Leaving them we thought we knew what combat was, but one never knows what something is until he actually experiences it.

We stayed at Septemes from 21 September to 31 October. Mud and C rations, shoepacs and "long johns" and French wine, securing and assembling of equipment, and our first glimpse of a foreign people in a foreign setting—through it all one singular train of thought was as constant as the chill, wet weather that enveloped us. It filled us with apprehension. Where were we going? When were we moving? What would it be like—this combat we had trained for so arduously? The answers were not long in coming.

2: TO THE BATTLE AREA

About this time the rejoicing of the people throughout the world, which had risen to a crescendo as the American and Allied armies smashed across northern France, had waned. Indications and hopes of peace before Christmas had faded away as the Germans along the entire front buttressed the new battle line of the Rhine River in the north and stemmed the Allied drive. It was evident now that the Germans had no intention of quitting as the world had hoped once their borders had been threatened. Although they entertained no hopes of victory the Nazis attempted to create a stalemate, assuming that time and the past years of war plus the bitterness of another winter would discourage further fighting and induce a negotiated peace. However, the Allies had no thought of demanding surrender other than unconditional, nor had they any thoughts of digging in for the winter. Reinforcements and more supplies and equipment were brought up to strengthen all armies. The German defenses were constantly probed for a weak spot. An opening was being sought through which Allied might could make a decisive effort to crush the enemy.

In southeastern France the American Seventh Army, of which our Regiment—the 398th Infantry—was soon to become an integral part, was preparing to push through the winter line and the Vosges Mountains.

Our Regiment, fully geared and equipped for battle, left Septemes in three groups for Villancourt, France. The first and second groups departed by rail on 28 and 29 October, respectively. The remainder of the Regiment left by motor convoy on 31 October at 0730. The motor march took three days. Valence, a distance of 142 miles, was arrived at eight hours later. On 1 November at 0730 the convoy pulled out of Valence and at 1815 hours of the same day arrived at Dijon, 190 miles away. On 2



Vicinity of St. Gorgon

November at 1545 hours the convoy arrived at the ETOUSA assembly area in the vicinity of St. Gorgon.

The trip by rail had taken three days and with the arrival of the motor convoy the entire Regiment was once again assembled at an area only five miles from the front. This was our last stop before going into actual contact with the enemy. Our proximity to the battle lines was emphasized by the sight of foxholes which had been recently vacated. The logs and camouflage covering the holes were still in contact and heavy impressions of combat boots, other than our own, were in evidence in the soft ground. Here for the first time we heard the thunder of our own heavy artillery sending tons of explosives into enemy positions. We heard and saw artillery before and during maneuvers, but this time it was for keeps.

A feeling of excitement rather than consternation filled the men. We were anxious to be on the way and face whatever consequences lay before us. We were aware that eventually it would have to be done, and the longer we remained at St. Gorgon the more the suspense grew.

3: THE VOSGES MOUNTAINS

Our initial assignment was with VI Corps, Seventh Army, 6th Army Group, European Theater of Operations. We were now in the big show, destined to play a major role in freeing Europe and possibly the world of the Nazi yoke. We were to relieve the 180th Infantry Regiment of the veteran 45th Division, who at the time were on line at the foot of the Vosges Mountains facing Raon-l'Etape.

At St. Gorgon the weather continued to be miserable. For the five days we were there it rained heavily. Tentage was soaked through and sagged under the weight of the absorbed rain. However, we continued to operate efficiently and advantageously in preparation for our entrance into combat. Commanders, platoon leaders, and even squad leaders made daily trips to the front lines as part of a combat orientation. They became familiar with terrain, battle conditions, and disposition of friendly and enemy troops. Also during this time all of the equipment and clothing in excess of what we actually wore and needed was turned in and stored away. Later we found it beneficial and even necessary to discard even more equipment.

The night of 5 November the 1st Battalion boarded trucks and moved to a point about two miles northwest of the village of St. Remy, where it dismounted and continued on foot to relieve the 2d Battalion of the 157th Infantry, 45th Division.

Here in the rain and the cold at the edge of the Vosges Mountains the men looked up into the black, enemy-held hills and awaited the morning to launch their first attack. The weather was an indication of the cold and wet which were to plague the Regiment throughout the entire Vosges Mountain campaign.

The following morning the Battalion moved out to its first action, an enemy strongpoint about three thousand yards northeast of the bivouac area. The men moved silently and cautiously through the heavy woods. Meeting no resistance the battalion



Raon-l'Etape

returned to its positions, leaving Company A in defense of the reconnoitered territory.

On 6 November the 3d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion of the 180th Infantry and took up positions to the left of the 1st Battalion along the same line in the vicinity of Ste. Barbe. The 1st Battalion continued patrolling to the east, its front, but only Company B made contact with the enemy as yet.

The following day Cannon Company and Antitank Company relieved respective units of the 180th Infantry, and our 2d Battalion prepared to relieve the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry.


November 8 found all three of our battalions committed as the 2d Battalion took up positions about five kilometers southwest of Raon-l'Etape along the Rambervillers-Raon-l'Etape highway. The three battalions were now abreast of each other: 1st Battalion was on the right flank southeast of the highway; 2d Battalion was in the center; and 3d Battalion was on the left flank northwest of the highway. The Regiment was on a north-south line, facing east and Raon-l'Etape between Thiaville and the vicinity of Etival. At 2000 this date all battalions were relieved from 45th Division control and Col. Nelson I. Fooks, Regimental commander, assumed command of the Regiment intact.

4: PUSHING THROUGH THE VOSGES


Now we were in strength and position to begin the cracking of the German winter defensive line. The rain, cold, mud, and snow were as much enemies as the Krauts when we concentrated on the Divisional objective—Raon-l'Etape.

This city was the nerve center of supply and communications in the German system of defense. As a natural barrier the Meurthe River lay before it and in our path. Both sides of the city were flanked by hills from which Jerry observed our movement and poured artillery into our positions. Because of these disadvantages a frontal attack was out of the question.

On the morning of 9 November the 1st Battalion pulled out of its position, after forcing the enemy to withdraw from a hill following a fire fight, and relieved the 2d Battalion of the 399th Infantry fifteen hundred yards west of Etival on the Meurthe River. The 2d and 3d Battalion operations were limited because of heavy enemy artillery fire and extremely bad weather.



This was a building in Raon




Baccarat

In this new position 1st Battalion men huddled in the shelter of their holes and awaited morning and the order to attack Etival.

Company B was the first to move out along the edge of the woods toward the objective, and succeeded in entering the south-east edge of the town unobserved. Late that afternoon Companies A and C followed. Company A proceeded through the woods but C, advancing over a heavily mined open field, suffered casualties from both the mines and artillery fire coming from across the Meurthe River. Casualties were heavy but with determination Company C pushed on into the center of Etival.

After establishing defenses for an expected counterattack which never came, the men for the first time since entering combat were able to heat their rations and warm themselves in the cellars of the town's shattered homes. The Battalion held onto Etival for four days, and on 14 November was relieved by elements of the 3d Infantry Division, sweeping in through the hills northwest of the town.

The day after Etival's attack and entry the 2d Battalion pulled out of its original position and swung around to the flank of the Regiment, occupying the high ground and protecting the right flank of the 1st Battalion. The 3d Battalion remained stable with heavy artillery fire falling into their area until 13 November



River at Baccarat

when it, too, moved north to relieve the 3d Battalion, 399th Infantry, in the vicinity of Baccarat.

Plans now were to outflank Raon-l'Etape by crossing the Meurthe River at Baccarat, moving down to the La Plaine River and crossing in the vicinity of La Trouche. Then they were to move in a southwesterly direction and into the key supply and communications city from the rear.

While the 1st and 3d Battalions were crossing the Meurthe River in the move to hit Jerry from the side and rear, the 2d Battalion was holding the original line before Raon-l'Etape and keeping the enemy's attention occupied with heavy barrages of machine-gun, 57mm and mortar fire. With the news that the 1st and 3d were safely across and in the process of encirclement of the key city, the 2d Battalion packed up and dashed north to protect the open left flank of the Regiment in the push down to the La Plaine River.

Heavily mined fields and roads and numerous roadblocks impeded the advance more than the token physical resistance offered by the enemy, which was eliminated by short, sharp bursts of fire from the automatic weapons in the hands of the alert doughboys.

5: CROSSING THE LA PLAINE

Advance elements of the Regiment reached the La Plaine on 18 November and were met with a furious barrage of artillery and small-arms fire, coming from the hills and emplacements across the river. The enemy was now aware of the trap in the making, and desperately concentrated his fire power in our new direction of attack.

Regardless, the 1st Battalion, with Company A in the lead, attempted a crossing of the river in the face of the withering fire, but the odds against the assault group were too great. The well-concealed Krauts burned this intended point of crossing with round upon round of artillery and small-arms fire, compelling Company A to withdraw and move west about five hundred yards where it succeeded in crossing despite heavy fire. With one company on the east bank of the river, the remainder of the Regiment dug in on the west bank toward the close of day.

Night in the Vosges at this time of the year falls fast and indescribably black. This new obstacle presented another unforeseen problem. The riflemen in the forward positions had to be fed and supplied with ammunition before morning. Jeeps could not operate over the rough terrain in the inky blackness and, if it were possible, the sound of their motors would in all probability invite enemy artillery and mortar fire.

Carrying parties from the Antitank and Ammunition and Pioneer Platoons were organized to bear rations and ammunition by foot. This was a long and tedious process. The only method the parties had of finding their way to the line companies in the pitch black was by holding on to the communications wire and trolleying their way forward over hundreds of yards of rocky, heavily underbrushed and uphill terrain in the pouring rain. Many times en route a carrier, bent under the load of a crate of rations and belts of ammunition, stumbled through barbed wire or deep mud only to lose hold of the guiding wire. Several

groped around aimlessly in the night over unfamiliar and mined territory for hours before they found their bearings. Too much cannot be said of these men who made it possible for the Regiment, on many occasions, to push successfully through the Vosges Mountains.

As the riflemen were being replenished with ammunition and supplies, patrols were sent out along the entire line in an effort to find just one weak spot in the strong German defenses. Determined resistance was met at all points except at the right flank of La Trouche, the town across the river. This was our opening. Here the 1st Battalion would smash through, gain the territory to protect the east flank of the bulk of the Regiment, as it crossed the river to sweep into the broad La Plaine Valley and complete encirclement of Raon-l'Etape.

The following morning broke partly cloudy but visibility was good. The 1st Battalion, with a company of the 325th Engineers in support, jumped off and started across the river. Enemy artillery and small-arms fire from the houses in La Trouche opened up but again, with Company A already across the river and in the lead, the battalion pushed on to clear the area and protect the flank of the 2d and 3d Battalions which were preparing to jump off.

Maneuvering in the rocky terrain was difficult. Hills were not gradually sloped but instead were steep and the men constantly exposed themselves in scaling the tough scrub bushes. There were many such hills which seemed to stretch in a never-ending range. With Jerry constantly looking down our throats and spraying our advance up the tortuous hillsides, each hill in the 1st Battalion's area was taken. Casualties were heavy but the doughs persisted in their efforts, thrashing their way upwards and eliminating each enemy strongpoint with well aimed grenades or a ripping burst of fire.

With its flank protected, the 3d Battalion pushed off from the north bank of the La Plaine River and proceeded in clearing the

heavily fortified hills in their sector of operations. Company K led and, while advancing over an open field on the opposite side of the river, met with a furious outburst of fire coming from the edge of the woods ahead. Squad flanking maneuvers eliminated the more effective enemy machine-gun nests, and finally the company wormed its way near enough to spring up and in a close-up fire fight killed or routed the enemy.

At the end of the day the entire 3d Battalion pushed across the open field, although subjected to observed artillery fire, and continued on to drive the Germans from the surrounding hills. Occasional bursts of fire punctuated the evening, but it was insignificant in comparison with the fire fighting earlier in the day. Sniper shots rang out and twanged through the valleys as the battalion dug in before their last big objective and Raon-l'Etape—Hill 578.

The next morning the 3d Battalion formed a huge line of skirmishers. Company L was to sweep up the left side of the hill, Company K the center, and Company I was to clear the right side. The men struggled through the underbrush up the face of the hill and had almost reached the crest when the entire hilltop broke out in a fury of staccato machine-gun and rifle fire. Tired from mounting the steep incline, the 3d Battalion men sprang into action at the first outburst of fire and deployed into position. Crawling and creeping through the heavy underbrush and enemy fire, they spotted the sources of fire and set to work wiping out each of the emplacements. At the end of the day Hill 578 was left smouldering and quiet but in the hands of the 3d Battalion.

Meanwhile the 2d Battalion pulled out of its flank protecting position, forded the La Plaine River and drove on in its mission of seizing the high ground north of Moyonmoutier. With Company G in the lead it pushed on across the open field on the south bank of the river and started up the steep side of Hill 603, drawing mortar and heavy small-arms fire. Halfway up, the first two platoons of Company G were pinned under a merciless blanket

of automatic fire coming from rock-banked positions. In a daring move the 3d Platoon crawled to a flanking position. Springing up and firing, they charged and routed the Germans at bayonet point.

The 2d Battalion drove on between the 1st and 3d to reach and occupy the high ground north of Moyennoutier and close the mission of the 398th in the Raon-l'Etape area.


With the encirclement of Raon-l'Etape and the enemy driven from the citadels protecting it, the city itself lost all strategic importance to the Germans and fell easy prey to the 100th Division. The tough outer shell of the winter defensive line in our sector as well as that along the entire Seventh Army front was cracked wide open, and the Germans were in full retreat to their borders and defenses in the east.

Lieut. George F. H. Walters describes the action in these words:

The Vosges are silent sentinels that through the centuries have stood as a military obstacle to those armies that have tried to operate through their winding, tortuous trails and the dark recesses of their forests. Since very early times, when Caesar's legions pushed northward from Rome, these bulwarks that stand as guardians to Germany's southwestern frontier discouraged and disheartened many a hardy veteran. The very nature of their terrain, as well as the cold chilling rains and fogs that descend in early fall, followed by severe snows and freezing weather, is enough to turn the blood to ice in one's veins. Truly the elements join with the mountains to make this spot a most undesirable one in which to wage war. Surely no sector on the long Western Front presented a more difficult or trying problem to leaders and men than this vast wilderness that stretches to the Rhine and the Black Forest on Germany's southern flank.

The gray skies of November had come, and with them the rolling icy fogs that creep down through the ravines with their keen penetrating cold, turning the woodlands into a deep and dreary gloom.

If the French and American forces were to attempt a push in this region, it seemed disaster would face them. The German forces waiting patiently in their seemingly impregnable positions watched with confidence the movements of their enemies. The paths, trails, open ravines, and roadways were mined with all the devices known to German in-



Crossing the La Plaine

genuity. From the hidden depths of the woods, guns of various calibers covered each natural approach. The entire region seemed nothing more than a giant death trap waiting to spring closed upon those who had courage enough to venture near its shadowy domain.

Friday, 17 November. To the men of the 3d Battalion of the 398th Infantry it had no significance. One day is as the other along the dark muddy roads of the Vosges.

But to many of the weary doughboys who plodded along under the weight of their equipment; cursing the war, the weather, and their luck; jesting with their comrades; turning silently to thoughts of home and happier days in their minds; this march was their last. Death was close that Friday, but not as we were to know it in the days to come, when whining bullet and bursting shell would forever silence the grumbings or the laughter of many of the boys. Bodies of German soldiers, their green uniforms sodden and wet from the incessant rains, their hands oftentimes upraised in protest, reminded us that death was ever near. So many soldiers have died on the field with this last futile gesture. Some men peering at these silent bundles, bloody and distorted, said nothing; others pointed with a grimacing remark, "There's a good Jerry." Despite previous warnings of booby traps and mines, soldiers found time to snatch various articles for souvenirs from the German equipment that was strewn along the roadside. In the distance could be heard the mortar's ominous thud and the machine gun's spasmodic bursts; these were the only sounds reminding us that somewhere ahead were the gray-green legions of the *Wehrmacht*.

The long lines of tired troops streaming along the dark roadside, their young, anxious faces peering from beneath their helmets, and the forms of other soldiers sprawled in death in the gloomy shadows beneath the trees, seemed to bring to one's mind the words of the poet Housman when he wrote:

Far and near and low and louder
On the roads of Earth go by
Dear to friends, the food for powder
Soldiers marching off to die.

Darkness fell rapidly as darkness does at that time of the year in the Vosges and in the semi-gloom soldiers still moved quietly toward the chosen assembly area.

On gently sloping ground, in the cover of a forest that turned the early evening hours into an inky blackness, the troops pulled the equipment from their tired backs and set to work digging in. The thud

of intrenching tools, the rattle of stones against metal, and low murmurs of jest or complaint told the story that infantrymen were preparing their beds for the night. Darkness fell quickly; men constructed their holes carelessly, some too shallow; others with only twigs overhead to protect themselves from the deadly tree-bursts. So the men, armed with a false sense of security, lay down in the cold, damp darkness and attempted to gain a night's rest, only to have their slumber interrupted by the occasional bursts of enemy artillery.

The morning of the 18th. The day was wet, cold, and foggy, as the troops crawled from their holes or rose from where they lay, rubbing their eyes, and trying to shake a little warmth into their stiffened limbs.

It has been traditional with the Army that soldiers should hurry and wait. So in the hazy morning light men stood or huddled around in groups, eating their K rations, engaging in low conversation, and most of all, waiting. The subjects were typical of the American soldier: the vices and virtues of women, the war, their breakfasts, and a hundred other incidentals. But most of all they waited, looking anxiously at any officer or runner who appeared on the scene, and with all the inquisitiveness of the American soldier, not hesitating to greet him with, "What's up?"

Near noon that day company commanders, staff officers from battalion, and runners with radios, clustered around a large stump to receive the situation and orders for their first attack. The troops were tense with expectation, and rumors were rampant in the ranks. The eyes of the most unconcerned private turned towards a short, mild mannered, quiet-spoken man who stood in the center of the gathering—Lt. Col. Floyd Stayton, 3d Battalion commander.

For men untried in battle, the objectives were most formidable-looking indeed. The river was narrow, meandering down through a small open valley. Across that valley rose the hills that formed the objectives. The last one, the one farthest away, known to us as Hill 578, rose abruptly to a height of some 578 meters. Dark and forbidding forests covered the slopes of these hills, and the tops, brush, and timber stunted from the ever wearing winds crowned the heights.

Here the German forces waited for their enemies. Among their units that opposed our attack were the 708th and 716th Infantry Divisions. The artillery fire that fell into our area was thought to be that of the 658th Artillery Regiment, which had its headquarters battery well concealed in the overlooking slopes. Lieutenant General Richter commanded the 716th Infantry Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Fischer directed the operations of the 726th Regiment. With them

also were the 748th Regiment, known as the People's Regiment. Its 2d Battalion was led by Captain Fisher, with Captain Sturn and Lieutenants Esser and Grosskopt in command of the 1st, 3d, and 4th Companies, respectively. Although many of the German vehicles were horse-drawn, it can be said that this force was well equipped.

To many of the men that day, the situation was rather hazy, so from points of vantage they kept vigil. The battalion observation post was a small foxhole behind a stone wall and could only accommodate two men. Forward of this observation post, facing the enemy lines, Lieutenants Guga and Anderson set up their own mortar observation post, zeroing their guns in from this point in order to support the coming attack. The day closed with the battalion still in position; the order to jump off was for daybreak the next morning.

Night descended upon the valley, and under the protection of its darkness T/Sgt. Albert Campbell of Elizabeth, New Jersey, who was later to wear the bars of a second lieutenant, led the first patrol towards the river. It consisted of two squads from his 2d Platoon of Company K. His men had been chosen to protect the battalion observation post, so from their positions they stole forward, going down the slope into the valley. They crept to the shadows of the lumberyard and cautiously crossed the bridge, which they found intact, although the Germans had attempted to mine it. Once across, they moved behind the shelter of the river's bank, to the right some hundred yards or more, and then boldly crossed the field towards the woods. The night was very dark, but there was enough light to see a number of holes, which they assumed was the work of mortar fire. This evidence led them to believe that the field was zeroed in. After listening for some time without hearing or seeing any other signs of the enemy, they returned to report to Captain Jones. During the remainder of the night, three more patrols moved out. The first encountered nothing, while the last two reported that they had heard moving horse-drawn wagons.

Delay and confusion have been part of every battle since battles have been fought. This was true on the morning of the 19th. Daylight came, and Company K was still on the road, waiting to move across the bridge and into the valley to strike at the Germans. They were in a column of platoons with the 3d Platoon leading, followed by the 1st, Weapons, and 2d, in that order. The 2d was in reserve because they had borne the burden of running the patrols. Captain Jones, anxious to get his company moving, met Lt. Henry Pajak of Chicago, Illinois, leader of the 3d Platoon, and told him to cross the bridge and move towards the objective. Pajak was the first to cross the bridge. He turned

from the captain, gave his platoon the signal to follow, and started on a dead run across the planking. On reaching the other end, he turned to the right and streaked along an embankment that paralleled the river. Having gone some three hundred yards, he stopped to allow his platoon to overtake him. There they formed in a two-platoon front, the light machine guns on the flanks. Pausing a moment for breath behind the protective bank, the company, with the 3d Platoon on the right, the 1st on the left, and the 2d in reserve, proceeded across the field in line of skirmishers.

When Howe's red-coated grenadiers marched up the steep slope of Breed's Hill to be mowed down by New England farmers, one of the grave errors of the day was that the English veterans were packing close to 125 pounds of equipment. They finally threw off their heavy packs and drove the farmers from the breastworks. The doughboys of the 3d Battalion that day suffered from the same cumbersome load that the Redcoats must have generations before. Hooks and belts were unfastened, and packs went rolling away, and any other items that got in the way were readily tossed aside. Behind each attacking company was a wake of discarded equipment.

The 3d Platoon was nearing the woods; the Weapons Platoon to its immediate rear, was thundering over the wooden bridge like a horse on a barn floor, each man racing for the bank. And then it came; what they had expected, what they had waited for, and what they had feared. It came from the corner of the woods, a little off to the left. A Jerry machine gun opened catching one squad of the 3d Platoon with fire. The two lead platoons, the 3d and 1st, both reached a defilade in the middle of the field. The machine guns were following the lead platoons; one directly behind the left flank of the 1st Platoon and the other behind the right flank of the 3d.

In command of these guns was Sgt. Andrew Porter, of Long Beach, Long Island, who won the respect of every man in his company for the way he worked his machine guns into position to knock out the enemy fire that pinned down his beloved Company K. The enemy weapon opened up at the left of the field. Porter shouted to his right gun, "Watch the tracers!" No sooner had the glowing bullet been fired than his gun joined in. He made a motion to the right gun and ran about twenty yards, the right gun, manned by Privates First Class Hunt and Burrows followed on his heels. The left gun continued to fire to cover the right gun's advance. The right gun again in action, the left gun picked up and moved forward about twenty yards. In this manner were the guns leap-frogged forward, until the two were out in front of that defilade, their muzzles spewing forth the death-dealing pellets.

Porter, when speaking about that action afterwards, said, "Those boys are the best damned gunners in the Army." He was referring to Privates First Class Hanse, Burrows and Raymond Hunt. Their cool and rapid action had given the men of the two lead platoons the opportunity to reach the defilade. The gunners on the left were Pfc. Frederick Arheit of Toledo, Ohio, and Pfc. Edward Garrity of Jersey City, New Jersey.

In the meantime, the 4th Platoon mortarmen were working madly to get their guns in action. Within a moment, T/Sgt. Edwin Rajotte was up forward, observing where another machine gun had opened up, keeping the riflemen pinned down in the defilade. He shouted his orders back to Sgt. Joe Perry, of Birmingham, Alabama, who was controlling and directing the operations at the guns. The three mortars fired in battery, and within two rounds had knocked out the Jerry gun.

During the intense firing from the woods, Company K was pinned to the earth, and it seemed at that point that the Germans would annihilate them as they lay helpless on the open ground. Lt. Henry Pajak ordered a squad to work around to the right, using to screen their movements a patch of weeds that lay directly to their front. Their mission was to rout the enemy from their left and reduce the fire that was holding them helplessly at bay. The squad pushed off, moving through the weeds, which afforded a little concealment. Pajak feared a delay would give the Jerries the opportunity to open up with mortar fire, and was determined to fight his way to the enemy. He passed word back along the line that all eyes should be turned toward him and that everyone was to come up with his weapon firing. The green patch that had grown still under the raking fire of German guns sprang to life. Up leaped the men of Company K, their Mls firing with steady barks, until their weapons blended in one huge chorus that became a roaring staccato. They went forward in a rush, their bodies bent like men bucking a strong wind. Men always run like that in the face of enemy fire. This volume of fire, together with the fire of the leap-frogging machine guns left the Germans no choice but to seek shelter in a hole or retreat.

Our men pushed on, gained the edge of the woods, overran the German positions, and swept through the forest like an avalanche. Whether the Germans were caught napping, or whether the speed with which the Americans struck caught them off balance is not known. Some turned to fight, others fired a few shots and either surrendered or fled. Green-coated veterans of the *Wehrmacht*, with hands upraised, and the cry of "*Kamerad*" on their lips, greeted many a panting dough-boy from the gloomy slopes of the first objective.

Company I followed the same route K had taken. As the 1st Platoon, led by Lt. Floyd McNally, Little Silver, New Jersey, crossed the field, they were fired at by snipers, even though Company K had already gone through the area. The 1st Platoon went straight into the woods, while the 2d Platoon of Lt. Raymond Snell, Saint Paul, Minnesota, fanned out to the left to clean out a pocket of snipers that kept the open field under fire constantly. Snell, after being pinned down by a sniper, arose from where he had hit the ground and calmly walked toward his enemy, emptying his carbine as he went. The remainder of Company I followed the route of the 1st Platoon. Company K had taken the first three objectives so Company I met only small pockets of snipers that Company K had been forced to by-pass.

Company L was the last to cross the field that afternoon, swinging left of Company I in the corner of the woods. Capt. Robert E. Brinkerhoff of Belleville, New Jersey, a big man with a harsh voice and an aggressive manner, went out ahead of his company to make sure that everything was going smoothly. He left the company in the command of Lt. William E. Nelson, of Birmingham, Alabama. Captain Brinkerhoff and his runner, Pfc. James R. McInnes of Brunswick, Georgia, went across the field in front of the 2d Platoon of Company M, a heavy machine-gun outfit following in close support of Company I.

The heavy machine guns of the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company M perhaps had the toughest time of all in this attack, for under the weight of their heavy guns and ammunition they constantly kept up with the rifle companies. Although these guns were used but little in this battle, they were always in position to support the fast-moving riflemen.

After Captain Brinkerhoff had crossed the field, he remained in the corner of the woods and watched his company advance across the open terrain. Only a platoon and a half crossed first. The rest of the company lost contact, and stayed behind until Lt. Samuel Titlbaum, Brooklyn, New York, was sent back to bring them across.

Once in the woods, Company L fanned out, swinging in a great arc to the left of Company I. Both companies came upon artillery pieces, horses with harnesses on, and other German equipment which the Germans had left behind in their haste to take off. The horses were unharnessed and were sent galloping away with a smart whack on the rump.

Late in the afternoon, with darkness approaching rapidly, the action slowed down. An occasional crackle of rifle fire or machine-gun fire flared up, but there were no real fire fights like the ones earlier in the day. Snipers still fired at our troops.

Darkness put an end to the fighting. The men dug in that night in the shadow of the last big objective, Hill 578.

The next morning broke at 0730, cold, damp, and dreary. The plan of attack was to have the three companies form a huge line of skirmishers. Company L was to sweep up the hill from the left, K from the middle, and I from the right. They were to converge on the top. Throughout the day, the companies lined the hill that in places resembled rugged cliffs, meeting pockets of resistance, none of which was organized.

A squad moved around to the left to outflank the Germans, killing one and capturing several others. It was at this time that the Jerries threw two counterattacks in this area. During an attack two doughboys, who had thus far failed to bag a German, spotted one creeping up on them. They commenced a conversation between them as to whether or not they should kill the man. While they continued their debate, the German continued to crawl toward their position. When within twenty-five yards of them he was shot by another soldier thus ending their debate and leaving both to lament their failure to bag a Kraut.

Company K, who had the mission of climbing the face of the slope was struggling through the underbrush and over the rocks in a column of platoons. It was the identical story of the two flank companies. They were allowed to approach almost to the crest and then the woods seemed to spring alive with fire. When the first bursts came, a number of men were resting for a few minutes to catch their breath. It caught them standing or sitting around rather nonchalantly; however it took the men but a few minutes to get into action and beat the Jerries at their own game. The fire pinned Captain Jones and the leading elements down. Lieutenant Pajak with his men went to their aid. Maneuvering around, they put a heavy concentration of fire upon the enemy, forcing him from the hill.

During the afternoon the sun broke through a cloudy sky but with the coming of night the gloom and fog settled down.

The companies consolidated their positions on the hill. Company L moved down the forward slope to dig in but was later withdrawn. Although the troops were ready to continue on, it was decided that on these heights that overlooked the small village of St. Blaise would be the place to await any further demonstration the enemy might make. Snipers still fired at men who exposed themselves to any extent.

Numerous and lengthy have been the tales told in history of the suffering of soldiers. Hallowed and sacred to American hearts are the hills

of Valley Forge. There liberty-loving men huddled together while icy blasts of winter with its drifting snow beat upon them. Here is where the bloody footprints on the snow bore testimony to their suffering. Indelibly inscribed in the minds of the 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment, is the name of Hill 578. What Valley Forge was to the blue-and-buff veteran of Washington's day this wind-swept hill was to these GIs. When the mantle of night put an end to their digging, there was but one thing to do—crawl into whatever shallow hole you had and wait until the light of morning came. With the coming darkness came a severe wind and a driving freezing rain. The men had no rolls for there was no possibility of getting them up to the positions in the darkness. In the first days of action men had discarded their packs and equipment in the heat of battle, so raincoats and blankets were lacking. There was nothing to eat, for they had dropped their rations along with the rest of their equipment. In fact, very little was in their stomachs, as they had eaten about one K ration apiece in the two days of fighting. It was in this condition that the doughboys huddled together as best they could in their holes and waited. The wind moaned in the trees around them, and those on the reverse slope received the icy blasts in their holes. The rain lashed at them with a cutting effect; their clothes were saturated. Bodies that had steamed with perspiration some hours before now writhed beneath each freezing blast. The downpour of rain filled the holes of the sufferers, driving them from a reclining position to one that would keep as much of their bodies out of the icy water as possible. They sat on their helmets and hid their numbed hands under their jackets. Some were driven out of their holes by the intense cold of their bodies, but once out, the intensity of the wind and rain drove them back in again. The wounded could not be evacuated, so in sodden German blankets that their comrades picked up they lay in their foxholes suffering silently, for any groans that may have escaped their lips were lost in the howling of the storm.

All night long through chattering teeth the question came in hoarse whispers, "What time is it?" At the answer, one could hear the usual remarks, "My God! How long will it last?" "I'm freezing to death." "Move over; it's running down my neck again." Men who braved the fury of the German guns now huddled together and whimpered like children. After a night that seemed as eternal as the ages, a faint streak of dawn began to appear. A few were able to crawl from their beds suffering. Somehow they got to their feet, and after they had gotten some movement back into their bodies, they helped drag other comrades from their holes, who dropped in their tracks from exposure. Men

attempted to build small fires to warm themselves, caring little whether the enemy saw them or not.

It was at that time that Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Ernest Janes came to the relief of the suffering troops. When darkness put an end to the battle of the 19th, carrying orders for the attack, accompanied by some forty men and six jeeps loaded with rations, ammunition, and water, the Major started in search of the battalion. In the darkness they picked their way over a tortuous trail through the hills. To keep contact was almost impossible. Two jeeps and a number of men became lost in the darkness. After a two-hour search they were found. At one point the jeeps were bogged down in mud. A group of prisoners passed by, and the Major motioned for them to push the vehicles. Whether the Germans did not understand the request or ignored it is not known. Getting no response, he whipped out his pistol and with a few wild gestures sent the Jerries scurrying to the jeeps, pushing like demons. The elements had unleashed their fury upon the caravan of struggling men as if to add to their misery. A tree crashed across the trail, blocking the passage of the vehicles. From there on the equipment had to be hand-carried. All night long the little band of men struggled up the hill, following a communications wire so as not to become lost in the inky darkness. They arrived on the summit of the hill with their life-saving loads at 0800 the next morning. The sight of the rations brought new encouragement to the nearly frozen troops.

The orders were to attack at 0700; it was a little past 1000 when the men moved out. The sun was shining, and its rays heartened them. Below lay a little village, and the mere sight of houses aroused the men. They had experienced the cold, wet gloom of the Vosges. They were ready to face anything the Germans had to get near a building. As they fanned out and strolled down through the forests, it was noticed that vehicles were in the village. Not taking any chances, they sprinted across the open fields until they gained the shelter of the first few buildings. There stood a GI truck. Underneath a shed two soldiers were busy over a jeep. Sighs of the profoundest relief were heard from the lips of the worn-out men. Out on the road some stopped to light a cigarette, others stood for a minute, looking back at the hill they had descended. Whatever ran through their thoughts we can only guess, for they turned and silently plodded on.

There was a break for the men in the village, and soldiers, mud-stained and drenched, swallowed coffee that the village women brought them. Soon little fires blazed along the road, and men tried to warm

their swollen hands or held their soaked feet toward the warmth of the flame.

Once along the road, they were able to march again without the fear of sniper bullets or machine-gun fire. The town of Moyenmoutier became their haven of rest; here were provided food, clothing, and shelter.

The crossing of the La Plaine will not go down in history as the names of Waterloo, Gettysburg, or the Marne, but to the 3d Battalion it was as decisive as any of these. Here is where bright-eyed youngsters from the classrooms, gangling youths from the farms, and men from other walks of life met the people who had trained long years for war and who thought they were destined to rule the world. Here is where this band of liberty-loving men routed the Supermen from their gloomy strongholds and beat them at their own game—war. Neither the elements nor German gunfire stopped them. This is a story not boastfully written, but with a reverence deep and full to the memories of those who served with the 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry. No towering monument, however colossal, can stand as a more fitting tribute to the deeds and valor of these men than their own symbol; a figure of an infantryman, mud-stained and battle-weary, who wrote with his blood and suffering the final chapter in the story of victory.



Regimental commander at OP

6: PURSUIT THROUGH THE VOSGES


Deep in the Vosges the men of the 398th Regiment, with the green of inexperience worn off in the recent trying and bitter battles in the hills and forests around Raon-l'Etape, started out in pursuit. Determination was written on their bearded faces and was even more pronounced in the way they reloaded their weapons and slammed the bolts home.

The mission of seek-and-destroy continued on as the 2d and 3d Battalions pushed on over the rugged terrain in the rain, cold and sleet to Moyennmoutier, south of La Trouche. Casualties rose as enemy artillery and mortar fire bracketed the advancing columns and fanatic but futile counterattacks developing from the south-east took their toll. Sniper-infested wooded areas slowed and sometimes halted movement but organized resistance was fast crumbling.

At Moyennmoutier, to keep the fleeing enemy in a disorganized state and from forming another line in the Vosges Mountains, G-2 of VI Corps decided on a mobile task force designed to strike swiftly and cut enemy supply lines. The task force, comprised of units of the 398th Combat Team, including engineers, tanks, tank destroyers and artillery, was built around a nucleus of the 2d Battalion.




High ground overlooking Moyennmoutier



However, the Germans retreating slowly on foot were aware of this threat and set up innumerable roadblocks on the way. Outside of Moyenmoutier and again at Senones the task force was halted by these obstacles and shelled heavily by artillery and mortars already zeroed-in on the area.

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion, now attached to the 397th Infantry, pushed forward on the right flank of the mobile force and reached Senones by foot without opposition. The 1st Battalion, attached to the 117th Reconnaissance Troop, after holding positions in and around La Trouche struck out on the left flank of the Regiment's advance and swept past Celles-sur-Plaine. By 25 November it had reached Grandfontaine and Shirmeck—its farthest point of advance in the VI Corps' area.

The task force continued on to Le Vermont where the operation was disbanded. Here the 2d and 3d Battalions met and together fanned out towards Champanay, St. Blaise and Salm




where the 398th Regiment climaxed its Vosges Campaign.

The 100th Division terminated its operations in the VI Corps' area after converging with elements of the 3d Infantry Division and 14th Armored Division pushing on to Strasbourg and the Rhine. In recognition of its success and tactical ability it was ordered north into the XV Corps area and the zone of the hinge of the Maginot Line—Bitche.

The 398th Regiment sped back to Raon-l'Etape where it regrouped and moved north into the vicinity of Troisfontaines preparatory to the Bitche campaign.

Movement orders weren't long in coming. On 2 December we were moving up by motor and foot. At the time we had no conception of the size or importance of the task that lay before us but from the massed artillery units we passed while moving up we were not wrong in assuming something big—really big—was in the offing.



The Fight to Bitché

7: DRIVE TOWARD BITCHE

The Maginot defenses in the vicinity of Bitche lay sprawled over the gently rolling country of Alsace-Lorraine like a huge octopus, with tentacles in the form of lesser fortifications reaching out and clinging to the earth for miles around. Never before in history had Bitche, nestled in the confines of its natural defenses, been taken by force and now, surrounded by and lying deep in the present-day man- and machine-made fortifications of the Maginot Line, the task was all the greater. The German Army, at the height of its power in the early phases of its sweep through Europe, could not overcome these defenses. Only through France's capitulation and after she had been almost completely overrun did the defenders of Bitche, alone and surrounded, yield to the Nazi hordes.

The Germans realized the significance of the Maginot defenses surrounding impregnable Bitche and strengthened them. This was the southern axis, extending from the North Sea, of the Maginot Line upon which the entire system swung and hinged. Once this hinge was smashed the line could be circumvented,



Road to Wingen



Pillbox at entrance to Meisenthal

neutralized and rendered useless. The gates to Germany would then swing wide open.

The guns in the turrets of the pillboxes, originally facing east and designed to repel imperialistic Germany, now pointed west. The huge octopus dug its tentacles deeper into the earth, watched and waited.

On 3 December the 398th Infantry Regiment started to hack away at the tentacles. With the 3d Battalion in reserve, the 2d Battalion jumped off in the attack with the mission of seizing Puberg. The 1st Battalion struck out for Wingen. The Germans were very sensitive to our probing the approaches to Bitche and showed it in the fury of their resistance as we methodically smashed defenses and forged ahead. They were determined to impress upon us the futility of this daring venture, but we were just as determined to reach our objective.

Heavy small-arms fire and artillery greeted the 1st Battalion driving in on Wingen. Companies A and C, attacking the flanks,

went through barrages of mortar and 88mm fire. Company C was stopped but A Company crashed through the defenses and entered the town. The Germans thrust back savagely and cut Company A off from the rest of the battalion. Out of contact, the men fought doggedly to break the ring encircling them but to no avail. Reconnaissance and combat patrols from the battalion attempted to break through from the outside, but withering machine-gun fire forced them to withdraw.

Fighting gallantly against a numerically superior enemy, Company A with the exception of one platoon, which managed to fight its way free of the trap, was compelled to surrender after exhausting its ammunition.

That night heavy concentrations of 81mm and 4.2 mortar fire blasted enemy strongpoints in the town chasing the Krauts out and into the hills. The following morning the battalion took Wingen and took up positions straddling the supply route leading to Bitche.


Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion drove on to Puberg and entered the town, now in flames from our artillery fire, and continued on to the outskirts of Soucht. The intensity of enemy artillery called a halt to the push and the men dug in. With the lifting of the



Village of Meisenthal

artillery came short rapid bursts of burp guns. The doughboys, peering down from their dug-in positions at the top of a hill, saw the field-green of German uniforms coming out of the woods at the base of the hill. Waiting until there wasn't a possibility of missing the attackers, the battalion's machine guns roared out simultaneously, cancelling whatever plans the enemy had. The riflemen then poured out of their holes and drove on into Soucht.

The 3d Battalion, not to be outdone, drove in from its reserve position, passed the 2d Battalion, and after a fierce fire fight amid artillery and mortar fire captured Rosteig and pushed on to Meisenthal.



Siegfried Pillbox

8: REYERSVILLER

On 5 December the 398th Infantry Regiment consolidated its positions on the high ground of Soucht, Meisenthal and Wingen. All three battalions were now abreast of each other; with Anti-tank Company protecting the flanks and rear they awaited the word that would send them hurtling towards Reyersviller—the last fortified town before the Maginot Line and Bitche. Meanwhile, the 397th and 399th Infantry Regiments were moving up on the right under the flank protection of the 398th.

On 11 December the Regiment leapfrogged the 399th under the leadership of Col. Paul G. Daly who had relieved Colonel Fooks. The 1st Battalion, with Company A reorganized and composed of replacements and veterans of other companies in the battalion, proceeded north to a point four miles southeast of Lemberg. The 2d and 3d Battalions met heavy resistance as they pushed past Lemberg.

German resistance had become increasingly evident as we approached the gates to Bitche. Artillery fire was heavier and curtains of automatic fire screened strongpoints and towns. At the slightest provocation the Germans poured in artillery. For



Reyersviller—gateway to Bitche



Before the push

the next two days the Regiment moved with caution as it jockeyed into position for the attack on Reyersviller. Then suddenly on 13 December like a cloudburst the 398th swept in upon Reyersviller behind a rolling barrage of artillery fire from the 375th Field Artillery Battalion. With the 2d Battalion in the lead pillboxes and strongpoints, which only a short time ago were spitting fire and raking the terrain before them, were blasted open. The Krauts who could, came stumbling out to surrender. The battalion continued on to the high ground north of Reyersviller with Company F being the first unit of the 100th Division to reach the Maginot Line and come under the fire of its heavy guns. Outside of the town the Regiment dug in before the divisional objective, Bitche.

9: BITCHE—AND THE FORMIDABLE MAGINOT

The tentacles had been torn away. The preliminaries of Wingen, Soucht, Rosteig and Reyersviller were over. Before us loomed the mighty steel-and-concrete fortifications of the Maginot Line buried deep in the protecting rock and earth of the hills. Only a thick mushroomed head or an obvious hump in the contour of the sloping terrain protruded from the underground bastions. From the slightest breeches in these cupolas and exposures poured volumes of automatic fire and shell fire ranging up to 135mm caliber, covering every approach and inch of the open surrounding ground. From Bitche itself our every move was observed and relayed to batteries of 88s, which sent shells screaming and crashing into our positions with frightening accuracy.

We cringed in our foxholes and wished we had dug just a little deeper as the shells exploded and tore up the ground around us. As yet we had not made a direct attempt on the forts and knew, despite the intensity of the fire we were undergoing, the enemy had not yet opened up to his full capacity. Soon we were to know the fullest fury of the Maginot Line guns manned by dyed-in-the-wool, confident Nazis, ordered and determined to hold the line at the cost of their lives.

The Divisional objective being Bitche, the 398th Regiment's objective was the main defense line of Bitche, namely Forts Freudenberg and Schiesseck. Fort Freudenberg was a single defensive unit independent of Fort Schiesseck as far as underground connections were concerned. It extended deep into the earth in sections of floors and was equipped with modern machinery and motors, facilitating movement between floors to the exposed pillbox. Elevators brought supplies and ammunition up to the bombproof casemate above the earth, which was the only visible indication of the powerful underground fortress. This, the business end of the fort, was armed with twin machine guns, automatic rifles and a 47mm antitank gun.



Ducking tree bursts in the forest near Bitche

Behind Freudenberg lay Fort Schiesseck, the more powerful of the two forts, consisting of eleven mutually supporting pill-boxes jointed together by subterranean railways, tunnels and communications. This greater fortress was spread out to cover any approach to Bitché with armament consisting of every conceivable type of modern automatic weapon in addition to mortars, 47mm antitank weapons and 75mm and 135mm howitzers. The 75s and 135s were mounted on elevators which popped them out into the air from casemates, spit out five or six rounds, then just as suddenly disappeared.

At the time we were ignorant of these facts. What we didn't know certainly helped us. An open cross-section of the defenses that lay before us would have been both amazing and frightening. All we knew was that there was plenty of fire of every description coming from the queer-looking knobs in the hills—more than we had ever seen or heard before.

Early on the morning of 14 December, with the 44th Division on the left and 399th Infantry Regiment on the right flank, the 398th attacked the Maginot Line. Following a concentrated artillery barrage on the forts, 1st Battalion riflemen left the cover of their holes and started slowly up the open gradual incline, immediately meeting with a furious machine-gun, mortar and artillery barrage. With not the slightest ripple in the ground behind which to escape murderous shrapnel from bursting shells or automatic fire criss-crossing from the pillboxes, the doughboys hunched over and moved forward. The sickening whistle and ear-splitting crash of enemy artillery sent them to the ground and clutching the earth, more from force of habit than for the protection they knew wasn't there. Maintaining great presence of mind throughout, they inched their way forward cutting through masses of barbed wire to wipe out machine-gun nests protecting the approaches to the forts en route. Fighting their way to only feet away from massive Freudenberg itself, they fired into its apertures and breaches driving the Germans away from their weapons and down into the protection of the fort's depths.



The Maginot lay beyond

Freudenberg now stood silent but increased fire from units of Fort Schiesseck raked the area surrounding it in an effort to relieve the mounting pressure from the outside. Despite the fire the 1st Battalion doughs climbed all over the pillbox looking for an entrance. They tried desperately to blast open the casemate with charges of dynamite, but like a child pounding its little fists on a great locked door their efforts were of no avail. The fort was as strong as it was silent. Its massive feet-thick steel door and walls of solid concrete intermeshed with steel girders were barely scratched when explosive charges were set off around them. Although temporarily neutralized by the 1st Battalion men who poured a continuous fire into its narrow firing slits, the heavy fire directed by other units around the beleaguered pillbox compelled the men to relinquish their prize and withdraw.

The following day, with a fuller knowledge of the exact strength of the forts, tactics were drastically changed. The forts were to be worked over with a greater softening-up process. Masses of artillery from 8-inch and 240mm howitzers to 105mm howitzers were brought to bear on the enemy positions. Hour after hour the artillery battered away at the pillboxes but without damaging effect. The 240mm shells were seen to hit directly on and, obviously of a time-fuzed nature, would bounce off the casemates and detonate in the air or on the ground yards away. The exploding-on-contact shells hit the forts time and again only to leave a black splotch on the concrete after the slowly rising



Maginot defender

smoke had cleared away. For two days the massed supporting artillery fired round upon round into the forts. As fast as a giant artillery piece recoiled another round was loaded into the chamber and sent screaming into Freudenberg and Schiesseck. For two days the earth shook under the concussion of the tons of explosives.

Amid this the Air Corps came into play. Flights of Thunderbolts hovered and circled over the forts, picked their targets, then dove and dropped their 500-pound bombs. Through the incessant pounding the forts appeared none the worse. Grim and ominous, heavy fire still belched from their apertures. The three disappearing-type casemates of Schiesseck were repeatedly hit during the intense shelling but still they continued to bob up and down, spitting fire and steel.

On 17 December the stage was set again. The 398th Infantry Regiment following an intense artillery preparation and in the wake of a rolling barrage supplied by the 375th Field Artillery Battalion, again hit at Forts Freudenberg and Schiesseck. In the interim Colonel Daly, Regimental commander, was wounded in action and evacuated. Lt. Col. Robert M. Williams, now one of the youngest regimental commanders in the entire ETO and soon to be a full colonel, immediately assumed command and led the attack.



Barbed-wire obstacles

The 3d Battalion, with Companies I and L in the assault, started up to Freudenberg and Schiesseck. Again the terrible raking fire was met. Mortars and artillery bracketed the advancing doughs but this time craters, left from the bombs dropped by the Air Corps, gave some shelter. Company L was receiving direct fire from Fort No. 2 which was equipped with a 135mm howitzer in a disappearing turret. Despite this fire the company, together with the dynamite-laden 325th Engineers, continued a steady advance towards Freudenberg which had now resumed firing. At the same time Company I under intense 88mm fire from Bitche pushed on toward Fort No. 10.

We were playing all our cards in this tremendously important but carefully planned attack. It could not fail. Every available unit of the Regiment took part. Every man, regardless of his job, was on the line where he was needed. The medics worked heroically. In their blazoned red-crossed helmets they darted about the battlefield treating the wounded and evacuating them under fire. Wiremen and radiomen scampered through the inferno to set up and maintain vital communications which were continually being disrupted by shell fire. Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon men and engineers loaded down with ammuni-


tion and explosives struggled over the pockmarked terrain right up to the pillboxes. All did not reach their objectives. Some fell under the heavy automatic fire; others disappeared in a blinding explosion of artillery fire.

As the 3d Battalion men advanced cannon, antitank, mortar and heavy machine-gun fire pounded away at their initial objectives and artillery toned down the volume of fire from adjacent forts.

Freudenberg and Forts 10 and 11 were now reached. The enemy had been driven into the bowels of the earth and the heavy supporting fire was lifted and concentrated on other Schiesseck units as the riflemen went about blasting open entrances. The great steel door at Fort 11 flew open when a satchel charge was set off by a bazooka round after it had failed to explode. The doughs stormed through and down into the depths of the fort, setting up defensive positions guarding tunnel approaches from other units.



Battalion CO on the objective



Post-mortem

With the ending of day, darkness and heavy barbed-wire entanglements slowed down the attack and the order was given to defend and hold what had been taken. The Germans in an attempt to take back Fort 11 infiltrated through underground tunnels at night but were spotted. A fire fight broke out, probably the first of its kind, below the surface of the earth. Machine guns and rifles blinked and echoed through the hollow passages while above and outside outposts peered into the blackness, awaiting a counterattack and unmindful of what was going on below.

The next morning the nightmare and the attack continued on behind a rolling barrage of artillery. There were still more casemates to be taken. Both sides broke out in another fury of lead and steel pelting. Friend and foe determined to thwart the other's plans. The elevator-operated 75s and 135s popped up and down faster than the day before spitting increased volumes of fire and death. The battlefield broke out in a frenzy of movement. Litter bearers darted about. Assault teams crept and crawled to their next objectives. Antitank guns and cannon already firing at point-blank range at Schiesseck units, moved up farther and were joined by batteries of "Long Tom" 155mm artillery. Moved up during the night after firing long-range indirect fire support, the 155s with muzzles lowered pointed directly at the forts and blasted away. Although this terrific, point-blank close-up shelling had no material effect on the stubborn knobs, it drove some of the enemy down and away from their weapons, cutting down fire power. The 3d Battalion doughs now had time to reach the enemy blocks before the guns could be remanned and fired. Together with the engineers they went to work cutting away barbed-wire entanglements and neutralizing the forts one by one as the artillery kept adjacent emplacements buttoned up with constant shelling.

Some of the forts were entered; others could not be blasted open despite the amount of explosive charge applied and were sealed. Still others could be neither blasted nor sealed. These were surrounded and covered. With all the casemates entered, sealed or surrounded and covered, resistance from the Maginot



Citation

Line emplacements ceased. Defensive positions were set up, and wisely, for on 19 December Freudenberg was counterattacked. The attackers were discovered by an observer in the pillbox. Silently, word was passed around. Machine guns arched around and pointed in the direction of the Krauts. Then when the Germans were but a hundred yards away the guns opened up. In a short simultaneous burst many were killed. The rest frantically waved white strips of cloth, not flags, but unmistakably a pleading offer of surrender. Later the same day a greater and more determined attack developed from the northeast, but with many of the 3d Battalion men behind weapons in the pillboxes the attackers were easily dispersed leaving the hillside littered with dead.

For the next three days the 3d Battalion clung tenaciously to their hard-won positions despite the enemy's repeated attempts at dislodgment. The men outside and surrounding the forts that



At long last—Bitche

could not be entered bore the brunt of artillery and mortar fire but remained alert with grenades and explosives regardless, preventing the Germans inside from remanning the weapons. Counterattacks from the draws surrounding the high ground were beaten off and only added to the pile of grotesquely sprawled bodies which were gradually becoming mangled beyond description as shells exploded around the exposed area.¹

The 1st Battalion meanwhile pushed past Forts Schiesseck and Freudenberg to seize the remaining high ground flanking and overlooking Bitche, and the 2d Battalion moved into the gap between the Divisional flank and the 44th Division on the left, after a fierce fire fight. While digging in and buttoning in with the 3d Battalion, the enemy fired a blinding barrage of time-fuzed artillery shells inflicting numerous casualties, but this action con-

¹ For its outstanding performance in taking the Bitche fortifications the 3d Battalion was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. The text of the citation is given in the Appendix. The recommendation of the CO, 398th Infantry, for award of the Citation to the 3d Battalion, also in the Appendix, gives more details of the Bitche action.



Moving toward Camp de Bitche

cluded the long bloody battle for the gateway to Bitche. The cost of the entire operation was high, but the German casualties far surpassed ours and we did smash a fortress that could have caused a lot more distress, as we soon shall see. "Axis Sally," Nazi drummer for discontent and disunity among the Allied nations, lost her usually fine composure and soft voice and venomously spat out, "Bloody Butchers of Bitche!" after our part in the Fort Schiesseck and Fort Freudenberg operation. But now we commanded the high ground and that part of the Maginot Line protecting the city. The 397th and 399th Infantry Regiments stood poised before Bitche, and Camp de Bitche, ready to sweep into the comparatively defenseless city.

However great and significant our accomplishment, it was overshadowed by ominous rumblings and a startling turn of events to the north. The Americans along the entire line had been maintaining constant and heavy pressure on the enemy, pushing slowly on towards the Rhine and gradually thinning the depths of his defenses to a bursting point. The German High Command, taking stock of its dwindling food supplies and war materiel, realized the mounting pressure could not be contained throughout the winter. Taking advantage of extremely bad weather which prevented air reconnaissance, the Nazis secretly

*Montbronn*

gathered their remaining manpower, tanks and guns to form a potent mobile army. From within the farthest corners of the Reich every available gallon of gasoline, vehicle and weapon were placed at the disposal of this huge and powerful striking force. Plans called for a lightning stroke into and past our lines to the rear, capture of stores of equipment and gasoline which were absolutely imperative for further movement to continue on into France. It was a tremendous gamble, the success of which depended solely upon maintenance of supplies. Clothed in absolute secrecy the Germans went about building up for the all-out assault. The plot seethed and boiled and unexpectedly the explosion came.

Suddenly on 16 December 1944 the massed German armor and infantry power erupted and flowed through the American lines carrying everything before it into the Ardennes. Crack SS panzer units, the cream of the German Army, spearheaded the drive intended to reach Antwerp and the Nazi radio, elated over initial successes, boisterously proclaimed "Paris by Christmas!" The great juggernaut fumed and roared through Allied defenses and captured stores of fuel, equipment and supplies.

10: READJUSTMENT

Concern grew as the breakthrough assumed serious proportions but on the battlefield steps were already being taken to stem the Nazi flood. Every division that could possibly be spared to repulse the strained enemy effort was moved north. Seventh Army was obliged to spread out and hold lines vacated by units dashing to the north. The 100th Division, particularly the 398th Infantry, found itself sticking out like a sore thumb beyond the general contour of the fast-changing lines toward Bitche. It was in danger of being cut off. Without delay the attack on Bitche was cancelled. The Regiment and Division were called back from their precarious position into a defensive line. The 398th Infantry abandoned Forts Schiesseck and Freudenberg and surrounding high ground and withdrew to the line of departure prior to the assault on the forts. Before doing so Company B, 325th Engineer Battalion, blasted all entrances to the forts and tankdozers, in the daylight and under artillery fire, pushed tons of earth into the gaping holes. Schiesseck and Freudenberg would never again be used to defend Bitche.

Abreast of the 397th and the 399th Infantry Regiments now, the 398th extended farther to the left to plug the gap left by 71st Infantry Regiment, 44th Division, as it too spread out to the north. As yet no specific dimensions of the enemy counterattack were known. Where the Germans would strike again gave rise to anxious speculation. Our lines were thinly held and an attack in our sector was a logical conclusion.

The period of 22 December 1944 to 6 January 1945 was one of continued strategic readjustment of lines and positions in which the maximum strength of a minimum of men and weapons were employed to counteract effectively any ambitions of the enemy. Roughly the Regiment was holding the sector in the vicinity of Siersthal, Lambach and Hottviller after relieving 71st Infantry Regiment. Thereafter, we jockeyed and maneuvered



CO at the situation map—Montbronn

constantly. As the Battle of the Bulge progressed the extent of our lines contracted and expanded accordingly. Supporting arms of Corps artillery, tanks and chemical mortar units were now in the north leaving us with little help in the event of an enemy thrust. Men and weapons were deployed to create an outward appearance of strength over the thinly spread lines. The rear was reconnoitered and plans were formulated for a withdrawal to stronger positions, if need be. Roadblocks were set up; roads, trees and bridges were mined.

A marked pitch of tension was noticeable during this period also. Patrol activity was unlimited. Friend and foe did not dare be guided by speculation but rather continuously sent out patrols to determine specifically what the other was doing. The Germans were probably bewildered as to why we hadn't pressed the attack on Bitche after completing a breakthrough of the Maginot Line and securing dominating positions. We didn't intend letting them



398th doughs, Goetzenbruck

know of our circumstances, a result of the counterattack in the north, and severe clashes flared up along the line as our alert outposts and patrols intercepted the curious Krauts. Our patrols, operating more aggressively, were more successful. Primarily our position was one of defense but we definitely took the initiative. The doughboys stealthily probed deep into enemy lines to gather information and generally harass and create confusion among the enemy. The initiative paid dividends. Boldly, enemy mess areas and outpost towns were entered. Unsuspecting Krauts caught napping or during chow-time found themselves wide-eyed and looking into the muzzles of tommy guns and either went back to our lines as prisoners or remained where they fell.

On 31 December a raid patrol from Company G was organized and after being thoroughly briefed raided the town of Dollenbach. The patrol succeeded in slipping past enemy outposts and into the town. At a prearranged signal hand grenades were thrown into house windows and as the completely surprised Germans opened doors to investigate the commotion they fell under automatic-rifle fire. Windows and buildings were sprayed with small-arms fire and, just as silently as it entered, the patrol made good its withdrawal without a casualty, leaving many dead and wounded enemy. The same day the 1st Battalion conducted

a raid in their sector, equally surprising, and captured fifteen Germans.

However, it became increasingly apparent the enemy was building and preparing for an attack along the southern extremes of the Maginot Line. The drive into the Ardennes had been contained and the greatest effort the Germans made since Normandy had been pushed back to its starting point. Remnants of the huge army escaped and made their way south to reinforce the already numerically superior enemy forces around Bitche.

On 1 January strong enemy patrols preceded a powerful thrust from Bitche, hitting the 399th's sector on our right and driving down into Wingen exposing our flank. Our lines were further extended to seal the opening. Heavy artillery fell along the Regimental sector but no seriously threatening gesture was made in our direction. For the next few days the enemy continued to pound our positions with artillery and rockets. Our men got little



Battalion CO and patrol



Foxhole chatter during a lull

or no rest. From behind machine guns and rifles they peered out toward the enemy lines waiting for the sight or sound of Jerries. Theirs was a constant, nerve-wracking vigil—observing, waiting.

The 6th of January brought relief. The Regiment, with the exception of the 2d Battalion, moved into a secondary line of defense in the vicinity of Etting and Kalhausen, with the mission to occupy, organize and defend along a section of the Maginot Line. The 2d Battalion remained in position at Lamback attached to and holding a flank position of the 399th Infantry. On the second day, under 399th control, Company F of the 398th was ordered to attack a strongpoint a thousand yards away, preparatory to a Regimental counterattack. But the Germans, in their counterattack in this sector, strongly fortified and consolidated their newly won positions and held this line throughout the winter. Company F was driven back with heavy casualties from a position strengthened with approximately a regiment of Germans.

Mounting pressure around Rimling in the 397th Infantry sector cut short the 1st Battalion's tension-relieving period in the secondary positions and alerted it for hurried movement to the hard-pressed front. A day later the battalion moved up to Rohr-



Air view of Citadel de Bitche

bach, directly behind Rimling, to intercept a flanking head-on armored enemy drive. The terrain before Rohrbach was open, flat and under observation. Movement in the day over the open fields was a certain invitation to artillery fire and with nothing behind which to seek cover, any such operation, including patrols, would have been disastrous. At night the battalion silently moved up into position and early the next morning smashed into an enemy column supported by tanks which was in the process of circling and cutting off units of the 397th Infantry. The enemy had already reached a point from where he commanded the open terrain behind Rimling, preventing supplies and ammunition from being brought up. And if the 1st Battalion, 398th Infantry, had not moved up during the night the situation would have been serious.

Companies A and C immediately assaulted the approaching superior force but drew intense automatic and heavy-tank fire. The battle mounted in fury as neither side would give. The doughboys, fighting from behind rocks, trees and much in the style of Indian warfare, held the enemy infantry and tanks at bay. The severity of the engagement was emphasized by the fact that Company B, although in reserve, suffered heavily too. Twice the tanks, rumbling out from the woods, tried to break this new source of resistance and twice they were turned back, but not



Cannon Company shell casings, Bitche area

before they had scored heavily. Compelled to dig in under the treacherous artillery supported attack, the doughboys hacked away at the frozen ground amid the crack of 88s and rockets. They held, and acted as observers for their own supporting artillery, directing accurate fire on the tanks and sending them scampering away into the cover of the woods. Dealing only with infantry now, the task was less difficult in proportion. The German positions were assaulted and under the relentless drive the enemy was forced to withdraw. The mission had been accomplished. The 1st Battalion had stopped the push intended to cut off friendly units. The 397th Infantry was able to re-form its lines and recover sufficiently to push the Germans back farther. Helping their casualties to the rear, the 1st Battalion moved out of Rimling. They will always remember it as they saw it then, its streets and surrounding hills littered with German dead.

With its ranks shattered in the short but severe fight, the 1st Battalion proceeded to its next assignment in the vicinity of Guising. The 3d Battalion which had moved up to the Rimling sector behind the 1st Battalion and prepared for action joined the 1st, and the 2d Battalion now returned to its parent outfit.



Getting ready to move out

By 12 January the Regiment was intact and the battalions were holding positions abreast of each other in the vicinity of Guising and Rohrbach along the Maginot Line. With the 3d Battalion on the left of the Regiment, the 1st Battalion in the center, and the 2d Battalion protecting the right flank, the 398th Combat Team prepared to function again as a unit.

There was still no evidence of the German winter offensive slackening. Only the location of the attacks differed. The southern extremes of the Maginot Line were the sites of the enemy thrusts instead of the north. Although not as forceful as previous attempts, there was more than enough behind the enemy's efforts to warrant our remaining in a defensive position. The usual system and plans for defense were put in motion. Roads to the rear were blocked and mined and to the front rolls of concertina wire were spread as an added precaution. Heavy machine guns were set up to provide effective cross-fire and antitank guns guarded possible tank approaches.

With defenses established, information which might lead to an indication of the enemy's plans, was sought. Patrolling became the keynote of the operations. Exact enemy strongpoints and locations had to be known and charted. His disposition, number



Camp de Bitche shambles

and type of weapons, supplies, and even an inkling as to his morale governed our planning. Artillery and mortar flurries fell along the Regimental front, but the aggressiveness of the enemy foot troops was showing unmistakable signs of wear. Our bull-baiting combat and reconnaissance patrols reported little activity, suggesting imminent attacks were not likely. Gradually the enemy was changing his tactics and resorting to defense until it was finally evident it was he who awaited attack.

The Germans had spent their remaining resources and accomplished little in their winter offensive other than prolonging the war and embittering the home front by leaving them little food of their own. This was borne out by statements from prisoners of war who were swelling our cages. They claimed the fuel shortage was so acute that during the offensive in early January tanks were given gasoline and the crews told to continue forward until fuel was exhausted, indicating the desperation with which the German commanders were committing their weapons and resources in a last-minute hope of a resultant miraculous development. Our reconnaissance patrols and air force substantiated these claims with reports of hearing and seeing large numbers of horse-drawn

wagons used by the enemy to carry supplies and ammunition up to the front.

There was little doubt now that the Germans were definitely on the defensive. Although their big offensive did not result in territorial gains, they did succeed in radically upsetting plans and strategy devised to slowly strangle them—slowly, because prior to their drive they had supplies and equipment to last indefinitely. Now they were very much weakened. Plans for the inevitable defeat of Germany were altered to coincide with her present physical condition. It would be impossible for her to stand up to a sudden powerful blow which the Allies were preparing to administer. A period of reconversion followed. Armies, corps and divisions had to be reorganized and regrouped. Divisions and units lifted from one sector to be placed in another to contain the drive into the Ardennes had to be re-formed and returned to their original zones of operation. Now that lines assumed a more defined and stable state, food, supplies and ammunition were brought up to depots close to the front and prepared to follow closely the thrust that would not stop until Germany had been overrun. The drive was to be taken up where it was interrupted prior to the enemy counterattack but it was to be considerably strengthened this time. Added to the fact that the enemy was considerably weaker, the Allies loomed up before the Germans as a brute force.

On 20 January the 398th Infantry Regiment relinquished its positions in the vicinity of Guising and Rohrbach to the former occupants, the 71st Infantry Regiment, and moved to a new line at Sarriensberg, Goetzenbruck and Lemberg. Regimental headquarters was set up in Montbronn. This sector in Alsace-Lorraine was familiar to those who passed through en route to Bitche and Forts Freudenberg and Schiesseck. At the time we did not know we were to hold this line for almost two months as the Allied armies marshalled their strength for the decisive and unrelenting drive that was to crush the Germans.

The towns of Lemberg and Goetzenbruck were atop hills looking down into a wooded draw and the enemy. On the reverse



Barracks area

slope of the hill the battalions dug in for a prolonged defense of this sector, and as time went by, the men improved what they came to regard as their winter "homes." They made them deeper and dug to give protection against any kind of fire. The tops of the holes were covered with layers of thick logs for protection against the incessant mortar fire. Only the small hole for the soldier on guard was left open.

As soon as it assumed control of this new sector the Regiment went about preparing for its defense as no sign of a push into enemy territory was in the offing. As was the case in previous defensive positions, the Regiment's lines were extended beyond the limit of its available riflemen strength, necessitating antitank platoons being sent to man rifle positions. To offset the critical shortage of men holding the extended lines, every day newer and more elaborate forms of precaution were taken to insure total and absolute coverage of the thinly spread lines. The ammunition and pioneer platoons laid countless rolls of barbed wire across the Regimental front, planted mines and set up trip flares at night. The towns themselves were organized into zones of defense with strongpoints prepared. Sandbag emplacements concealing antitank guns were built up at street intersections. Machine guns looked out of houses down into the draw. Roadblocks and anti-tank barriers were constructed and automatic weapons were advantageously set up covering all possible approaches to the towns.

With Lemberg and Goetzenbruck established as a strongpoint the Germans made no attempt at regaining the territory but instead rained artillery and showers of mortar shells down on the towns. They had good observation on the small villages from positions in higher and adjoining hills to the north and northeast and enemy observers, at the slightest movement in the streets, directed showers of mortar fire. In a short time they were well zeroed in on almost any point at all, which was proven in the accuracy and quickness of falling shells. When moving through the town's streets the GIs learned the many and different spots which necessitated running or crawling.

In the early part of February raider groups were organized within the Regiment with the mission of infiltrating past enemy outposts and into rear areas to destroy installations, shoot up chow lines and areas the Germans thought safe from actual physical enemy contact. Each battalion formed a platoon of its most aggressive men, each with nerves of steel and fully experienced in combat. These men did yeoman work hitting the enemy time and again when he least expected it and at places he never thought likely. Because of the hazardous duty the men were given special privileges but rarely had time to take advantage of them. The majority of the raids were carried on during the night, but in the daytime raiders went into enemy territory to become better acquainted with the terrain and enemy positions at night. Each night the raiders, armed with tommy guns and other automatic weapons affording a maximum of fire-power, slipped past our forward outpost positions Indian style and made their way through treacherous minefields to look for and kill the enemy in close-up combat. Gradually the Germans showed signs of uneasiness and became wary of the destructive patrols. They planted more mines before their lines and set up more defensive weapons to combat our night marauders. But the more positions they created, the more targets and objectives they afforded the raiders opportunity to eliminate. The operations of these men weakened the enemy over an extended period of time equal to that of a



Good Krauts, vicinity of Bitche

large-scale attack besides filling him with a constant dreaded expectancy. From the prisoners taken much valuable information was gained which formed the basis of future raids.

During this time our artillery poured volumes of fire into the enemy lines. Just before or after the raiders went out on their nightly calls of destruction, the sky over enemy territory flashed and lit up brightly as the shells found their targets and exploded. How anyone managed to exist under the terrific pounding was hard to imagine. Some that did could not bear the thought of going through any more, and voluntarily made their way over to our lines and surrendered. Through a powerful amplifying system, brought up to the front lines, other Germans were enticed and directed to give up the fight. Pamphlets were shot into and behind enemy positions relating to the soldiers the progress of the war and the futility of further fighting. Some Germans did make their way to our lines but the majority summed up their decisions and answered our request with mortar fire.

The pitch-black nights at Lemberg and Goetzenbruck gave birth to another idea. Our partols found normal darkness an ally but intense darkness proved to be a hindrance. Artificial moon-



After the battle

light was created through the use of batteries of antiaircraft searchlights whose subdued beams, playing off overcast skies, cast an eerie light over the enemy held territory to the front. Guided by this light, the raiders could more easily pick their way through *Schu*-mine fields and other numerous obstacles the nervous enemy established to combat infiltration. The revealing light clearly defined enemy positions and, added to the aggressive tactics of combat patrolling, gave the Germans little rest.

February passed by quickly. March saw Lemberg and Goetzenbruck battered beyond recognition. The two villages had been the target of enemy artillery and mortar fire for over a month, leaving as much of a single house littered in the streets as there was still attached to its foundation. There was a noticeable decline in the snow and cold. The foxholes were not as stable under the warmer conditions and as the ground thawed the walls began to crumble. Water ran and settled in the holes and soon the men were splashing around in deep mud. The care of weapons became a problem and caused more concern than the miseries of life in a foxhole. The raider patrols continued to probe enemy territory



Searching for Jerries, vicinity of Bitche

wiping out strongpoints and creating confusion behind his lines but operations grew increasingly difficult as the Germans extended minefields and heavily guarded the much used and known approaches to his lines.

The fact that the Regiment endured the hardships of the front throughout the winter months and since its entry into combat began to reveal itself in the haggard faces of the men. The strain

of holding a line in excess of its manpower added to the belief that a rest was needed. With the advent of the Allied drive in the north, which was rapidly progressing towards the Rhine, the 398th Infantry was considered for a well earned breathing spell. On 13 March a regiment of the 71st Division began relieving elements of our Regiment in position at Goetzenbruck. The 2d Battalion was the first to be relieved and started for the rear and Saare-Union and ten days of an existence out of foxholes, beyond range and sound of mortars and other deadly fire.

But on this day the greatest drive in history was developing out of the north and gaining momentum. The Americans had driven to the Rhine and crossed a bridge at Remagen before the enemy could destroy it. This break was the signal for the entire Western Front to push and push hard. Armored columns raced to objectives on the Rhine, cutting the enemy's defenses to ribbons. Orders for the Seventh Army to attack immediately were received.

The 1st and 3d Battalions were relieved of their position but were not on their way to a rest. The 2d Battalion, on the road to Saare-Union by motor convoy, was intercepted and sped back to rejoin the Regiment and the attack. Orders came in fast. The 398th Infantry was to attack and seize Bitche, keep moving and destroy the enemy.




11: CAPTURE OF BITCHE

The excitement and rapid succession of events after a period of waiting and watching, brought renewed vigor and life to the men. The disappointment arising from the cancellation of the rest period was lost and forgotten amid the hurried preparations to meet with the changes in plans. The preponderance of the operations and news of outstanding successes from other sectors of the front filled the optimists with a wild speculation of the war ending with this drive. Even the less imaginative and more calculating minds were inclined to share the optimistic viewpoint.

Five months of constant and severe fighting in the mountains and bitter cold of winter had shown a marked change in the troops. The battle for the Vosges Mountains and the Maginot Line hardened the men to combat. They were wiser, more experienced and discerning than they had been when first going into action at Raon-l'Etape. The questions they had asked themselves and others as to what it was like, they answered for themselves. They knew the whine and crash of shells and what it was to be pinned down and sweating it out. They made a thorough study of the enemy and became familiar with his characteristics and habits. They knew his weakness and forte. This understanding instilled confidence. Toughened, experienced and confident, the 398th Regiment pushed off for the Rhine River and the mountainous strongholds of Southern Germany.

Supported by the 375th Field Artillery Battalion, Company B of the 325th Engineer Battalion, Company B of the 781st Tank Battalion, Companies A and B of the 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, and Company B of the 325th Medical Battalion, the 398th Infantry moved out of its defensive positions at Lemberg and Goetzenbruck in preparation for the attack on Bitche. Under cover of darkness, the combat team marched north to a position placing it on an east-west line with its objective. Regimental CP was set up at Fromuhl, a small town not far behind the rifle-company position. Jerry immediately started pounding the town with heavy artillery fire.



The Battle for Bitch

Plans for the impending attack differed from the first assault on Bitch. In the first attempt, the 398th struck from the southwest out of Reyersviller. From the present position, the objective lay to the east and somewhat south. An attack from the west and northwest was devised to cut the city off and effect an entrance from the rear and the flank.

The morning of 15 March broke clear. Visibility was exceptionally good. With the 3d Battalion in reserve, the 1st and 2d Battalions jumped off towards Bitch. Although there was no artillery support the terrain to the front was mapped out and numbered. In the event artillery was needed all that had to be done was the calling back of a number from the front and the sector that number represented would immediately be plastered. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, led by Companies A and B, attacked the high ground southwest of Schorbach. The 2d Battalion drove on the Maginot forts northwest of Bitch and



Presentation

quickly captured Freudenberg Farms. Small-arms and automatic fire was light but antipersonnel, antitank and *Schu* mines were numerous and cleverly laid out in patterns covering every approach to the mighty bastion of the Maginot Line. Artillery fire was heavy. Enemy observers in Bitche and surrounding heights saw the determined lines of infantrymen moving slowly but deliberately forward and directed salvos of their prized 88s into the direction of the attack. Despite this fire, our riflemen continued forward. The engineers worked feverishly under the artillery fire, probing for mines and tenderly lifting them out of the ground.

Systematically the attack progressed. The 2d Battalion drew intense mortar fire but Company G swarmed over the battered remains of Forts Freudenberg and Schiesseck to clean out the crust of resistance in comparison with that of what was encountered in the first attack. German efforts to rebuild the forts were evident but the demolition charges set off by the engineers, prior



Routing them out of the Maginot

to the withdrawal in December, discouraged any possibility. Instead, the Germans dug positions in and around the ruins but these hastily prepared defenses weren't anywhere near as effective as the original positions. The enemy was quickly spotted by the alert infantrymen. Mortar and automatic fire supplied by the heavy-weapons platoons supporting the rifle companies, was brought to bear on his positions, eliminating them. The perfect coordination between riflemen and supporting heavy weapons completely smashed the enemy by nightfall. With the high ground surrounding Bitche taken, the troops dug in and awaited morning and the order that would send them storming down from the hills into Bitche. During the night the Germans moved out.

Early on the morning of March 15 the 2d Battalion attacked. Fort Ramstein was quickly seized and E Company led the triumphant entry into Bitche and continued on to take Fort Aviation. Only sporadic sniper fire greeted the advance elements.




First Americans in Bitche

A hurried and thorough search of the houses and buildings uncovered groups of Kraut soldiers who had changed from army uniforms to civilian clothes. While the 2d Battalion was cleaning out Bitche of snipers and hidden enemy, the 3d Battalion meanwhile pushed through and captured Camp de Bitche, site of an old French training area, after a bitter fire fight. The 1st Battalion met considerable resistance in taking Forts Petite Otterbiel and Grand Otterbiel, the two remaining strongpoints atop the ground north of Bitche. After a pulverizing aerial bombardment the infantry swept in to complete the seizure of Bitche and surrounding forts.

12: CROSSING THE RHINE

For two days the Regiment remained in the vicinity with the missions of cleaning out snipers, rounding up prisoners, neutralizing forts and protecting the Corps' east flank, left open by the rapid push north. During this time troops were impressed with the seriousness of association in any manner or form with the conquered enemy, forecasting an early movement into Germany. This was our first contact with the much discussed policy of fraternization. With Bitche cleared, the 398th Combat Team assembled north and west of the city in the towns of Schorbach, Hottviller, Nouswiller and Langelsheim. These towns, long used by the Germans as a training area for their artillery were completely smashed. No one had lived in them since the German occupation of France and gradually they became known as the "Ghost Towns." Here intensive training was carried on in preparation for the next mission, that of breaching the Siegfried Line, which lay directly to the west and just before the Rhine River. The 3d Infantry Division, at the time, was already engaged with the Germans in that sector. Upon completion of their breakthrough, the 398th was to become a mobile task force and dash



This was a machine



Dragon's teeth on the Siegfried


through the opening. The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of Headquarters Company had already made several patrols to the 3d Division front, mapping out roads and routes and taking note of obstacles which otherwise might delay movement. However, these plans did not materialize. To the north, Third Army armored columns had knifed through to the Rhine then swept south to come in from the rear of the Siegfried Line. The enemy, fearful of being trapped, fled from their defenses. On March 22 the 398th, motorized, sped west through the crumbled German defenses and over into the border. Into the German border cities of Reichweiler, Dellfeld, Stambach, and Contwig, the convoy rolled without meeting any resistance. White flags hung from a window of every house and every building. In less than two days the Regiment had covered more than one hundred miles. Through the Hardt Mountains to the banks of the Rhine the roadsides were cluttered with battered and smashed German mobile equipment caught as it withdrew by our airplanes. For miles German Labor Supervision Battalions of Russians, Poles and other conquered nationals who had been digging emplacements and fortifications in the mountains, were



Pillbox and former occupant

making their way back to the rear. The smashing through of the American armed might never gave the enemy a chance to man the positions. Thousands of dead horses littered the roads. The piles of mutilated carcasses necessitated the bringing up of bulldozers to sweep them from the path of the swiftly moving columns. The Division had moved so fast that when it finally did reach the Rhine River it was compelled to halt and wait until other units could come up to protect the flanks. Until 30 March the 100th Division remained on the west bank of the river with the mission of guarding vital enemy installations, suppressing sabotage, and cleaning out snipers in near-by towns. Hundreds of prisoners were taken in the four-day mop-up. German resistance was completely shattered. We waited for the construction of the ponton bridge that would send us across the Rhine River and into Southern Germany.

On 31 March the bridge was completed. At 1700 that day the 398th, still motorized, sped across at Ludwigshafen over into



Over the Rhine

Mannheim. It was ordered to overtake elements of the 63d Division and relieve them on position. This was not easy. The 63d was also motorized and pushing fast against relatively minor opposition, but movement over the *Autobahnen* (highways) soon lessened the distance between us and the 63d. The famed old university city of Heidelberg was passed through and by 3 April we were only twenty-four hours' riding from the unit we were to relieve.



13: HEILBRONN AND THE NECKAR

On down through Southern Germany our convoy of tanks, trucks, tank destroyers, jeeps and weapons-carriers roared. Infantrymen rode on anything that would carry them. They clung to the tops of tanks and piled on jeeps until no part of the vehicle could be seen and finally after a hectic drive overtook elements of the 63d Division on the banks of the Neckar River in the vicinity of Bad Wimpfen. Still there was no sign of opposition, let alone organized opposition. All over Germany Allied armies were riding roughshod over a land which the Nazis said would never be invaded. Central Germany was cut to pieces but the enemy was not yet beaten to the point of surrender. When the meeting between the Russians and the Americans seemed inevitable, the Nazis hurriedly pulled the remainder of their equipment and weapons out of that sector and reports had it they were moving into the mountainous confines of Southern Germany. If they could hold the American armies in the south for any period of time which would give them ample opportunity to set up their weapons in the mountains, it was possible that they could hold out indefinitely and extend the war into a long, tiresome and costly type of fighting. The Neckar River was the site chosen to hold off the surging tide of Americans until positions could be prepared in the mountains.


In the vicinity of Heilbronn, along the easy-moving Neckar, was to be fought the bitterest battle in all Germany. In the 398th Heilbronn will go down alongside Salerno, Anzio and Normandy. It was definitely the decisive battle that resulted in the collapse of whatever hopes the Germans held for the continuity of their abominable principles. They gathered their weapons, munitions and quietly lay in wait in prepared positions on the east bank of the Neckar River. For the fanatic SS troops and equally fanatic *Hitler-Jugend* who manned the positions and who were determined to hold at the cost of their lives, this was



Ruins of Heilbronn

a glorious gesture of fidelity when everything else seemed lost.

On 3 April the last battalion of the 398th to roll into Bad Wimpfen was the 3d. Before the men had a chance to dismount from the trucks a hurried call came in from the 10th Armored Division, which was also checked in its drive into Germany by the bridgeless Neckar, for infantry to establish a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the river. Since the start of the drive into Germany only roadblocks, a few snipers and mines momentarily held movement up and from all indications the Neckar River was another undefended obstacle. Aerial reports and ground patrols moving ahead of the main columns reported no enemy in sight. Nevertheless, precautionary measures were taken in the crossing of this new obstacle. The 3d Battalion proceeded to a crossing site in the vicinity of Heilbronn, key communications and rail city leading into Southern Germany.



14: BRIDGEHEAD ACROSS THE NECKAR

With only a short time to formulate plans, Company K with one heavy machine-gun platoon from Company M was ordered to cross in the first assault wave. They were to swing to the right after crossing and secure the factory buildings on the outskirts of Heilbronn. Company L with one heavy machine-gun platoon from Company M attached was to cross in the second wave, swing to the left and secure the lumberyard and buildings near Neckarsulm. Company I was to cross in the third wave, and as soon as Companies K and L had secured their initial objectives, was to pass through the two companies and take the final objective which was Castle Hill and the high ground overlooking the valley.

At 0300, 4 April 1945 Company K started the crossing. After getting across with practically no opposition the company quickly reorganized and continued the attack. One rifle platoon had been left in the factory buildings to secure the right flank of the battalion. The company commander was then ordered to send a strong combat patrol to Castle Hill to determine if it was occupied. One rifle platoon with a mortar observer and an SCR-300 radio was sent to accomplish this mission. At 0710 the platoon leader reported via radio that this platoon was on top of the hills and was given the order to hold the hill and control the observation. Company L sustained some casualties while crossing the river. However, they quickly reorganized and pushed aggressively forward until they had cleared the area around the canals and had searched the buildings in the lumberyard. Company I, after crossing, reorganized in the vicinity of the power plant and made preparations to move through Company K.

Things were comparatively quiet; then at 0900 with the bulk of the 3d Battalion across the river Jerry showed his hand by shelling the crossing site with a terrific barrage of artillery and mortar fire. Barrage after barrage landed with almost pinpoint



Neckar crossing


precision on the position used for crossing, making the use of assault boats impossible and isolating the battalion on the east bank of the river. Simultaneously hundreds of enemy troops launched a fierce attack on Companies K and L. The enemy plan was now clear. He had quietly lain in wait until the 3d Battalion had crossed the river and was now in the process of cutting it off and wiping it out. It was later determined that the Germans used one full regiment in this attack designed to cut the battalion off and wipe out the bridgehead. Wave after wave of fanatic SS troops and *Hitler-Jugend* hit the 3d Battalion positions. In spite of the fact that our troops fought doggedly and made the maximum use of every available weapon, the superiority of the enemy gradually forced the men back to the river's edge. The platoon from Company K holding Castle Hill was immediately cut off from the rest of the battalion. The Germans, thinking the hill unoccupied, sent several small artillery observation parties up to established observation posts, but the platoon captured several officers and twelve men before their presence was de-



Infantry sailors on the Neckar

tected. At 1200 the platoon was attacked in force but, despite the fact they were vastly outnumbered, beat off attack after attack, inflicting many casualties on the enemy. Several hours later the platoon leader radioed that his position was entirely surrounded and that his ammunition supply was nearly exhausted. Immediately after this message was completed the radio was smashed and the entire platoon was either killed or captured. It was later revealed through interrogation of PWs that it took a force of ninety men armed with automatic weapons to overcome the heroic group holding Castle Hill. In this same time two platoons of Company L were entirely isolated from the rest of the battalion, also.

In the meantime, the remainder of the battalion reorganized its forces, established a defensive line running parallel to the river in a small ravine, and here repulsed the rest of the savage enemy attacks. The Germans finally withdrew a short distance and dug in. But the 3d Battalion had no intention of giving the enemy any respite, and shortly after lashed out in a determined counterattack with the reserve company and the remnants of the other two companies and drove the enemy back. Approximately



Tourists beware!

three hundred Germans had taken positions in the factory buildings on the right and the battalion suddenly found itself subjected to a withering cross-fire from automatic weapons. The success of the mission depended on the holding of this ground so the battalion prepared a line of defense.

Shortly after the platoon on Castle Hill was captured the Germans established observation posts on the top, from which they were able to direct accurate artillery and mortar fire on the new defense line, the river crossing and all other installations. This fire continued without let-up for six days.

On 5 April the enemy attacked ferociously in force, first on the left of the defensive position then on the right. But due to the volume of fire laid down by every available man in the battalion the attacks failed. For five nights the Germans poured from positions never thought likely, trying desperately to regain the east bank, but each and every attack was thrown back.

On the night of 6 April a three-mile-long column of enemy troops and vehicles was seen moving into Neckarsulm. Air and artillery barrages were laid on this force but failed to keep it

from entering the town. The next morning all our 3d battalion positions were subjected to an unmerciful barrage of artillery, mortar and rocket fire and immediately following it came the inevitable attack. Advancing with fanatical zeal and disregarding the terrific toll our automatic weapons were taking, the attackers managed to make a slight penetration. Committing its reserve the 3d battalion stopped the attack and also bagged thirty PWs. Because of the increased enemy action, it was impossible to construct a bridge across the river but the battalion accomplished its mission of holding the ground on the east bank. For eight days and nights it held under constant and intense artillery. For eight days it drove back savage attacks of a numerically superior enemy. All supplies and rations had to be ferried across the river at night and hand-carried to the forward positions. The battalion A&P Platoon organized these parties and aided immeasurably in the defense of the ground by going well out to the front of the lines to plant antitank mines and set up trip flares. The medical Section of the Battalion worked untiringly and heroically, treating and evacuating the wounded amid the intensity of the enemy fire. With complete disregard for personal safety they darted about the fire-swept terrain to bring aid to the wounded and moved casualties from exposed positions preventing further injury.

The intrepid actions of the officers and men of the 3d Battalion enabled our Division to push other regiments across the river and intensify the attack on the enemy. Had the mission failed, a much more costly river crossing would have been necessary and the offensive in this sector would have been delayed indefinitely. On 12 April while another unit attacked Heilbronn, the 3d Battalion jumped off in the attack to the south and captured Neckarsulm and advanced unchecked until placed in reserve.²


² For its outstanding performance in establishing the Neckar bridgehead, the 3d Battalion was awarded its second Distinguished Unit Citation. The text of the citation is given in the Appendix. A more detailed account of the crossing is given in the Regimental commander's recommendation for this citation, also included in the Appendix.

15: CROSSING THE JAGST

While the 3d Battalion was holding a precarious position on the east bank of the Neckar River in the vicinity of Heilbronn, the 1st and 2d Battalion were roaring out of Bad Wimpfen with the mission of crossing farther upstream, then coming down to hit the defenders of Heilbronn from the flank and rear to relieve the pressure on the beleaguered battalion. But it was not only at Heilbronn the Germans fortified and protected. Their line of defense extended north to Odheim and Jagstfeld. The enemy realized the importance of the defense of his flank positions and fought with equal determination to prevent them from being rolled up.


On the morning of 4 April the 2d Battalion together with attached units of tanks, tank destroyers, engineers and medics crossed the Neckar River with the twofold mission of relieving friendly troops at Heilbronn and of smashing the enemy's flank.

Company F crossed in the vicinity of Offenau, after a combat patrol reported no enemy on the opposite bank, after a thorough investigation. A perimeter of defense was hastily set up as the engineers constructed a bridge to expedite the urgent mission. Movement continued on to Duttenberg uninterrupted, overlooking the approaches to Heilbronn and the Jagst River, the next natural obstacle. Behind the Jagst River lay flat open terrain guarded by commanding hill positions to the left and wooded areas to the right. This open expanse sharply rose to and beyond the Kocher River into hills studded with batteries of artillery and rocket platforms. These were the weapons drawn in long convoys from Central Germany after the Allies had split the country to protect the last vestiges of Naziism in southern Germany. Beyond the Jagst River in this sector approximately two battalions of fanatic SS troops and equally infamous *Hitler-Jugend* were solidly entrenched behind a cunningly devised series of machine-gun and other automatic-weapon emplacements.



Vicinity of Jagstfeld


Reaching the Jagst River, assault groups from each company started across, while the remainder of the battalion watched and waited behind their weapons in concealed positions. Halfway across, the enemy revealed himself and his intentions with an ear-splitting roar of automatic-weapons fire. Simultaneously, mortar shells dropped along the opposite bank and in the water with deadly accuracy. The raking fire made a landing impossible and forced the boats to return to their starting point. Company H watching intently the progress of the crossing behind their heavier weapons immediately opened up on spotted enemy positions to cover the withdrawal of the assault boats. Under this continued fire the riflemen again pushed off and gained the opposite bank. With not the slightest ripple in the open terrain behind which to seek cover the men fought and wormed their way forward to a railroad embankment 150 yards ahead. Here the battalion regrouped. Casualties were heavy, compelling the Ammunition and Pioneer and Antitank Platoons to be brought to fill the gaps left by the fallen riflemen. Despite initial reverses and while under heavy mortar fire, the 2d Battalion pushed off in the attack on Heilbronn. Behind a rolling barrage of support-



Abandoned

ing artillery Company E drove towards Heuchlingen, Company F moved out towards the city of Jagstfeld and Company G drove directly to the front and center towards Waldau on the Kocher River. All three companies met fanatical resistance. The enemy, further incensed by the steady progress of the infantrymen despite the intense fire, increased his artillery and automatic fire to temporarily halt the advance.

Slowly but steadily the 2d Battalion men advanced to a distance of feet from enemy positions. Singling out objectives they rose from the ground hurling grenades and firing into the stubborn enemy. This type of vicious close-up fighting was indicative of the day's operations. Under no conditions would the enemy withdraw or surrender. By late afternoon Company E seized Heuchlingen after one platoon had been completely cut off and gallantly fought its way back to the main body. Company G in an attempt to thrust through the center of the German defenses became pinned down in an unmerciful cross-fire for six hours. Friendly tanks attempted to relieve the pinned-down troops but direct 88mm fire from the heights above the Kocher River knocked one out and the continued intensity of the fire drove the remaining few away. During the night, with its fighting strength whittled down to less than half, the company effected a withdrawal. Meanwhile Company F succeeded in smashing to the



Valley guardian on the Siegfried

outskirts of Jagstfeld and after a severe close-up fire fight took several of the outlying houses. During the night the Germans attacked all positions of the battalion time and again but were repulsed with heavy losses.

The next morning the 2d Battalion regrouped its battered forces to storm the city of Jagstfeld into which the SS and *Hitler-Jugend* gathered for a final stand. For the next five days the battalion fought against a fiercely resisting enemy who turned every street corner and house into an independent fortress. The infantry and tanks moved upon one position at a time blasting roadblocks and barbed-wire entanglements. Bazookas, rifle grenades and point-blank tank fire tore gaping holes in buildings through which groups of riflemen poured to come into hand-to-hand combat with SS. Exhausting their ammunition, the 2d Battalion men courageously continued the fight, swinging rifle butts to subdue the enemy. But winning a position did not mean the end of a fight. Hundreds fled into the hills and every night returned in force in an effort to regain their positions within the city but each time they were turned leaving the streets littered with their dead.

By 10 April the city of Jagstfeld was entirely cleared of the enemy, but the surrounding hills in which were concealed bat-


teries of 88s and rocket platforms continued to shell the battalion's positions without letup. On 11 April the men, dog-tired but anxious to finish clearing their sector of the enemy, pushed toward the Kocher River. Again they met with automatic fire coming from defenses before the river but the defenders, now conscious of the fighting superiority of the attackers, turned and fled before the thin line of steadily approaching 2d Battalion doughs. Supporting artillery turned heavy fire on the enemy emplacements in the hills and behind that the infantrymen crossed the Kocher River and stormed up the sides of the hills, capturing or killing entire gun crews.

Let the officers and men of the 2d Battalion describe the fighting at the Neckar, the Jagst, Waldau, and the Kocher.

FIRST PHASE: NECKAR RIVER CROSSING

On the morning of 5 April 1945 the 2d Battalion of the 398th Infantry moved into Hoenstadt, Germany, by motor and relieved elements of the 63d Division with the understanding that a bridgehead across the Neckar River was to be established as soon as practicable, so as to effect a drive to the high ground to the east of Heilbronn. Having been told previously by the Regimental commander that it might be possible to make the crossing over a bridge that the 3d Battalion was attempting to construct near Heilbronn, the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Harvey Weisel, with his S-3, Capt. Elba Bowen, and his four company commanders, went to the vicinity of Heilbronn on a reconnaissance. Upon arriving there it was found that much opposition was being met at the crossing site and it seemed advisable to attempt a crossing at another place. That afternoon Captain Bowen and Lieutenant Pollitt, Heavy-Weapons Company commander, made a reconnaissance of the river in the vicinity of Offenau and found a likely site for a footbridge. This was reported to the battalion commander and he then ordered Company F to outpost the area and to send a patrol that night into Offenau to determine whether or not it was occupied by the enemy.

Upon receiving these orders Lieutenant Adams directed his 2d Platoon, led by Lieutenant Stalikas, to occupy a house overlooking the river and the town of Offenau, and from there to send a patrol into Offenau. By 2130 Lieutenant Stalikas had the proposed crossing site outposted and a reconnaissance patrol organized. The patrol was lucky in finding a small boat near the water's edge and with makeshift



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paddles and grim determination finally reached the opposite shore. Even though the crossing was difficult the patrol laid wire which they hoped would prove useful the following day. Upon reaching the muddy bank of the river Sergeant Curbo, who was in charge of the patrol, ordered the small boat to be hidden in the brush and led his small group of men into the dark streets of Offenau. Finding no activity of any kind in the town, members of the patrol roused some civilians hoping to gain some information regarding the enemy. All the knowledge that they could get from the natives was that during the previous night a ten-man SS patrol had gone all through their town and reconnoitered the river bank. After searching several houses and feeling confident that the town was not occupied Sergeant Curbo and his patrol returned to their well concealed boat and made a return trip, reporting to their platoon CP at 2400 hours.

With the report from Captain Bowen that a footbridge could readily be constructed across the river near Offenau and also the information brought by Sergeant Curbo that the town seemed to be free of enemy, the battalion commander ordered that one platoon of Company F cross the Neckar at this point in the morning in engineer assault boats and secure the far shore and the town so that the engineers could construct a footbridge to be used by the remainder of the battalion later in the day.

The following morning at 1010 hours Lt. John Visser, Executive Officer of Company H, was fired upon near the proposed crossing site as he was making a reconnaissance for a covered route to the river's edge. The fire was from a machine gun that was at some great distance and not well aimed, but it served as a warning to Lieutenant Stalikas of Company F who was just then bringing his platoon down the embankment to make the initial crossing. Moving quickly and with great skill this platoon of thirty men soon had three assault boats in the water and were headed for the far bank. As they were about halfway across the river, which at this point was some 120 yards wide, enemy long-range harassing fire fell, but was unsuccessful in hitting any of the boats.

As soon as the boats reached the shore each squad ran quickly to previously selected positions from which they were to start the search of the town. One squad remained near the edge of town to protect the flanks and the other two squads moved from house to house up the two main streets on the east side of town. When that section of the town had been searched Lieutenant Stalikas, using the wire laid the night before, called Lieutenant Adams informing him all seemed clear. Lieutenant Adams immediately sent another platoon across in boats and together the two platoons searched the town, finding only two German

soldiers who had been left behind. A defense for the protection of the battalion's crossing was established and the men of the 2d Platoon of Company B, 325th Engineers, under Lieutenant Pinnell began construction of a footbridge.

By 1500 hours the bridge was completed and the remainder of Company F crossed the river followed by Company E plus a platoon of heavy machine guns from Company H. Company F consolidated and prepared to spend the night outposting Offenau. Captain Garahan, Company E commander, was ordered to send one platoon northeast to Obergriesheim to make contact with the 63d Division and to take the remainder of the company to Duttenburg where they would meet the tanks attached to them. Both groups proceeded to their objective without mishap and found that the Germans had recently pulled out of the vicinity. In the open ground just outside both towns were found small pillboxes which had recently been occupied and hastily abandoned. The platoon in Obergriesheim set up a defense of the town and awaited further orders while the remainder of the company outposted the town of Duttenburg with the idea of protecting the area where the battalion was to cross the Jagst River which flowed swiftly toward the Neckar far below the heights on which Duttenburg was perched. A platoon of heavy machine guns from Company H was in support of Company E and went into positions where the whole valley below them could effectively be covered by fire.

In the meantime Company G, under Captain Einsman, was accompanying the tanks attached to the battalion which crossed the river some miles upstream. After crossing the river and arriving at the woods northeast of Offenau, Company G dismounted from the tanks and searched the woods where they found pillboxes that apparently had been left in haste. American Red Cross boxes were strewn around the emplacements and a small amount of ammunition was found. Before leaving the woods a patrol was sent out to contact the 63d Division and tell them of the battalion's movements. Company G arrived in Offenau about 2300 hours and prepared to spend the night.

The Neckar River had been crossed with little difficulty but it was the two tributaries, the Jagst and Kocher, that presented the 2d Battalion's greatest problem. As they wound their way to the Neckar a veritable peninsula was formed which must be cleared before the drive southeast could really begin. For the most part this neck of land which lay between the Jagst and Kocher rivers was high and afforded a formidable defense line for the determined enemy. With two rifle companies in and around Offenau, one at Duttenburg, and vicinity, and elements of the heavy-weapons company supporting the various rifle companies

the battalion was prepared to make its second river crossing, which would put it in a position to attack this peninsula which was known to be the line that the Germans were most likely to defend.

SECOND PHASE: JAGST RIVER CROSSING

At 2400 hours Lieutenant Colonel Weisel called the company commanders to his CP at Offenau and issued the order for the next phase of the battalion's attempt to break through the defense of these river lines. The battalion was to cross the Jagst River at 0500 hours in engineer assault boats in the vicinity of Duttenberg and from there the companies would carry them to the crossing site which the company commanders would select in the meantime. Company E was to be on the left, Company G in the middle and Company F on the right. Upon crossing the river Company E was to proceed to Heuchlingen where the tanks would be met and continue on toward Haganbach and secure the high ground. Company F was to drive into Jagstfeld, clear out the town and continue on to Waldau, and contact Company G. Company G was to pass over the high ground directly ahead and drive hard toward the town of Waldau where they would secure the bridge across the Kocher River which was still intact according to a report from the Air Corps. The 81mm mortar platoon of Company H was to go into position in Duttenberg where it could support the river crossing and also be prepared to give supporting fire to the companies as they advanced toward their objectives.

Upon receiving the battalion commander's order the company commanders returned to their respective companies and proceeded to make a reconnaissance for possible crossing sites. Before leaving for the reconnaissance each company commander gave orders that their executive officers would call in the platoons from various outposts, assemble the company, and meet guides at designated points in the vicinity of Duttenberg, to be guided to the river's edge.

By 0500 hours the company commanders had selected sites for their crossing and had posted guides for their companies. The guides pointed out the engineer boats which were unloaded in Duttenberg, and each company carried to the river bank the boats that they were to use in crossing. Each platoon leader was assigned the needed number of boats and by 0530 hours the first wave was loaded in boats and on its way across the swift-flowing river. The first wave of each company reached the far shore at approximately the same time. They quickly unloaded and ran across the two hundred yards of flat open terrain toward the railroad that borders the woods and high ground to their front. Just

after the first elements reached the far shore at approximately the same time. They quickly unloaded and ran across the two hundred yards of flat open terrain toward the railroad that borders the woods and high ground to their front. Just after the first elements reached the railroad embankment and before the majority of the men had cleared the open ground enemy machine guns and small arms opened up from the high ground to the front and from the railroad bed on the right. Most of the men immediately hit the ground when the firing started but were soon ordered to move up to the embankment where the enemy could not have direct fire on them, for lying in the open field they presented perfect targets for the machine guns which were firing from the heights above. As soon as the firing started the men left on the Duttenberg side of the river began firing on the high ground from which the enemy fire was coming. Captain Garahan of Company E had started across in the second wave and was pinned down by the fierce fire on the river's edge just after he stepped out of his boat. Since Company E and Company G had selected crossing sites near each other, it was possible for Captain Einsman of Company G who had not crossed yet to build up one continuous firing line. Two sections of Company H's HMGs were placed in strategic positions and the riflemen of both Company E and Company G flanked these automatic weapons. It was the quick action of the machine gunners in getting their guns into position and firing that enabled the men pinned down in the open ground to advance safely to the steep embankment. No sooner had Company H's machine guns opened fire than the enemy automatic weapons were directed on their positions, knocking out one heavy machine gun and wounding two gunners. Enemy riflemen could be seen running from hole to hole to gain for themselves more protection and better firing positions.

Down the river a short distance Company F was receiving fire from the high ground to their front and also from their right flank. Realizing that the enemy was at a distinct advantage holding the high wooded ground directly to the front of the crossing site and also well concealed positions in the town of Jagstfeld, Captain Einsman directed Sergeant Austin, the artillery forward observer, to call for a concentration on the sector of the town from which the fire was coming. Company H's mortars had already begun a barrage on the woods directly in front of the crossing sites. From their OP in Duttenberg the mortar men could see Germans running in groups of four and five to well dug-in positions along the wooded embankment. Because of their commanding position high above the river valley the mortar observers could see all the action clearly and consequently could engage groups of

enemy in the woods with little difficulty. Several direct hits on groups of enemy personnel were observed. Observation into the town of Jagstfeld was not good, but it is believed that the artillery fired with good effect on the enemy positions for the fire was silenced.

During the mortar and artillery barrages Sergeant Compton of Company G, disregarding the small-arms fire that was still coming his way, ran up and down the bank of the river getting the boats lined up for crossing. When the enemy started firing many of the boats were washed downstream and away from the crossing site. Sergeant Compton displayed unusual bravery and heroism as he went beyond the call of duty in effecting a reorganization of the boats and getting men lined up to go over in the next wave. In the meantime Captain Einsman went upstream in hope of finding another place, perhaps more secluded, where the rest of the troops could cross. Upon reconnoitering the dam which was across the river he found that the water flowing over it could be reduced by raising the headgates, and a few minutes after the gates were raised the water level had dropped. Plans were made to take the Company H heavy machine guns across in boats above the dam and the remainder of the men of Company E and Company G would infiltrate across the river on the dam itself. Because at least one automatic weapon was still being fired on the men as they exposed themselves the Company H weapons were left in place until the last minute, so that they could cover the men as they ran across the open field after crossing the river. As the men who had been pinned down on the water's edge and the men who were crossing on the dam ran across the open field toward the railroad embankment, Company H's mortars and machine guns fired all along the wooded area to keep the enemy down and permit a safe crossing. After most of the riflemen had crossed the heavy machine guns were loaded in the boats and taken across above the dam. As the mortar barrage continued the machine gunners made their way to the safety of the railroad embankment even though snipers were still active.

THIRD PHASE: THE DRIVE FOR WALDAU

Company F

It was 1030 hours by the time all of Company E and G personnel reached the railroad embankment and reorganization could take place. Company F upon getting all their men across the river still found it impossible to cross the wide open ground in front of their crossing site because of the fierce fire coming from their right flank. Realizing he

could not get his entire company up to the railroad, Lieutenant Adams directed his men who made it in the first wave to join the remainder of the company on the river bank where he reorganized and prepared to push farther down the river and into Jagstfeld. The reorganization showed that one soldier had been killed and four wounded in the long day's tedious and dangerous fighting. At 1600 hours Lieutenant Adams started his company down the river bank hugging the shore in defilade from observation of the enemy on the high ground to their left and from their positions in the town. Upon coming to a relatively narrow strip of open ground between the river and the railroad track Lieutenant Adams directed that his company dash, a squad at a time, across the open ground to the railroad and take cover in the buildings which were on the edge of town. The dash was made without mishap and upon searching the buildings they were to occupy three prisoners were taken. After the reconnaissance Lieutenant Adams ordered his platoons to occupy a series of houses overlooking the town and prepare to defend that sector for the night.

At 0330 hours the following morning (7 April) an eighteen-man German patrol came into the area occupied by Company F. They were fired upon as they ran up the street in front of a Company H machine gun. Upon receiving fire from the heavy machine gun the patrol took up positions in nearby houses and returned the fire with rifles and automatic guns knocking out one of our machine guns with five direct hits. Lieutenant Lustica, in charge of the section, ordered his other gun to spray the house from which the enemy fire was coming and finally with the help of riflemen firing from other angles the patrol was forced to withdraw. Through the dark of night the enemy could be seen running away carrying at least one wounded comrade. One dead German was found in the street the next morning.

At 0600 hours that morning a radio message from battalion ordered Company F to proceed into Jagstfeld, clean out the town, go to the blown bridge site between Jagstfeld and Wimpfen and secure this point so engineers could put in a Bailey bridge. In accordance with these orders Lieutenant Adams sent his 3d Platoon under the command of Lieutenant Cantor into town to clear the street on their left.

Soon after this platoon left the company CP, Staff Sergeant Stankus, mortar observer for Company H, spied from his attic OP a German vehicle loaded with Germans coming down the road toward his position. He immediately called the information to Lieutenant Adams, who ran to the window and fired on the vehicle which was pulling an antitank gun. About the time that he fired, one of his light machine

guns fired from its position in a nearby railroad tower. The Germans taken entirely by surprise quickly rounded a corner stopped the vehicle and dived into the ditch beside the road. Sergeant Stankus fired from his attic window and the machine gun continued to fire, killing seven of the occupants of the vehicle. When members of Company F went out later to destroy the gun and vehicle with bazooka fire they found one live German hidden under the vehicle. He was taken prisoner and the demolition continued. Sergeant Stankus and two wire men later crawled out to the dead Germans and cut off three P38 pistols, even though snipers fired at them from the woods to their front.

After the excitement with the German vehicle subsided Lieutenant Adams got word that his 3d Platoon was well into the town, so he ordered Lieutenant Ward and the 1st Platoon to proceed into town on another street. They had not gone far before they met strong opposition from enemy located in houses and in a small concrete pillbox which was covering an open field. Lieutenant Ward ordered the pillbox fired upon with bazookas and after three rounds were fired twelve SS troopers came out with their hands up. Lieutenant Ward then made contact with Lieutenant Cantor's platoon and with the section of heavy machine guns in support they proceeded toward the blown bridge site. Just after they started forward they were fired upon again from houses on the left. Lieutenant Lustica's heavy machine guns fired five belts in the fire fight that ensued and many casualties were accounted for. One of the tanks attached to Company F was then called forward to fire directly upon the house from which the heavy fire was coming. It took just one well aimed round to silence the opposition at that point and the two platoons proceeded on to the bridge site at the edge of town.

About this time a radio message from battalion said that Company G had been held up and could not drive straight to Waldau as planned, but would come to the north of Jagstfeld and make contact with Company F. In the meantime Company F was to continue clearing the east side of town. As Company F moved toward the factory district in the eastern sector stiff opposition was met and the fighting was from building to building. Company H had a squad leader killed and Company F had several wounded, as the men battled their way with great difficulty from factory to factory. When the troops finally reached a large pickle factory which afforded beautiful fields of fire and excellent observation of the large railroad yards from which the main organized resistance was coming it was decided to consolidate for the night and hold the ground taken. Many enemy were killed that evening as they ran from houses on the left which were targets for Company G. Their

only retreat from Company G's fire was across an open field which was covered perfectly by Company H's five heavy machine guns. In Lieutenant Lustica's words, "The boys had a field day picking off those Germans as they ran across that open field." That night a small enemy patrol came into the factory area and was captured by riflemen standing guard.

At 0700 hours 8 April the 2d Platoon of Company F with two tanks in support led the company's push farther into the factory section of Jagstfeld. Two large factories were cleared of snipers and thoroughly searched before they proceeded towards the railroad yards. Upon approaching the yards enemy opposition was great and Company F was fired upon by mortars, machine guns and small arms. In return Company F fired their 60mm mortars and clip after clip of .30-caliber with the Mls. Company H's heavy machine guns fired several belts at snipers and automatic-weapons crews stationed in the buildings surrounding the yards. A final protective line was set up so as to fire down the railroad tracks, thus cutting off the enemy's route of retreat from the buildings. As they ran across the tracks withdrawing from their positions the machine guns killed them in their tracks. By 1700 hours that evening Company F was able to move a platoon into the main building of the railroad yards and set up an outpost for the night. That night was a harrowing experience for Lieutenant Stalika's platoon and the section of machine gunners from Company H, for the enemy attempted during the night to drive them out of the buildings by firing armor-piercing ammunition through the wall and bazookas at the windows where the heavies were mounted. Staff Sergeant Dahlberg, section sergeant from the heavies, told of the enemy fire coming down the corridor and how his men had to crawl on their hands and knees to get from room to room. One soldier was wounded as he lay asleep on the floor when an AP round came through the wall. As this terrific battle was waged several belts of .30-caliber were poured into the houses occupied by the enemy. The riflemen with antitank grenades finally set fire to the closest enemy building and the attempt to knock out the outpost was repulsed.

On 9 April Company F's fight for the city of Jagstfeld continued with Company H's mortars dropping round after round on the buildings designated by Lieutenant Adams as giving them trouble. At one point during the firing Lieutenant Lonsberg of Company F called Lieutenant Mavrinac, who was supervising the firing of the mortars, and asked if they had fired about five minutes before that. Lieutenant Mavrinac, a bit worried at first for fear they had had a short round,

told him the mortars had been firing and wanted to know if anything was wrong. Lieutenant Lonsberg replied, "No, they are dropping right where we want them. The shrapnel is flying across the tracks and all over our house but keep throwing them in." The Air Corps was called upon to strafe the town and the woods lying to the north from which fierce fire was coming. The strafing was effective to the extent of killing several enemy and causing others to withdraw via the canal. That night a terrific explosion was heard which proved to be a charge set to demolish the bridge at Waldau. The enemy apparently had withdrawn from Jagstfeld, but all day on 10 April they continued to drop mortar shells into the railyard area. For the first time in four nights Company F slept without being hit by a counterattack or a combat patrol. The fight for the town had been a terrific one and the enemy suffered many casualties.

On the morning of 11 April Company F was able to push out of Jagstfeld and on toward their original objective, the town of Waldau. With two tanks and two TDs and the section of heavies from Company H, Company F moved without resistance to the northern end of Waldau where their 1st Platoon met a German strongpoint which was soon overrun by the TDs. One German was killed and two were captured. A Company F patrol that followed along the canal to give flank protection ran into a Schu-mine field in which one soldier lost a leg. Upon arriving at Waldau at 1200 hours a heavily booby-trapped roadblock was encountered but it was soon cleared by Lieutenant Kelly and his A&P Platoon. The town was entered and searched and a defense was established. Two patrols were sent out to reconnoiter for a possible river crossing site. Both patrols were sniped at, but one group was successful in finding a footbridge across the canal and a likely place to ford the river if the enemy could be cleared of the area. This information was reported via radio to battalion, and Company F was ordered to remain in Waldau for the night and await further orders.

Company E

As was mentioned above, Company E completed their crossing of the wide stretch of open ground beyond the Jagst River by 1030 hours, and by 1100 hours had reorganized and moved out in a northeast direction along the railroad. The 1st Platoon of heavy machine guns from Company H was in support of Company E. After advancing about two hundred yards the 1st Platoon, led by Lieutenant Passero, was fired upon by automatic weapons from the high ground on the right. A

patrol was sent forward to try to knock out the enemy weapon, but it found upon advancing a short distance that there were a number of automatic weapons dug in on the hill in such a position that they could fire easily on anyone that approached the steep incline. Staff Sergeant Holt, the Company H 81mm observer with Company E, radioed his section to lay a barrage on the area which he designated by coordinates. Lieutenant Lacy, the mortar platoon leader, informed him that from their OP in Duttenberg they could see the enemy in groups of four and five scattered along the ridge and that he was just ready to fire on them. The mortars had already fired over three hundred rounds farther to the right of this area as the companies were crossing the river. Now that the enemy could be seen shifting their strength to the right so as to block Company E from reaching Heuchlingen, Company H began laying down intense concentrations in the corner of the woods just above the railroad. As one section laid down repeated barrages in the woods another section began to fire smoke so as to screen the path that Company E had to take along the railroad. Two hundred rounds of smoke were fired, thus protecting Company E and the section of heavy machine guns from Company H as they made their way into Heuchlingen.

Before starting behind the smoke screen for Heuchlingen, Captain Garahan ordered Lieutenant Pittman to take his platoon plus one section of heavy machine guns and skirt the woods on the company's right to give some protection to the flank and knock out anything that might be in the lower corner of the woods. The main body of the company moved on into Heuchlingen about 1540 hours under the protection of the beautiful smoke screen laid down by Company H, and upon arriving there found that the tanks which were supporting the company were already in the little settlement and had captured thirty-eight enemy who had been sniping from their excellent position high above the river. Eight members of the 2d Battalion's antitank platoon had come in on the tanks and helped round up the enemy scattered throughout the buildings. Captain Garahan ordered his platoon to organize a defense of the town and prepare to hold it until further orders. Lieutenant Matthew, in command of the Company H heavy machine guns, selected positions on the edge of the settlement and ordered the guns set up in readiness for a counterattack.

About 1930 hours word came from battalion that Lieutenant Pittman's platoon and the section of heavies supporting him had been cut off from the company, and that Company H's mortar platoon had rescued them by laying down a barrage thus permitting them to with-

draw back across the river to Duttonberg. Some of the enemy had worked down the hill toward the river, set up a strong defense line on the ground above Lieutenant Pittman and had fire covering the area he must cross to get to Heuchlingen. The mortar barrage plus many rounds of smoke enabled the platoon and the heavy machine guns to get back to Duttonberg safely. Knowing that Company G had run into heavy opposition on the high ground to the right of Heuchlingen and also knowing that many enemy were dug in on the high ground toward Hagenbach, Company E was ordered to consolidate and stay in Heuchlingen that night.

On the morning of 7 April the 2d Platoon of Company E again joined the company and about 0900 hours they moved out to clear the woods southwest of Heuchlingen, so that Company G who had arrived at Heuchlingen the night before could proceed on to Jagstfeld and join Company F in clearing out the town. Only snipers were encountered, so it was assumed that the strong force had withdrawn the members of their unit that were still alive.

During the day numerous enemy could be seen walking from hole to hole far to the east of Heuchlingen. Members of Company H spotted a German sneaking down a deep cut that led up to the barn in which they had their machine gun, and after a couple of shots were fired in his direction he dropped his rifle and came toward them with his hands up. Staff Sergeant Kraszewski, section sergeant from Company H, ordered the young SS trooper to call in his comrades which he did after some hesitancy. Two more came out of the dugout about three hundred yards down the road. Much artillery was fired on the high ground to the front with great effectiveness, for the enemy could be seen running toward Hagenbach between the bursts.

At 1800 hours Company E, less one platoon which was to hold Heuchlingen, was ordered to move to the north sector of Jagstfeld and set up a defense for the night. With Company G and Company F pushing into the town proper the battalion's left flank needed protection, and it was Company E's mission to relieve Company G's platoon and protect this flank. At 2200 hours Company E less the 3d Platoon proceeded through the woods and into Jagstfeld, where they consolidated for the night. One platoon of heavy machine guns from Company H was in support of Company E and these guns were mounted so that they could cover the woods on the north and also the open ground just west of the woods.

The following morning, 8 April, Company E was ordered to clear the woods northeast of Jagstfeld of the enemy that had been firing on

Company G and holding up their advance. At 0830 hours the 1st and 2d Platoons moved into the woods and before they had gone over three hundred yards they were fired upon by a flakwagon, and soon enemy rockets and mortars were falling on the riflemen as they were deployed through the woods. Before the entry into the woods, the two TDs fired and artillery shells came down on that sector of the woods, but apparently the enemy observers were well dug in and had no thought of withdrawing. Realizing the futility of trying to clear the woods with only two platoons and with the terrific mortar barrage protecting the area, Captain Garahan withdrew his company to the north side of town and called for more artillery to be thrown into the woods. He also asked the artillery to see if they could locate the flakwagon with their reconnaissance plane, but this attempt proved useless for the woods were offering excellent camouflage for the wagon. Soon after withdrawing his company Captain Garahan slipped on a stairway and injured his back and Lieutenant Keddie took command of the company.

At 1500 hours a second attempt was made to clear the woods when Lieutenant Pittman's platoon, with Lieutenant Passero's platoon following, started forward with platoons escheloned to the right. The 1st Platoon of Company H accompanied the riflemen into the woods. After the unit had advanced about six hundred yards it was decided to send a patrol to the right to contact Company G who was reported moving forward and also another patrol sent to reconnoiter the northeast sector of the woods. The patrol sent to contact Company G met elements of their left platoon and found that they were being held up and could not advance. The patrol which went forward into the corner of the woods was fired upon by two machine guns and small-arms fire. Members of the patrol returned individually to where their platoon had halted and found that one of their group was unaccounted for. Lieutenant Passero then sent another small patrol back hoping to locate Private Duncan who was missing. This search was unsuccessful for this patrol was fired upon by automatic weapons that sprayed the area. Private Clow, a member of the second patrol, was missing when others of the group finally worked their way back to the small ravine in which the platoon had halted. Mortar fire again began to come in on both platoons and Lieutenant Keddie via the radio got permission to withdraw to the houses on the north of Jagstfeld and set a defense for the night.

At 2000 hours that night Private Duncan came out of the woods, and told of how he had lain flat on the ground for three hours. The Germans had fired over his head and into the patrol that had been

sent out to locate him. He had been too close to the enemy to call to his comrades or to attempt to escape before the fire fight ended. Only by cautiously crawling through the underbrush had he been able to escape. He reported that he knew nothing of Private Clow and it was believed that he had either been captured or killed. However, the following morning about 0900 hours the Company H machine gunners spied him limping out of the woods and toward their positions. He was quickly gotten into the house and given first aid for shock and a serious arm wound. Even though weak and completely exhausted from the loss of blood and the long exposure he told of how he had managed to get a bandage on his arm, and then lay motionless for hours hoping that the Germans would withdraw. It was not until early morning that the voices near him ceased, and with great pain he made his way out of the woods and back to his company.

At 0730 hours 9 April, Captain Bowen, battalion S-3, and Lieutenant Pollitt, Company H commander, came into Jagstfeld on reconnaissance to determine how best this defense line might be broken and the drive toward Waldau continued. After looking over the positions of the troops and talking with the company commanders regarding the strength of the enemy, Captain Bowen decided in order to make the battalion's line more secure as Company G and Company F battled for the town of Jagstfeld that Company E should draw one platoon back to the woods between Heuchlingen and Jagstfeld, thus making one continuous defense line between the two towns. The plan was to clear the town and then turn attention to the woods and the terrain beyond. This change in the lines was made and then at 0830 hours the next day, 10 April, upon order from battalion Company E proceeded toward Hagenbach which they were to occupy and from there dispatch patrols to reconnoiter for a possible crossing site over the Kocher River in case Company F was unsuccessful in getting one at Waldau. This move to Hagenbach was deemed advisable for a report from the Air Corps confirmed the belief that the explosion heard during the night had blown the bridge at Waldau. With the bridge blown there was cause to believe that the mortar and artillery fire plus the fire power displayed along their front had caused the enemy to withdraw across the Kocher. Then too the mortar fire that Company F had been getting seemed to come from the direction of Kochendorf.

As Company E approached Hagenbach with two tanks and two TDs the 3d Platoon led by Lieutenant Bird was leading. Upon reaching the outskirts of the town Staff Sergeant Cain took a patrol and started down the main street. No sooner had they reached the first

house than a machine gun opened up on them from a knoll to their left and near the river. The patrol soon outflanked the gun and after several shots were fired the crew surrendered. Two of them were badly wounded and the third was captured. The town was divided into sectors and each platoon proceeded to clear out its sector. Several enemy were killed in the search and sixteen were captured, including a lieutenant with a powerful radio set. Upon securing the town Lieutenant Keddie ordered it outposted and patrols were sent out to reconnoiter for possible crossing sites. The far banks of the river afforded no suitable crossing site, and both patrols were fired upon by snipers as they made their way along the banks of the river. Company E reported this to battalion, and received orders to hold that sector for the night and await further orders.

During the next day, 11 April, Company E improved positions dug in above the bank of the river outside of Hagenbach and sent a patrol to the right to contact Company F near Waldau. Contact was made and it was then known that the ground between Hagenbach and Waldau was clear of enemy. Knowing this and also that Company F had found a possible crossing site, the battalion ordered both Companies G and E and the sections of HMGs from Company H supporting them to proceed to Waldau and await instructions there. Lieutenant Visser of Company H brought trucks to the crossroads east of Heuchlingen and the 1st Platoon of Company H went on carriers to Waldau where they were supposed to set the machine guns into position so that they could support a river crossing. Company E arrived in Waldau at 2030 hours and Lieutenant Keddie reported to the battalion CP for orders.

Company G

With Companies F and E now in Waldau ready for the final river crossing which would end this peninsular campaign, let us now turn back and follow Company G as they made their desperate fight over the high ground above the river and fought against bitter opposition in Jagstfeld.

At 11 hours, 6 April, Company G, commanded by Captain Einsman, moved across the railroad tracks and up over the high ground with the 1st Platoon leading supported by a section of HMGs from Company H. The leading elements had not gone far until they were fired upon. Returning the fire, Company G could see the enemy pulling back to what appeared to be better positions. By the time Company G had gone one thousand yards they hit the enemy's main line, estimated by Cap-

tain Einsman to be manned with at least eight machine guns and 150 men. A bloody fight ensued lasting for several hours and resulting in Company G having 4 killed, 3 captured and 27 wounded. In addition to these casualties there were three men from Company H's machine guns wounded. Ten enemy were captured and at least forty were killed. When reorganization was being attempted so as to hold what had been gained, the battalion radioed Company G that tanks were coming up from the left to aid in the fight and the preparations should be made to continue the attack. As the tanks approached the 2d Platoon of Company G was pushed forward to lead, but the enemy was too strong. One tank was knocked out by an SP gun and all the crew members were wounded. They were able to withdraw from their tank mainly because of the covering fire from the Company H's machine guns. Technical Sergeant Good who was in charge of the machine guns described the action on this high ground thus: "We were advancing against heavy artillery, small arms and absolutely fanatical opposition. Our entire unit demonstrated great courage and a determination to perform their assigned tasks as a fighting team." The remaining tanks withdrew because of the intense artillery and mortar concentrations being laid on the area.

Captain Einsman at this point realized the futility of further offense and ordered his platoons to withdraw to positions which would be more advantageous for a defense. The enemy seemed to sense what was occurring and now concentrated their fire against the 3d Platoon, led by Lieutenant Herold. They had been defending the right flank of the company. The fire on them was so intense that repeated messages to them to fight their way back failed to produce any results. A private who lay in a furrow of ploughed ground for several hours expressed their plight thus: "We seemed glued to the ground and nothing could move us." Realizing that something must be done if the platoon was to be saved, Captain Einsman and Sergeant Compton, his communications sergeant, stripped off their equipment and rushed out to the isolated unit to give them courage and inspire them to make a run for their lives. Sergeant Compton, former All-American football player, made three trips over this ploughed open ground, each time carrying wounded back. At one place he came into physical contact with an enemy soldier and beat him over the head with his helmet, since he had left his M1 in order to carry his fellow soldier.

At 1900 hours battalion radioed Company G to proceed to Heuchlingen and join Company E. At 2000 hours what was left of the company arrived at Heuchlingen tired, hungry and completely exhausted

from the eight long hours of battling against the onslaught of the determined foe. K rations, which had been rowed across the river at a point just below the castle, were eaten and preparations were made to spend the night in the hay barns. It had been a long and costly day but because of the heavy casualties on the part of the enemy they were forced to withdraw, enabling the battalion to get a firm hold on the city of Jagstfeld the following day.

By 1100 hours the following day (7 April) Company G was in Jagstfeld after following Company E's platoon through the woods as it was cleared of snipers. Company G's mission was to clear all houses on the left of the railroad yard and drive hard toward Waldau and secure the bridge which air reconnaissance had proved was still intact. As the leading platoon started down the left side of the railroad it received tremendous small-arms fire from buildings ahead. The tanks were called forward at this point and they knocked out the guns and set the two buildings on fire.

Men of Company G plus a section of HMGs from Company H advanced cautiously from house to house as artillery fire was shelling the area. Fierce automatic fire was coming from the woods east of town and was responsible for three Company G casualties. One HMG and a platoon of riflemen were left on the north edge of town to defend the left flank as the remainder of the company pushed farther into the town toward the large railroad station. As the leading elements approached the station terrific automatic-weapon fire came from it and nearby buildings. One of these buildings was set on fire and many Germans were seen fleeing from it. Sergeant Good fired several belts into this area as the enemy attempted to withdraw. A reconnaissance the following morning showed over twenty Germans had been killed in this fight including the officer who had been the commander of the town of Jagstfeld. Due to darkness the company consolidated for the night.

On the morning of 8 April Company G's platoon on the left flank was relieved by Company E and the company attempted to push farther into the center of Jagstfeld. Because of the dogged determination of the enemy the leading elements were held up and the fighting again resumed a house-to-house basis. Company H machine gunners spotted a large group of Germans coming out of the woods on the left and fired several belts causing many casualties. All during the day and the following day fighting continued with no great amount of ground gained but many Germans were accounted for as they rushed from buildings being fired upon by the riflemen of Company G and the

HMGs and mortars of Company H. Staff Sergeant Hatley, Company H mortar observer, has been recommended for the Silver Star for his activity during these two days. Time and time again he directed fire on groups of enemy that he could see from his advantageous OP. There was a narrow corridor of clear ground over which the enemy had to cross when retreating from the scene of the battle and Sergeant Hatley repeatedly fired upon this area with great accuracy. So many were killed here that the action is still spoken of as "Hatley's Slaughter." Sergeant Tillett, who had a HMG near Sergeant Hatley's OP, said they cheered as they saw legs and arms of the enemy fly into the air numerous times.

On 10 April when the battalion's lines were extended after the bridge at Waldau had been blown and the enemy had withdrawn across the Kocher River, Company G relieved elements of the first battalion near the town of Odheim so that the regiments could have one battalion in reserve. Reconnaissance was made for a possible crossing site but without success. A patrol was sent to contact the 63d Division on the left and the company remained in this area until the following evening when they were ordered to proceed to Waldau. By 1800 hours the company was assembled in the town of Waldau, and Captain Einsman went to the battalion for further instructions.

FOURTH PHASE: KOCHER CROSSING

At 2000 hours Lieutenant Colonel Weisel gave to the assembled company commanders the order for crossing the Kocher River at 2200 hours. A successful crossing here meant that a Bailey bridge could be constructed and the battalion would be free to drive southeast. Company F, who had made the reconnaissance of the canal, railroad yards, and river, was to lead the battalion with Companies E and G following, accompanied by the heavy weapons of Company H. At 2200 hours Lieutenant Cantor led his platoon down to the crossing, and as soon as the leading elements reached the footbridge over the canal the enemy threw great amounts of fire from automatic weapons and even bazookas on the crossing site and along the embankment where the riflemen were cautiously feeling their way. There had been a downpour of rain about an hour before and the ground was slick and hard to traverse. Word was sent to Lieutenant Adams by messenger when the platoon was held up, and he ordered them to withdraw to the safety of a railway underpass so Company H's mortars could shell the area from which the fire seemed to be coming. A heavy concen-

tration was thrown across the canal and also into Kochendorf on the far side of the river. The fire could not be observed but was believed to be effective, for no fire was drawn by a patrol that was sent across about 0200 hours. The patrol returned to Company F about 0300 hours and by 0400 hours the companies were organized and ready to move out. The narrow footbridge was used to cross the canal and the river was waded at a spot which was only knee-deep. Company F crossed and entered the town of Kochendorf where they captured eighteen Germans. After clearing the town they established roadblocks and set up a defense of the river so as to give security to the engineers as they constructed a Bailey bridge. Company E followed, skirted the town and drove on toward Neckarsulm. Company G moved through Company F and occupied the high ground out of Kochendorf before starting on their drive to the southeast.

Thus the last three rivers and the ground between them which the enemy had used as its last organized defense line were crossed. The 2d Battalion with the aid of elements of the 10th Armored Division which was soon to join them could not push on to the southeast in pursuit of the enemy as they raced for their Southern Redoubt.

The 1st Battalion attacked farther north and on 7 April struck out from Untergriesheim in an encirclement movement toward Heilbronn with Odheim as its first objective. The approaches to Odheim were covered first by the Jagst River, over which the engineers hurriedly threw a bridge expediting the fanning out of the supporting tanks and tank destroyers. Behind the Jagst were many commanding hill positions, notably Hill 233 on the left and Hill 215.8 on the right. Farther to the rear and directly between the first two hills rose Hill 210.9, forming a perfect triangle and peering down into the draw between Hills 215.8 and 233. Beyond this natural defense lay Willenbach Farms—an open, flat expanse offering no means of protection from the intense fire that was to come from the woods to the right and left, and from the high ground behind the next obstacle—the Kocher River.

Companies B and C, without artillery preparation, spearheaded the battalion's drive. Company C started up the long incline of Hill 233 under intermittent enemy artillery fire and

had almost reached the crest of the hill when suddenly intense fire poured from caves at the top, driving the men to the ground. With the volume of fire increasing and supplemented by equally heavy fire from the adjacent hill, positions became untenable. Company C withdrew to the base of the hill under the covering fire of Company D's heavy machine guns, and moved around into the draw between the hills while Company B resumed the attack on Hill 233. With a platoon of Company D attached, Company B succeeded in occupying the hill. Company C, together with a platoon of tanks, battled its way through the draw. Fire raged down from Hill 215.8 and from a new source of positions along a road and directly to the front. Direct 88mm fire crashed into the area, scoring direct hits on two of the tanks. However, the company fought on to overwhelm the positions to the front and moved on out into the open expanse of Willenbach Farms, where the intensity of artillery and automatic fire forced a withdrawal back into the draw. The SS followed and again took up their lost positions along the edge of the road. In the meantime Company A was called from its reserve position and proceeded around to the right to protect Company C's flank as it extended out into Willenbach Farms. Slowly it went about the costly process of cleaning out and occupying Hill 215.8 and at the end of the day the two hills were in our hands. Company C dug in for the night in the draw. Casualties for the day were heavy. Tank and tank destroyer platoons took up positions atop the hills and fired round upon round into the entrenched enemy to the front during the night.

The next morning Companies B and C attacked but again met with a furious and unrelenting enemy fire. Company B advanced two hundred yards but C was held in the draw after an attempt on the positions to the front. Patrols missioned to feel out a weak spot in the enemy's defenses could not get as far as sticking their heads out of their foxholes without inviting fire from all directions to the front.

It was evident now that the Heilbronn defenses extended to this area and that the enemy realized the importance of this flank position and was determined to hold at all costs. Time artillery fire was called for to eliminate the enemy in their well dug positions. All day and the following night engulfed the stubborn enemy with concentrations of time fire. It did the trick. On the third day heavy patrolling activity was carried on, but despite the severe time fire some Germans were still around to combat the patrols.



Two-gun man

16: ODHEIM

On 10 and 11 April the 1st Battalion, far below strength, was ordered to attack and secure a line along the north bank of the Kocher River. With Company A continuing its mission of protecting the battalion's flank, Company B started out to the left of Hill 210.9 sweeping across the German positions along the road, and continued on into the open terrain toward the Kocher River. Company C again moved out toward Willenbach Farms and Odheim without too much difficulty until it had gotten about halfway to its objective. Then from the high ground on the south bank of the Kocher came the 88mm fire catching the men out in the open. At the same time heavy small-arms fire came from the woods to the right. Company A advancing on the flank, engaged the enemy in the woods. Company C also closed in, having the alternative of remaining in the open under direct 88mm fire or seeking the shelter and concealment of the patch of woods held by the enemy. Moving in towards the small-arms fire, Company C ran into an area heavily sown with electric mines, but eventually forced the enemy to flee and gained the comparative safety of the woods.

Company B coming within sight of the Kocher River found itself the target of direct artillery and rocket fire and from Hill 230.1 came curtains of automatic fire. The Company pushed on to take the hill after supporting tank fire neutralized the small arms. With Company B overlooking the Kocher and Company C coming within fire of the river's defenses, all that remained for the successful completion of the mission was the crossing of the river and the neutralizing of the artillery fire from the hills behind.

The entire battalion together with tanks and TDs punched away at the Kocher River defenses, but the continued heavy artillery fire from the hills rising above the river thwarted a breakthrough. The Air Corps was called on to silence the self-propelled enemy weapons and with pinpoint accuracy sent gun positions



Kocher River at Odheim

flying skyward. Behind a rolling barrage of artillery the infantrymen crashed through to complete with the 2d Battalion the rolling up of the German flank along the Neckar River. With that the drive of the 398th Combat Team continued unchecked deep into Southern Germany. The enemy was thoroughly crushed. After the 3d Battalion had held the all-important bridgehead on the Neckar River and then went on to crack the enemy defenses, other units of the Division went on to press home the attack and wipe out the fanatic Germans. At the same time the 1st and 2d Battalions were crashing through Odheim and Jagstfeld to roll up the entire enemy flank, permitting a non-stop drive into Southern Germany. On 13 April, with the 10th Armored Division spearheading the drive, the 398th Combat Team struck south in pursuit of what remained of the protectors of the last vestiges of Naziism.³

³ The 1st and 2d Battalions, and the 398th Combat Team, were recommended by the Regimental commander for the Distinguished Unit Citation. These recommendations, included in the Appendix, give a detailed account of the actions of these units in the Neckar and Heilbronn operations.

The following account of the 1st Battalion's fight for Odheim was written by Capt. Samuel J. Light, Adjutant:

BATTLE FOR ODHEIM


This is not the story of a history-making attack; it was but one of thousands of attacks which have been successfully made by the gallant men of the Infantry. In every attack of this kind we see the same high type of courage, determination, and initiative exhibited—the qualities that make our Army unbeatable and the fighting team that it is.

In this compilation we have attempted to give not only the significance of the objective taken and the enemy routed, but to give also the story of the men who fought in this action. These men, advancing in the face of murderous fire, stumbling over the bodies of their own dead and wounded—men tired of war, of death, and of suffering—these are the men whose deeds we attempt to record on paper. The men who came from every section of America to fight and die for the ideals they so firmly believed in—to these men this story is dedicated.

At 1700 on 3 April 1945, the 1st Battalion, 398th Infantry, 100th Division, closed into Bad Wimpfen, Germany. This hard-hitting, fighting unit had come a long way since landing at Marseille, France, on 21 October 1944. With six months of battle experience under their belts the men and officers of this battalion were a cocky bunch, meeting every assignment cheerfully and confident of a job well done after each operation. With the attachment of one platoon of engineers, one platoon of TDs, a platoon of light and a platoon of medium tanks, the 1st Battalion was a task force within itself.

Bad Wimpfen, Germany, is located on the western bank of the Neckar River. From Bad Wimpfen the Neckar turns and flows south by Untergriesheim and Heilbronn. Directly across the Neckar from Bad Wimpfen the Jagst River flows in from the northeast. The high ground southeast of the Jagst running from northeast to southwest (see map) formed the defensive positions the Germans were manning to protect Heilbronn from the north and northwest.

During the evening of 3 April the 1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion, 255th Infantry, in the vicinity of Bad Wimpfen and maintained protecting positions from the south and east and was prepared to advance east on order. At 0045 7 April Operation Instructions No. 33 came down from the Regiment ordering the battalion to move without delay to assembly area in Obergriesheim on foot, attack within zone at



The Battle for Odheim

0800. At 0500 the battalion moved north out of Bad Wimpfen on foot, in order: B, C, A, D, and Headquarters, and crossed the Neckar on a footbridge, previously constructed by the engineers. The bridge was located approximately a mile north of Bad Wimpfen. The vehicles moved over a circuitous route north and crossed the Neckar at (9984).

At 0715 the battalion closed in Obergriesheim. The order of attack: Companies B and C to cross the Jagst River at Untergriesheim and attack southeast to Odheim. At 1200 Companies B and C jumped off southeast from Untergriesheim, Company C passing through positions held by Company E, 255th Infantry, which was dug in on the northern slope of Hill 233, and Company B advancing down the draw to the east of Hill 233. On crossing over the crest of Hill 233 at approximately 1215 Company C drew intense rifle and machine-gun fire, as well as artillery and mortar fire. Immediately noticing that the majority of enemy small-arms fire was coming from Hill 215.8 to the right front, Lieutenant Hyslip of the 375th FA Battalion, artillery forward observer attached to Company C, at once called for an artillery barrage on this area. Company B meanwhile was receiving intense small-arms fire from their direct front, and from Hills 233 and 237. A platoon of medium tanks from Company B, 781st Tank Battalion, and a platoon of TDs from the 824th TD Battalion, then moved forward to fire on enemy positions on Hill 233. At 1550 Companies B and C again started forward, but again met strong enemy resistance and heavy artillery fire from the hills surrounding Odheim. An air mission was called for, and a short time later our fighters strafed enemy positions near Willenbach Farms, in the draw between Hills 215.8 and 210.9 and in the woods five hundred yards south of Willenbach Farms. The mission was very successful, but due to the proximity of our forces and those of the enemy, no immediate help to the assault companies could be given. Company C then sent the 1st and 2d Platoons, to attack up the draw between Hills 233 and 215.8, while the 3d Platoon, mortar section, and heavy machine-gun platoon remained on the west slope of Hill 233 to support the attack by fire. At 1900 the assault platoons moved forward, and advanced several hundred yards, where they were temporarily halted by intense small-arms fire. Artillery fire was then again laid in on the enemy, and five light tanks of Company D, 781st Tank Battalion, under Lieutenant McIntyre went forward to support the attack. A combined tank and infantry attack then pushed forward several hundred yards, killing a large number of Germans in fierce, close-in fighting.

Pfc. Mike Colalillo, a rifleman of Company C, jumped up on one tank and, under concentrated enemy fire, manned a light machine-gun located in the turret. During an approximate ten minutes that Private First Class Colalillo was on the tank he definitely knocked out three enemy machine-gun nests, and killed or wounded an estimated twenty-five Germans, without suffering any injury himself. For his heroic action Private First Class Colalillo was awarded the Medal of Honor. S/Sgt. Loma Hash, a squad leader of Company C, alone charged several machine-gun nests located on the west slope of Hill 210.9, but was mortally wounded by a burst of machine-gun fire.

The two platoons had advanced to within seventy-five yards of Wiltenbach Farms, where the German mortar positions and battalion CP were located, when the tanks ran out of ammunition and were forced to withdraw, leaving the riflemen in open country with absolutely no protection. It was here that the gallant action of Lt. Frank Reinhart 4th Platoon leader of Company C, and several other men saved the greater part of the company. Lieutenant Reinhart, with utter disregard for his personal safety, exposed himself to all enemy fire in order to direct fire of his mortar and machine-gun sections, which helped keep the enemy pinned down while the rest of the company withdrew. Lieutenant Reinhart was killed in this action. Lt. Noel Felix, S/Sgt. Herman Black, and S/Sgt. Charles Earle (were all listed MIA when) in order to protect the men under their command, remained behind and put heavy fire on the enemy to cover the withdrawal. As a result of the gallant actions of these men, the majority of Company C's two rifle platoons and machine-gun section was able to form a line on Hill 215.8, where they dug in for the night and reorganized. A company, which had been in reserve up until this time, was called upon to move into position on the right flank of Company C, where it was expected the Germans might attempt a counterattack. By 2100 all the companies had dug in, forming a line roughly north and south from Hill 215.8 to Hill 233, then around the slope of Hill 233 and running east. A gap in the line between Company B's left flank and the 63d Divisions' right flank was being plugged by a platoon of engineers from the 63d and the 1st Battalion's antitank platoon, with A&P Platoon prepared to enter the line at a moment's notice.


At 0545 on 8 April Companies A and B jumped off again, with Company C in reserve. Heavy artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire were received, and the light tanks and TDs moved out to join in the fire fight. After a fierce battle, characterized by small-arms duels at distances of fifty to a hundred yards, the assault companies returned to

their original positions. During this action Technician Fifth Grade Johnson, a rifleman of Company A, singlehandedly charged a machine-gun nest which had been putting heavy fire on our troops, wiping out all four members of its crew. T/Sgt. Frank Bujnowski, acting platoon leader of the 1st Platoon of Company A, was killed as he personally led a charge against several enemy dug-in positions, completely ignoring his own safety. The gallantry and inspiration of men like these resulted in inflicting a heavy toll on the enemy in this action, and contributed much to the eventual defeat of the German troops in this sector. After the companies had returned to their original positions T/Sgt. Paul Santora, platoon sergeant of the 2d Platoon of Company B, saw a man about two hundred yards to his front and within a hundred yards of the enemy lines struggling to crawl back to safety. Throwing off his pack and weapon, Sergeant Santora jumped from his hole and started to run toward the man. Despite intense rifle and machine-gun fire directed at him, Sergeant Santora reached the wounded man, who had twelve bullet wounds in his legs, and lifting him to his back, carried him back to our lines, still under intense fire. Pfc. Francis Crowley, a machine gunner of Company B, volunteered to lead a group of litter bearers five hundred yards in front of our lines to evacuate some casualties, making two trips under heavy fire.

For the rest of the day and all of 9 and 10 April there was little activity. Having forced the enemy to reveal his positions to meet the attack of our hard-driving infantry, we were now in a position to pound him with artillery—and pound him we did. Artillery, mortar, and cannon FOs were with the forward elements of each company and, aided by men who had attacked these positions only a few hours previous, directed the shelling with deadly effect. Heavy machine-guns from each of Company D's weapons platoons fired indirect fire missions, spraying enemy positions and forcing the German infantry to stay in place, while our heavy artillery pounded these positions incessantly. Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) McCrum's forward battalion OP was also close to the front lines, and from this position Lieutenant Colonel McCrum directed and coordinated the various units supporting the attacking riflemen. On the afternoon of 8 April Company A captured a total of 15 PWs. According to these prisoners, our battalion was opposed by approximately a regiment of SS troops. Also one medical officer claimed that he had some of our wounded in his aid station including one officer. If this information was correct several of the men listed as missing in action from Company C on 7 April might still be alive and prisoners.

On 9 April Company B sent out a patrol toward Buchof on the extreme left flank of the battalion sector, reporting no enemy in this area. Companies A and C each sent out reconnaissance patrols to their front, which were fired on by enemy dug in in this sector. On the night of 10 April Companies B and C reported tank and vehicle movement in the vicinity of Odheim. At 0330 on 11 April Company B picked up one PW, who claimed that his battalion had withdrawn. Acting immediately on this information, patrols were sent out early in the morning to attempt to make contact with the enemy. At 0845 the order came from Lieutenant Colonel Williams, the Regimental commander, to move forward, seize the Kocher River line, and secure any river crossings that could be found. All companies moved out soon afterward with our artillery supporting the advance with fire laid in on positions across the river. Moving rapidly forward, the companies quickly established a line on the north and west bank of the Kocher, and in the case of Company C were in position before the enemy was aware of what was happening. Once the Germans spotted our troops they opened up from positions in and around Odheim, using small arms, machine guns, 20mm artillery, and SP guns. Lieutenant Waldie, acting CO of Company B, spotted one SP gun and directed artillery fire on it, knocking the gun out of action, and removing a major threat to his company's advance. By 1515 all companies were in positions along the river bank and were digging in. An air mission over Odheim a few minutes later achieved excellent results. For the remainder of the day the companies held the river bank, and during the night were relieved by units of the 2d Battalion, 398th Infantry, and moved back to Bad Wimpfen, Germany.

During this five-day action the 1st Battalion had driven from strategic, well dug-in positions, a regiment of German SS troops, had helped to shatter the defense of the enemy guarding Heilbronn, and had inflicted exceptionally heavy casualties on both men and equipment in this sector. The 1st Battalion had completed the task assigned to it quickly and well. It had added one more victory to its long list of successful actions. And it had helped to hasten the end of all enemy resistance in the famed southern redoubt. The men of the 1st Battalion can look back on this record with justifiable pride—the pride of a good soldier in a good outfit, and in the best and most important branch of service—the Infantry.



17: PURSUIT

Motorized, the infantrymen swept past town after town, taking and clearing miles of enemy territory. At Lowenstein 1st Battalion was temporarily halted by artillery, rocket and small-arms fire and again at Pfedelbach 2d Battalion doughs had to dismount from trucks and tanks to clean out pockets of last-ditch Nazi resisters.

The objective of the drive was to cut the road to the rear of Stuttgart, preventing the Germans in that key city from escaping the jaws of a huge American-French pincers movement. Except for the actual physical resistance at Lowenstein and Pfedelbach, the armored-infantry attack combination accomplished the mission with little trouble. Methodically, the 3d Battalion followed in the wake of the 1st and 2d to mop up and clean out pockets and by 19 April the front had widened to such an extent that the 44th Division was called in to plug the gap between our Division and the 63rd to our left. The 2d Battalion, 398th Infantry, was ordered out of the lines to guard VI Corps headquarters, but 1st Battalion continued the lightning attack and took Murrhardt and stopped at Althutte. Here the 3d Battalion passed through the 1st, which remained behind to clear Althutte, and continued on to its objective, Unter-Urbach. Opposition was practically nil. Some towns and roadblocks were defended, but the big fight in our area of operations as well as those in all others of Europe was practically over.

On 23 April a task force consisting of Company L, a platoon of tanks and engineers, was assigned to drive through to Stuttgart and meet the French. The motorized contingent swept past through Bad Canstatt, Feldbach, Unter-Turkheim and continued on to clear Bernstein, Endersbach, Heppach and Korb to contact the French 3d Algerian Infantry Division at the site of the wooden bridge crossing the Neckar between Bad Canstatt and Stuttgart. On the same day march conditions for the 398th

ceased. Except for security missions and mopping-up operations the war was over for the 398th Infantry Regiment.

The Regiment as a whole came out of the front lines for the first time since its entry into combat, the beginning of November 1944. All over Europe fighting was sporadic and light. Only the official signing of the unconditional surrender remained to call a halt to the fighting in the most terrible of all wars. And on 9 May 1945 peace in Europe was declared. The 1st Battalion was assigned to Seventh Army for a security mission in Stuttgart, the 2d Battalion continued to guard VI Corps CP, and the 3d Battalion moved into the Waiblingen area.

The 398th Infantry accomplished its mission. From the cracking of the German winter defense line in the Vosges Mountains to Heilbronn, Germany, the insignia of the Alert was seen fighting, driving and dying to fulfill its part in vanquishing a tyrannical foe who threatened to rule the world.



APPENDIX
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

1. MEDAL OF HONOR

GENERAL ORDERS

WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 97

Washington 25, D. C., 1 November 45

MEDAL OF HONOR.—By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved 9 July 1918 (WD, Bul. 43, 1918), a Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty was awarded by the War Department in the name of Congress to the following-named officer:

First Lieutenant *Edward A. Silk*, 01310890, commanded the weapons platoon of Company E, 398th Infantry Regiment, Army of the United States, on 23 November 1944, when the 2d Battalion was assigned the mission of seizing high ground overlooking Moyonmoutier, France, prior to an attack on the city itself. His company jumped off in the lead at dawn and by noon had reached the edge of a wood in the vicinity of St. Pravel, where scouts saw an enemy sentry standing guard before a farmhouse in a valley below. One squad, engaged in reconnoitering the area, was immediately pinned down by intense machine-gun and automatic-weapons fire from within the house. Skillfully deploying his light machine gun section, Lieutenant *Silk* answered the enemy fire, but when 15 minutes had elapsed with no slackening of resistance, he decided to eliminate the strong point by a one-man attack. Running 100 yards across an open field to the shelter of a low stone wall directly in front of the farmhouse, he fired into the door and windows with his carbine, then, in full view of the enemy, vaulted the wall and dashed 50 yards through a hail of bullets to the left side of the house, where he hurled a grenade through a window, silencing a machine gun and killing two gunners. In attempting to move to the right side of the building, he drew fire from a second machine gun emplaced in a woodshed. With magnificent courage, he rushed this position in the face of direct fire and succeeded in neutralizing the weapon and killing two gunners by throwing grenades into the structure. His supply of grenades was exhausted by now, but undaunted, he dashed back to the side of the farmhouse and began to throw rocks through a window, demanding the surrender of the remaining enemy. Twelve Germans, overcome by relentless assault and confused by his unorthodox methods, gave up to the lone American. By his gallant willingness to assume the full burden of the attack and the intrepidity with which he carried out his extremely hazardous mission, Lieutenant *Silk* enabled his battalion to continue its advance and seize its objective.

GENERAL ORDERS

WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 4

Washington 25, D.C., 9 January 1946

MEDAL OF HONOR.—By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved 9 July 1918 (WD Bul. 43, 1918), a Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty was awarded by the War Department in the name of Congress to the following-named enlisted man:

Sergeant *Mike Colalillo* (Army serial No. 37588843) (then private first class), Company C, 398th Infantry Regiment, Army of the United States, was pinned down with other members of his company during an attack against strong enemy positions in the vicinity of Untergriesheim, Germany, on 7 April 1945. Heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire made any move hazardous but Private *Colalillo* stood up, shouted to the company to follow, and ran forward in the wake of a supporting tank, firing his machine pistol. Inspired by his example, his comrades advanced in the face of savage enemy fire. When his weapon was struck by shrapnel and rendered useless, he climbed to the deck of a friendly tank, manned an exposed machine gun on the turret of the vehicle, and, while bullets rattled about him, fired at an enemy emplacement with such devastating accuracy that he killed or wounded, at least 10 hostile soldiers and destroyed their machine gun. Maintaining his extremely dangerous post as the tank forged ahead, he blasted three more positions, destroyed another machine gun emplacement, and silenced all resistance in his area, killing at least three and wounding an undetermined number of riflemen as they fled. His machine gun eventually jammed; so he secured a submachine gun from the tank crew to continue his attack on foot. When our armored forces exhausted their ammunition and the order to withdraw was given, he remained behind to help a seriously wounded comrade to safety over several hundred yards of open terrain rocked by an intense enemy artillery and mortar barrage. By his intrepidity and inspiring courage, Private *Colalillo* gave tremendous impetus to his company's attack, killed or wounded 25 of the enemy in bitter fighting, and assisted a wounded soldier in reaching the American lines at great risk to his own life.

2. DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 306

November 6, 1945

EXTRACT

IV—DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of AR 600-45 September 22, 1943 as amended the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded to:

Sgt. Charles E. Compton, Jr., 14130845, Infantry, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action, as Communications Sergeant, Company G, 398th Infantry Regiment, on April 6, 1945. When a cleverly concealed enemy machine gun opened fire on his platoon as it attempted to cross the Jagst River, Sergeant Compton seized an automatic rifle and with one blast destroyed the enemy weapon and killed the three members of the crew. He then rescued four wounded men, carrying them boldly through fireswept terrain, and rendered a hostile infantryman unconscious with a single blow of his helmet when the enemy soldier, approaching from the rear, called upon him to surrender. The unparalleled gallantry displayed by Sergeant Compton contributed materially to the success of the operation and upon two occasions prevented infliction of severe casualties upon our troops. Entered military service from Alabama.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, USA,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 645

November 14, 1945

EXTRACT

I—AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, September 22, 1943, as amended, the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

Sgt. Charles R. Johnson, 14182066, Infantry, Company A, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on April 7-8, 1945 in Germany. When his unit was subjected to heavy automatic fire, Sergeant Johnson leaped from his foxhole and charged the enemy. After throwing a grenade into an enemy machine gun emplacement, he followed through and annihilated the position's 4-man crew with rifle fire. He then destroyed the German weapon and rejoined his comrades. Sergeant Johnson's courageous actions, which permitted his company to advance upon its objective, reflect great credit upon himself and the armed forces. Entered military service from Headland, Alabama.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC.
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 603

October 11, 1945

EXTRACT

AWARD, POSTHUMOUS, OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, September 22, 1943, as amended, the Distinguished Service Cross awarded posthumously, by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

Pfc. Virgil J. Gooch, 35247219, Infantry, Company M, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on April 4, 1945 in the vicinity of Heilbronn, Germany. Assigned the mission of crossing the Neckar River and securing the right bank, Private First Class Gooch, a member of a machine gun platoon supporting a rifle company, reached a railroad where he rapidly set up his machine gun on a bridge offering excellent fields of fire. At 0900 hours the enemy, under cover of intense artillery and mortar fire and supported by tanks, assaulted friendly positions and succeeded in cutting off forward elements. A limited withdrawal was ordered and Private First Class Gooch volunteered to cover the movement. Intrepidly maintaining his exposed position, he diverted the enemy attack by his accurate fire, killing fifteen of the enemy and wounding an unestimated number before he was killed. Next of Kin: Mrs. Ethel M. Gooch (Mother), 335 Lynn Street, Indianapolis, Indiana.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 620

October 18, 1945

EXTRACT

I—AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, September 22, 1943, as amended, the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

Second Lt. Marvin L. Larson, 02000794, Infantry, Company I, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on January 28, 1945, in the vicinity of Lemberg, France. Leading a combat patrol on a night mission, Lieutenant Larson had penetrated well within enemy lines when he detonated a hostile mine. The explosion blew off his foot and drew intensive fire from enemy positions. Ordering his men to withdraw without him, he delivered accurate and effective covering fire and killed four Germans who attempted to capture him. He then applied an improvised tourniquet and dressing to his wound and painfully and laboriously crawled through enemy defenses back to friendly troops. The indomitable courage and resolution displayed by Lieutenant Larson reflect great credit upon himself and the armed forces. Entered military service from Staten Island, New York.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC.
Chief of Staff

GENERAL ORDERS

No. 589

October 8, 1945

I—AWARD, POSTHUMOUS, OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45 September 22, 1943 as amended, the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded posthumously by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

T/Sgt. Frank B. Bujnowski, 32252715, Infantry, Company A, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on April 8, 1945 in the vicinity of Odheim, Germany. After gaining the crest of a strategically important hill, Sergeant Bujnowski's platoon met severe enemy fire and was unable to advance. Determined to push forward, Sergeant Bujnowski moved to the front of his platoon, defying enemy fire, and gave the order to attack. Firing his submachine gun, he destroyed one hostile machine gun nest. He killed two more Germans and, when his ammunition was exhausted, continued to fight with a wounded man's rifle. While charging another enemy emplacement, he was hit by a machine gun burst but continued moving forward until he was hit again and instantly killed. His daring, inspiring leadership and audacious action broke the back of the enemy resistance in the area. Next of Kin: Mrs. Edith Bujnowski (Mother, 29 Hawk Street, Amsterdam, New York.)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 589

October 8, 1945

EXTRACT

I—AWARD, POSTHUMOUS, OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45 September 22, 1943 as amended the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded, posthumously, by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

S/Sgt. Loma M. Hash, 37738830, Infantry, Company C, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on April 7, 1945 in the vicinity of Odheim, Germany. When stubborn enemy resistance halted the attack, Sergeant Hash moved forward alone, alternately running and crawling, and first hurled a grenade into an opposing machine-gun emplacement and then charged the position, killing the three occupants. His action inspired his comrades to follow him and he continued to advance, firing into each entrenchment. When two hostile soldiers surrendered to him and then attempted to fire upon his comrades, he killed them both. The enemy directed intense fire at him, but Sergeant Hash refused to seek cover and was eventually killed while charging enemy positions. The indomitable courage which he displayed was directly responsible for the accomplishment of his company's mission. Next of Kin: Mrs. Mildred A. Hash (Wife), 6015 East 16th Street Terrace, Kansas City, Missouri.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 585

October 6, 1945

EXTRACT

I—AWARD, POSTHUMOUS, OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45 September 22, 1943 as amended the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded posthumously by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

T/5 Joseph P. Nebesney, 33429268, Medical Department, Medical Detachment, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on April 5, 1945 in the vicinity of Heilbronn, Germany. When hostile fire inflicted heavy casualties on the platoon to which he was attached as aid man, Technician Fifth Grade Nebesney unhesitatingly advanced to the assistance of the wounded. He was fired upon and wounded by opposing riflemen who ignored his Red Cross brassard, but he disregarded the injury and treated many casualties. Although wounded twice again, he still refused to abandon his efforts, and was making his way to the side of a wounded soldier when he was killed. The heroism and gallantry which Technician Fifth Grade Nebesney displayed in sacrificing his life for his comrades reflect the highest credit upon himself and the armed forces. Next of Kin: Mrs. Margaret Nebesney (Mother), Railroad Street, Everson, Pennsylvania.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 585

October 6, 1945

EXTRACT

I—AWARD, POSTHUMOUS, OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45 September 22, 1943 as amended the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded posthumously by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

Second Lt. Thomas E. Plante, 01050421, Infantry, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on March 16, 1945 in the vicinity of Bitche, France. When the enemy launched a strong tank-infantry counterattack, the weapons platoon under Lieutenant Plante's command took refuge in a nearby building. One hostile tank approached the building, firing cannon and machine guns at pointblank range. When two rocket rounds fired at the tank missed their mark, Lieutenant Plante seized the rocket launcher, ran toward the armored vehicle and disabled it with a third round. He then attempted to hurl a phosphorus grenade into the tank, but was mortally wounded by machine gun fire. Lieutenant Plante's extremely courageous actions prevented many casualties and live as an inspiration to his men. Next of Kin: Mrs. Shirley R. Plante (Wife), 53 Morton Place, East Orange, New Jersey.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

October 6, 1945

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 585

EXTRACT

III—AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, September 22, 1943 as amended the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

Sgt. John A. Hambric, 34581156, Infantry, 399th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on April 13, 1945 in the vicinity of Heilbronn, Germany. After the platoon in which Sergeant Hambric was a squad leader had gained a wooded area, fire from two enemy machine guns, which were unknowingly bypassed, immobilized the company's two remaining platoons. Crawling to a point seventy-five yards to the rear of the nearest hostile emplacement, Sergeant Hambric fired two rounds, killing both gunners. Moving out again, he then advanced to a position behind a second gun. His first shot killed one of the gun crew members, but the other German, firing a machine pistol, initiated a suicidal charge. Standing his ground, Sergeant Hambric waited until the foe was forty yards away, then killed the man with two rounds. His audacious and unselfish devotion to duty accounted for two enemy machine guns destroyed, four German dead, and enabled his company to take its objective. Entered military service from Marietta, Mississippi.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 585

October 6, 1945

EXTRACT

III—AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45 September 22, 1943 as amended the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

First Lt. William E. Sullivan, 01325944, Infantry, 399th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on March 16, 1945 in the vicinity of Bitche, France. After helping to reduce enemy resistance emanating from two concrete pillboxes, Lieutenant Sullivan, a platoon leader, advanced alone toward the fortifications. Observing two Germans attempting an escape, he fired, killing one and wounding the other. Then, holding a grenade in readiness, he continued toward the encasement, and directed the enemy to surrender. When a German non-commissioned officer emerged, Lieutenant Sullivan used him as a hostage and advanced close to the entrance, repeating his directive. Eighty enemy, including a battalion commander and his 5-officer staff surrendered. Lieutenant Sullivan's heroic and inspiring single-handed action accounted for one machine-gun nest, two enemy casualties, and eighty prisoners. Entered military service from San Francisco, California.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 585

October 6, 1945

EXTRACT

III—AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45 September 22, 1943 as amended the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded by the Army Commander to the following named individual:

Second Lt. Herbert S. Verrill, 0552113, Infantry, Company E, 398th Infantry Regiment, for extraordinary heroism in action on March 15, 1945 in the vicinity of Reyersville, France. During an attack upon strong enemy fortifications, Lieutenant Verrill was leading his platoon under intense automatic weapon fire through hostile mines and barbed wire when he detonated a mine which blew off his foot. He retained his senses and issued clear and concise orders to his men to extricate themselves from the minefield. Then by arm and hand signals he directed the continuation of the attack. The indomitable courage and resolution which he displayed prevented confusion and consequent casualties among the men, and made possible the capture of the objective. Entered military service from Westbrook, Maine.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

JOHN M. WILLEMS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

3. POSTHUMOUS AWARD OF SILVER STAR MEDAL

Adams, Earl L., Pfc Co B	Meaney, John C., Jr., 1st Lt Co C
Albright, John M., 1st Lt Co I	Medaglia, Peter A., Pvt Co H
Arheit, Frederick J., Jr., Pfc Co K	Medvin, Ellis, T/5 M.D.
Austin, Sherburne C., Pfc Co A	Miller, Robert E., Pfc Co C
Baeschlin, Sidney J., Pfc Co L	Mole, Samuel A., T/5 M.D.
Bruno, Anthony C., S/Sgt Co I	Montie, Jay V., Pvt Co C
Cohen, Hyman, Sgt Co I	Moon, Allen L., Sgt Co H
Clyburn, Clifford J., Pfc Co G	Napier, Robert L., Pfc Co M
Cook, Robert C., 1st Lt Co B	Ngor, Lew N., Pfc Co L
Curtis, Paige K., Pfc Co M	Plagge, Leland H., Pfc Co A
Dolphin, Howard F., Pfc Co G	Reinhard, Clarence C., Pvt Co C
Doran, Harold H., S/Sgt Co L	Reinhart, Frank M., 2nd Lt Co C
Fletcher, Arthur L., Pfc Co I	Ribinsky, Michael M., Pfc Co I
Folds, William M., Jr., Pfc Co A	Rosenberg, Samuel L., 2nd Lt Co I
Funari, Robert, Jr., Pfc Co L	Rosenberg, Sidney G., Pfc Co K
Glass, Richard, Pfc Co G	Schaeffer, Matthew W., S/Sgt Co H
Goodrich, Charles S., Pvt Co A	Seijo, Victor M., Pfc Co L
Grakus, Frank J., T/Sgt Co B	Spinelli, Dominic V., Pfc M.D.
Hochevar, Henry F., Pfc Co G	Taber, Alvadis, Jr., Sgt Co A
Hosse, Robert, T/Sgt Co H	Tyree, Samuel J., T/5 M.D.
Hunger, Irving, T/4 M.D.	Vranisky, Joseph P., Pfc Co H
Kearfott, John L., Pfc Co L	Wharton, James A., Pfc Co F
Lynch, John J., 2nd Lt Co B	Whitten, Clettus V., Pfc Co A
McInerney, Martin T., Pfc Co A	Wilkens, George, 2nd Lt Hq 3d Bn
Williams, Walter S., Jr., 2nd Lt Co L	

4. SILVER STAR MEDAL, MIA

Cook, Raymond W., Pvt Co C	McLean, Russell T., Pfc Co G
DePiazza, Frank V., Pfc Co G	Milano, Felix J., Pfc Co D
Dutko, Stephen J., T/Sgt Co K	Smith, Griffin D., S/Sgt Co C
Glass, Richard, Pfc Co G	Smith, John P., Pfc Co B
Holmes, John R., Capt Co C	Smith, Robert R., Pfc Co B
Ihrig, Theodore M., S/Sgt Co C	Streiff, Jr., Thomas R., Pfc Co C
Trutter, Edward H., Sgt Co K	

5. SILVER STAR MEDAL

Adams, George H., 1st Lt Co F	Campbell, Albert, 1st Lt Co K
Ahlers, Richard D., Sgt Co L	Carlucci, Victor A., Pfc M.D.
Allen, Arthur P., 1st Lt Co F	Cavanaugh, Edward J., S/Sgt Co E
Annicchiarico, Michael J., Pvt M.D.	Chaty, Raymond P., Sgt Co G
Bailey, Francis J., Jr., Pfc Co B	Chekitis, Bruno, S/Sgt Co E
Baker, Floyd W., Sgt Co L	Clark, Joseph, S/Sgt Co L
Barley, Lewis M., Pfc M.D.	Colalillo, Mike, Pfc Co C
Barry, John J., III, Pfc M.D.	Crow, James E., Sgt Co C
Bietz, Charles W., 2nd Lt Co F	Crowley, John A., S/Sgt Co G
Birchall, William R., S/Sgt Co F	Daigle, Allen J., S/Sgt AT Co
Bissell, William C. M., Sgt Co E	Daly, Paul G., Lt Col 398th Inf Hq
Boling, Archie E., T/Sgt Co I	Deck, Alfred E., Pfc Co H
Bowen, Austin C., Pfc Co E	DeForge, Henry F., Pfc M.D.
Bowen, Elba W., Capt Hq 2nd Bn	Dixon, David W., 2nd Lt Co I
Bradley, Zorro A., Pfc Co K	Drumm, James M., T/Sgt Co E
Brinkerhoff, Robert E., Capt Co L	Duncan, Robert M., Pfc Co E
Brown, James J., Pfc Co L	Eckles, Ralph B., Pfc Cn Co
Browning, Lyda, S/Sgt Co B	Edwards, John T., Sgt Co A
Byrd, James E., 2nd Lt Co E	Einsmann, Matthew B., Capt Co G
Cain, Lloyd R., Sgt Co E	Elledge, Kirg D., Pfc Co I

Enright, Robert J., Cpl Co F
 Evans, Hayden O., Jr., Pvt Co I
 Farah, George E. P., Pfc AT Co
 Fittery, Robert J., S/Sgt Co G
 Forbes, Robert C., Lt Col Regt Hq
 Friday, Richard L., Pfc Co H
 Friedman, Jack B., Pfc M.D.
 Frost, Richard B., S/Sgt Co L
 Garahan, Thomas H., Capt Co E
 Glavich, Edward C., Cpl Hq Co 2nd Bn
 *Grimm, Wilbert C., S/Sgt Co G
 Groat, Clarence M., S/Sgt Co G
 Hagenberger, Robert P., Pfc Co H
 Hansen, Alfred C., Pfc Co L
 Harris, James C., T/Sgt Co G
 Hart, Fred B., T/5 M.D.
 Haught, Warren E., Capt Co E
 Hazen, James B., Sgt Co G
 Henderson, Allen T., Pfc Co B
 Herold, Warren C., 2nd Lt Co G
 Hix, Clarence R., 2nd Lt Co C
 Horn, Herbert C., Pfc Co G
 Horrigan, Harold S., Tec 4 M.D.
 Huckaby, Cecil F., S/Sgt Co H
 Jackson, Clarence, Pfc Co L
 Jacopi, William F., Pfc Co H
 Jaycox, Marion D., Sgt Co E
 Jennings, Arthur F., Jr., 2nd Lt Co A
 Johnson, Charles R., S/Sgt Co F
 Kanter, William E., 1st Lt Co F
 Kazelis, Albert J., S/Sgt Co A
 Keddie, James A., 1st Lt Co E
 King, Charles R., Pvt Co A
 Kirkland, Robert L., Pfc Co E
 Kravets, Adolph, Cpl Co A
 Kuzminski, Benjamin, T/Sgt Co F
 Landahl, Clayton E., Pfc Co C
 Landon, Luther E., Sgt Co A
 Larson, Marvin L., 2nd Lt Co I
 Lavangie, Ephriam J., Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Lederer, Theodore H., 2nd Lt Co M
 Lee, James P., Pfc Co C
 Lee, Roy A., Pfc Co C
 Lentsch, Arthur J., Cpl AT Co
 Lester, Walter, Pfc Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Levesque, William J., S/Sgt Co F
 Light, Thomas M., Sgt Co I
 Lindquist, John A., T/Sgt Co H
 Logan, Burton B., T/5 M.D.
 Lonsberg, John P., 1st Lt Co F
 MacDonald, William F., Pfc Co A
 Mace, Kenton, Sgt Co F
 Manning, Herbert E., Pfc Co A
 Marshall, Lloyd B., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Matheny, Charles R., Pfc Co F
 Matthews, Robert E., Pfc Co L
 McCrum, Ralph C., Lt Col Hq 1st Bn
 McKenna, Edward P., S/Sgt Co G
 McKinley, Howard A., Pfc Co L
 McNally, Lloyd C., 1st Lt Co I
 Mika, Bernie L., S/Sgt Co G
 Millsaps, Clarence, Pfc Co F
 Minshall, Paul E., S/Sgt Co C
 Moeller, Bernard H., Pfc Co H
 Moffitt, Kermit C., S/Sgt Co L
 Moisan, William J., Jr., Pfc Co G
 Moore, Lewis L., Cpl Co H
 Morgan, Walter E., Pfc Co B
 Mullen, Robert C., Pfc Co K
 Nelson, William E., Capt Co K
 Nichols Jr., Clarence F., Sgt Co E
 O'Brien, Russell M., Sgt Co A
 Ostrow, Stanley V., S/Sgt Co E
 Pajak, Henry J., 1st Lt Co K
 Passero, Sam P., 1st Lt Co E
 Pittman, John W., 2nd Lt Co E
 Pondo, Nicholas, T/Sgt Co F
 Pozzi, John P., Pfc Co A
 Reilly, Philip P., Pfc Co F
 Rice, Harry E., S/Sgt Co B
 Ritzo, Alfred J., 2nd Lt Co K
 Roisen, Maynard W., Pfc Co B
 Rose, Raymond M., T/Sgt Co E
 Rudolph, Joseph A., Pfc Co E
 Ryan, William J., S/Sgt Co E
 Sadowski, Joseph F., S/Sgt Co C
 Santora, Paul J., T/Sgt Co B
 Sather, Gerald G., Sgt Co E
 Saucier, Fergus, Pfc Co G
 Scheller, John A., Jr., Pfc Co E
 Scholten, Hilbert, Pfc Co E
 Silk, Edward A., 1st Lt Co E
 Simeone, Ernest V., Pfc Co L
 Sinofsky, Albert J., 1st Lt Co C
 Skawinski, John J., S/Sgt Co I
 Skotarski, Daniel J., T/Sgt Co K
 Smith, Howard D., Capt Co F
 Smith, Walter P., Jr., 2nd Lt Co H
 Smock, Roy, Pfc AT Co
 Stoddard, William E., 2nd Lt Co A
 Strickland, Joseph R., Jr., S/Sgt Co K
 Surmanek, Joseph M., Pfc Co F
 Swager, Theodore L., Pfc Co G
 Sweet, Thomas G., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 *Tate, John A., 1st Lt Co L
 Thompson, Walton R., 1st Lt Co G
 Tramel, Oliver T., S/Sgt Co L
 Vargo, James, Pfc Co A
 Wachtel, Lawrence, Pfc Co G
 Walk, John H., Pfc Co A
 Warren, William D., S/Sgt Co K
 Warren, William W., Pfc Co E
 Whitaker, William J., S/Sgt Co H
 Williams, Claude, Jr., 2nd Lt Co C
 Williams, Vincent G., 2nd Lt Co I
 Zarabet, Joseph, Sgt Co F

*Award of Oak Leaf Cluster to Silver Star.

6. POSTHUMOUS OAK LEAF CLUSTER TO BRONZE STAR

Oliver, Clyde M., Pfc Co K

7. OAK LEAF CLUSTER TO BRONZE STAR

Augello, Joseph A., T/Sgt Co D	Keene, John B., Capt Hq 3d Bn
Baker, Charles M., Jr., S/Sgt Co B	Knight, William C., Sgt Co G
Barnhart, William R., S/Sgt Co K	Kutzman, Paul J., T/5 M.D.
Borgstrom, Kurt V., Pfc Co B	Ledford, William E., Pfc Co F
Black, Herman F., S/Sgt Co C	Lee, Robert E., 2nd Lt Co H
Bolton, Gordon E., Sgt Co C	Lovelace, Earl R., Pfc Co A
Book, Herbert W., Pfc Hq 1st Bn	Mason, Walter R., 2nd Lt Co C
Brown, Harold G., 1st Sgt AT Co	Matthew, Melvin R., 1st Lt Co H
Cahoon, Samuel G., 2nd Lt M.D.	McCrum, Ralph C., Lt Col Hq 1st Bn
Classi, Dominick, S/Sgt Co C	McDonald, Lyle A., 2nd Lt Co I
Crowley, Francis A., Jr., Pfc Co B	Mignerey, Harry F., Capt M.D.
Curran, Robert F., Lt Col Hq 2nd Bn	Orel, William L., T/Sgt Co F
DeMartini, Edward L., J., Pfc Co A	Payne, Burnus L., 1st Lt Co L
Drum, James M., T/Sgt Co E	Price, James W., Jr., S/Sgt Co L
Duerr, John L., T/4 Hq Co	Puckett, Robert R., 1st Lt Co D
DuFrene, Erving L., Sgt Co C	Racy, Julius J., Sgt Co F
Easley, George K., Pfc Co G	Restani, Raymond, Capt Co E
Edsall, Floyd L., 1st Lt Co C	Rhea, Jack L., 2nd OLC, Capt Hq 3rd Bn
Edmond, Robert G., T/4 M.D.	Rimlinger, James L., Capt Co C
Fatheryar, Dominick T., 2nd Lt Co L	Rollins, Louis B., 1st Lt Co H
Felix, Noel A., 2nd Lt Co C	Romero, Candelario R., Pfc Co H
Flavin, Charles M., S/Sgt Co G	Sabia, James V., S/Sgt Co B
Forbes, Robert C., Lt Col Regtl Hq	Scarborough, Leland D., Capt Cn Co
Geers, Arthur C., Sgt Co B	Silverman, Hyman L., T/Sgt Co A
Good, John R., T/Sgt Co H	Siuba, Stanley A., S/Sgt Co A
Goodner, Ronald D., Pfc Co F	Smith, Edwin D., Pfc Co A
Gueerry, John C., T/Sgt Co D	Smith, Harry J., Pfc M.D.
Hankins, Kenneth, Pfc Co A	Snell, Raymond H., 1st Lt Co I
Harrell, Henry S., T/4 M.D.	Sowels, Wilber L., Sgt Co L
Henson, William C., 1st Lt Co D	Spiegelberg, Fred W., Capt
Herrmann, Jack A., S/Sgt Co G	Stalikas, Nicholas, 2nd Lt Co F
Hilliker, Stanley B., S/Sgt Co L	Teitelbaum, Samuel, Capt Co L
Hodge, Frederick G., 1st Lt Co K	Thomas, Richard L., Pfc M.D.
Hooker, Olen P., Pfc Co L	Turner, Harry L., S/Sgt Co D
Horler, Thomas W., 2nd Lt Co F	Tyler, Samuel, Jr., Capt (Chap) Regtl Hq
Hudspeth, Ralph C., 2nd Lt Hq 3d Bn	Urresti, Alfred, Pfc M.D.
Hunt, Talmage H., S/Sgt Co F	Van Bockern, Donald, 2nd Lt Co A
Hunter, John F., Pvt Co E	Weaver, William O., Pfc Co C
Hurley, Borromeo W., 1st Sgt Co F	Weisel Jr., Harvey C., Lt Col Regtl Hq
Janes, Ernest L., Lt Col Hq 3rd Bn	Williams, Robert M., Col Regtl Hq
Jennrich, Edward W., Cpl M.D.	Zanoni, Basil P., 1st Sgt Co M
Jones, Wesley E., 2nd Lt Co L	Zawisza, Frank A., T/4 M.D.
Zychowski, Edward A., Pfc M.D.	

8. OAK LEAF CLUSTER TO BRONZE STAR, MIA

Greenberg, Herbert W., Pfc Co K	Rizzo, Alfred J., 2nd Lt Co K
Vanderhoff, Russell J., Pvt M.D.	

9. BRONZE STAR MEDAL, MIA

Accomando, James J., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Amtmann, Richard J., Pfc Co K
 Breish, John W., T/Sgt Co K
 Danieluk, John J., Sgt Co D
 Deem, James E., Pfc Co K
 Girard, Aldor J., Pfc Co K
 Hastings, Jimmie, Pfc Co K
 Holmes, John R., Capt Co C
 Kittelson, Orris E., Pfc Co L

Loehding, Ben F., Sgt Co C
 Minnon, Mike J., S/Sgt Co G
 Montgomery, Edward, Pfc Co G
 Peterson, William G., Pfc Co G
 Ring, Wallace W., S/Sgt Co K
 Sevigny, Gerard A., Pfc Co B
 Telbert, Garnet D., S/Sgt Co L
 Wagner, Edward J., Pfc Co K
 Willis, Robert W., Pfc Co L

10. POSTHUMOUS AWARD OF BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Adams, Earl L., Pfc Co B
 Anderson, Leorne W., Pfc Co G
 Ashton, Roger S., Pfc Co F
 Atkinson, Lonzo, Sgt Co C
 Borjon, Charles, Pvt Co L
 Buck, Jr., Jacob L., Pfc Co C
 Burrola, Frank M., Pfc Co M
 Chesney, Robert E., Pfc Co K
 Coffey, James C., Pfc Co G
 Danner, Edward G., 2nd Lt Co G
 Devereaux, John J., Pfc Co I
 Dillon, John J., Pfc Co G
 Dougherty, James E., Pfc Co M
 Downey, John H., Pfc Co K
 Ethridge, Jack A., Pfc Co C
 Ferguson, John D., Pfc Co D
 Friebel, Leo R., Pfc Co A
 Gallup, Francis M., T/4 M.D.
 Gifford, Robert E., Pfc Co K
 Gilmour, William R., Sgt Co L
 Gray, Chester B., 1st Lt Co M
 Hatfield, Ellis H., Pfc Co L
 Hoffman, Edward M., Sgt Co B
 Igo, Vernon L., Pfc Co L

Jempelis, John, Pfc Co G
 Johnson, Edwin E., Sgt Co A
 King, Frederick C., Pfc Co C
 Koelenbeek, Daniel R., Pfc Co C
 Lloyd, Richard J., Pfc Co I
 Lutz, George E., Cpl Co L
 Manis, Miller K., Pfc Co L
 Manosh, Robert F., Pfc Co B
 McFadden, Charles, 2nd Lt Hq Co
 Merrick, Paul H., 2nd Lt Co C
 Moody II, Edward R., 1st Lt Co K
 Morgan, Albert R., Pfc Co C
 Poor, Clarence R., Pfc Co G
 Riddle, John C., Pvt Co H
 Roberts, Ralph L., Pfc Co B
 Smith, David H., Sgt Co I
 Stephens, Marvin L., Pvt Co L
 Thompson, Oscar, S/Sgt Co C
 Treiman, Carl, Pfc AT Co
 Turnage, W. H., Pfc Co I
 Wachter, Henry N., S/Sgt Co C
 Waggoner, Joe A., Pfc Co E
 Wharton, James A., Pfc Co F
 Wortman, Lloyd T., Pfc Co C

Zahner, Raymond F., S/Sgt Co C

11. BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Abert, Edward R., T/4 Co D
 Adams, George H., 1st Lt Co F
 Adams, Henry C., Jr., S/Sgt Co G
 Alfonso, John G., Pfc Co C
 Alberty, William C., Pfc Co L
 Alfonsi, Joseph P., Pfc Co B
 Aliberti, Umberto J., Pfc Co H
 Allburn, Jr., James N., Pfc Co A
 Allen, Guy P., CWO Sv Co
 Allen, Hubert A., Pfc Co G
 Allen, Leo G., T/4 Hq 1st Bn
 Alleva, Nicholas A., Pfc Co D
 Allred, Calvin H., Pfc Co I
 Altland, Joseph C., Pfc Hq Co
 Ammirato, Ernest F., Pfc Co I
 Amos, Robert T., Jr., 1st Lt Hq 2nd Bn
 Amszynski, George A., S/Sgt Co B
 Amtower, Leslie C., Sgt Co K

Anderson, DeWayne M., S/Sgt Co I
 Anderson, Earl J., T/Sgt Co E
 Anderson, Edward K., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Anderson, Joseph H., 1st Lt Co M
 Andress, Lawrence E., Sgt Cn Co
 Andrzejak, Raymond L., T/4 Hq Co
 Angelone, Angelo J., S/Sgt Co L
 Annicchiarico, Michael J., Pfc M.D.
 Annunziato, Frank M., S/Sgt Co F
 Anselmo, Albert P., Pfc Co E
 Ansley, Samuel H., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Apple, Jr., Orange F., T/3 M.D.
 Applemann, John D., Pfc Co D
 Arakelian, Garabed, Pfc M.D.
 Arbegast, Harry W., 2nd Lt Co M
 Arendt, Theodore E., T/Sgt Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Armstrong, James D., Pfc Co F
 Armstrong, Jr., Lewis C., Pfc M.D.

Armstrong, Oran R., Cpl Cn Co
 Armstrong, Robert L., T/Sgt Co I
 Arnett, Ralph F., Pfc Cn Co
 Aschoff, Carl R., 1st Lt M.D.
 Ashford, Leonard, S/Sgt Co M
 Ashworth, Willie, Pfc Co K
 Augello, Joseph A., S/Sgt Co D
 Austin, Norwood K., Pfc Co M
 Babbitt, Richard, Pfc M.D.
 Bailey, Charles H., Pfc Co B
 Bailey, Crawford M., Pfc Co A
 Bailey, Francis J., Jr., Pfc Co B
 Bailey, George V., S/Sgt Co F
 Baird, John A., M/Sgt Sv Co
 Baker, Jr., Charles M., S/Sgt Co B
 Baker, Floyd W., S/Sgt Co L
 Baker, George F., T/Sgt Co L
 Baker, Walter L., 1st Lt Hq 3rd Bn
 Ball, Marvin L., Sgt Co C
 Bamesberger, Fred F., T/4 Co B
 Barasch, Norman, 1st Lt Sv Co
 Barb, Ralph J., Pfc M.D.
 Barber, Orville, Pfc Co A
 Barg, Francis E., Pfc Co C
 Barlow, Luther B., Pfc Co A
 Barmer, Maxwell R., Sgt Co K
 Barnes, James A., Pfc Hq 3rd Bn
 Barnes, Warren A., Pvt Co D
 Barnett, Sheldon M., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Barnhart, William R., S/Sgt Co K
 Baron Jr., Joseph R., Pfc Hq 3rd Bn
 Baron, Nick M., Pvt Co K
 Barrows, Francis W., Sgt Hq 3rd Bn
 Barys, Frank J., S/Sgt Co E
 Basanda, Raymond G., Pfc Co E
 Batchelor, Stephen D., Tec 4 Hq 3rd Bn
 Bates, Theodore H., Pfc Co I
 Baxter, George I., Pfc Co B
 Bayard, Theodore D., Pfc Co L
 Beadling Wesley H., Pfc Co M
 Beale, Barkley D., Sgt Co G
 Beard, Lawson R., 1st Lt Hq 1st Bn
 Beaudoin, Euclid P., 2nd Lt
 Beaven, Robert P., 1st Lt AT Co
 Beekman, John J., S/Sgt Co F
 Beemer, Roy D., Sgt Co E
 Belden, Jean P., Pfc Co G
 Bell, Philip F., Pfc Co G
 Belland, Francis H., Pfc Co G
 Bellows, Clarence H., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Bender, John R., Pfc Co A
 Benjamin, Theodore S., S/Sgt Co K
 Benke, Robert F., T/Sgt Co G
 Bennett, Edward M., T/5 Co L
 Bennis, Christopher J., Pfc Co H
 Benton, James G., Pfc Co H
 Berry, James F., S/Sgt
 Berry, Paul E., S/Sgt Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Berry, Uland, S/Sgt Co D
 Bibb, Robert B., 2nd Lt At Co
 Bielaczy, Theodore C., T/Sgt Co M
 Bietz, Charles W., 2nd Lt Co F
 Billings, Ernest E., Pfc Co D
 Bills, Danny H., Pfc Co D
 Binkley, John W., Pfc Co B
 Bindel, Jerome E., Pfc Co M
 Bisaantz, Harold B., Pfc Co H
 Bisson, Leopold, Pfc Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Bjornholt, Rueben E., Cpl Serv Co
 Black, Herman E., S/Sgt Co C
 Blaha, Robert J., 1st Lt Co A
 Blair, Rufus E., Pfc Co F
 Bland, Jack L., Sgt Co D
 Blaney, Henry J., S/Sgt Co A
 Bledsoe, Joel G., Sgt Co H
 Bless, Berthram O., Pfc Co F
 Bloom, Irving, T/Sgt Sv Co
 Bloom, Theodore, Sgt Co C
 Blumenfeld, Jacob P., Pfc Co C
 Blumer, William H., S/Sgt Co B
 Bogert, Jr., Edmund A., T/Sgt Co L
 Boling, Archie E., S/Sgt Co I
 Bolton, Gordon E., Sgt Co C
 Bolton, Samuel C., Pfc Co G
 Bomar, Jr., Harry F., Pfc Co I
 Bonanni, Anthony A., Pfc Co A
 Bonham, Perry E., Jr., Pfc Co B
 Book, Herbert W., Pfc Co C
 Boortz, James W., Pfc Co E
 Boothey, Lloyd F., Pfc
 Borgstrom, Kurt V., Pfc Co B
 Boston, Bernard, Capt Co L
 Bowen, Elba W., Capt Co H
 Bowen, John F., S/Sgt Co B
 Bowers, Eric B., Pfc Co G
 Bowlds, Louis E., 1st Lt Co D
 Boyer, Robert E., Co C Co C
 Brackett, Samuel W., Sgt Co C
 Bradbury, Francis W., Capt M.D.
 Bradford, Harold, Jr., Pfc Co A
 Brainard, Raymond F., Jr., 1st Lt At Co
 Braman, Oscar R., Pfc Co F
 Bramley, Robert, Capt Hq
 Brandon, Richard G., Pfc Co C
 Brannon, Paul E., 2nd Lt Co L
 Bratton, Hilton R., Pfc Co L
 Breeden, Jr., Ernest G., Pfc Co E
 Brennan, John J., T/5 Hq 2nd Bn
 Brevard, Jonathan C., Pfc Co D
 Brocato, John A., Cpl Co D
 Brock, Doyle L., Pfc Sv Co
 Brodsky, Stanley, Sgt Co A
 Brody, John J., T/3 M.D.
 Brough, Herbert J., Pfc Co L
 Brown, Jr., Arles O., Sgt Co B
 Brown, Harold G., AT Co
 Brown, Walton E., Sgt Co I
 Brown, William A., Cpl Hq 3d Bn
 Brown, William J., S/Sgt Co B
 Brown, William P., Pfc Co B
 Browning, Lyda, S/Sgt Co B
 Brucker, Peter, T/4 Co C

Bruner, Robert T., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Brunskole, Anthony J., Sgt Co A
 Bryant, Jack K., S/Sgt Co H
 Burdett, Thomas C., T/5 Hq 2nd Bn
 Brzozowski, Leo J., Pfc Co A
 Bub, John J., Pfc M.D.
 Buckingham, Byron B., Pfc Co B
 Buckley, John P., Pfc Co L
 Buckley, Michael J., Capt Hq 2nd Bn
 Buckley, William A., T/5 Hq Co 1st Bn
 Buckwalter, Lloyd M., Pfc Co E
 Budd, William D., Pfc Co B
 Budnick, Norman E., Pfc Co G
 Buono, John J., Sgt Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Burchard, Leslie A., Pfc Co C
 Burd Jr., Harry W., Pfc Cn Co
 Burns, John W., Pfc Co C
 Burrows, Douglas J., 1st Lt AT Co
 Burrows, William A., S/Sgt AT Co
 Burrus, Luther T., T/5 Co I
 Burton, Dwight L., 1st Lt M.D.
 Burzynski, George, S/Sgt Co L
 Bush, Byron J., Jr., Pfc Co L
 Bushway, Kenneth C., S/Sgt Co I
 Buteau, Roland C., Sgt Co H
 Butler, John I., S/Sgt Sv Co
 Byrne, Hugh J., S/Sgt Co I
 Burroughs, Reginald C., 1st Lt Hq
 Caddell, Charles I., Sgt Co M
 Cadden, Joseph T., 1st Lt Co G
 Cade, Charles A., Pfc M.D.
 Cahoon, Samuel G., S/Sgt M.D.
 Caldwell, Berlyn G., T/Sgt Co D
 Caldwell, Paul H., Pfc Co L
 Callow, William C., Pfc Co D
 Campagna, Clarence, Pfc Co H
 Campbell, Albert, 2nd Lt Co K
 Campese, Ettore A., S/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Camposo, Raggio L., T/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Canina, Ralph J., 1st Sgt Co H
 Cannizzo, John J., T/5 M.D.
 Cantemalo, Prospero, Pfc Co M
 Capuano, Frank R., Pfc Co B
 Carlino, Anthony J., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Carmichael, Olin D., Sr., Pfc Co G
 Caron, Laurent L., Sgt Co I
 Carr, Lyle K., T/Sgt Co K
 Carrick, Joseph, Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Carrieri, Patrick F., Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Carselle, Joseph D., S/Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Carter, Marion A., Pfc Co G
 Catron, Kelly H., T/Sgt Co A
 Cecere, Nicholas J., T/5 Co A
 Chaffee, Norman C., Pfc Co C
 Champion, Clifford, Pfc Co L
 Champion, Howard M. G., T/3 M.D.
 Champney, Wayne A., S/Sgt Co K
 Chandler, Herbert G., Jr., Pfc Co M
 Chaney, James M., S/Sgt Co F
 Channing, Donald R., Pfc Co F
 Chastain, Herman L., T/Sgt Co C
 Chastven, Samuel, Pfc M.D.
 Chekitis, Bruno, S/Sgt Co E
 Chenoweth, Jack J., S/Sgt Hq 2
 Chmura, Edward M., S/Sgt AT Co
 Chrzan, Bronislaw S., Pfc Hq Co
 Chubbuck, Cecil F., Cpl M.D.
 Chynoweth, John C., Pfc Co F
 Clark, Dorman S., S/Sgt Hq 3rd Bn
 Clark, Frederick J., 1st Lt Hq Co
 Clark, Orville M., J., Pfc M.D.
 Clark, Robert B., M/Sgt Sv Co
 Clary, Leon V., Pfc Co G
 Classi, Dominick, S/Sgt Co C
 Clebock, Edward J., Pfc Co E
 Cleland, Sherrill, Pfc Co F
 Clow, Levert W., Pvt Co E
 Cloyd, Raymond E., Pfc Co H
 Coale, Joseph H., Sgt Co G
 Coffman, Kaohlin M., Sgt Co B
 Cohen, Robert, T/5 M.D.
 Colborn, Russell J., Pfc Co A
 Coleman, Richard L., Pfc Co G
 Colimore, Vincent J., T/4 Hq Co
 Colleran, John R., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Collins, James M., Pfc Co D
 Collison, Malcolm D., Sgt Co I
 Collison, Wilmer H., Pfc Co B
 Colunga, Louis A., Pfc Co G
 Colwell, Mose C., Pfc Co G
 Compton, Jr., Charles S., Sgt Co G
 Condrey, Eugene, Pfc Co F
 Coneys, Francis R., Pfc Co C
 Conn, John F., T/5 Hq Co
 Connelly Jr., James L., Pfc Hq Co
 Conners, Williams P., Sgt Co H
 Conners, Richard T., S/Sgt Co B
 Conroy, Durwood H., Sgt Co B
 Consorte, William, T/3 M.D.
 Cooper, Carvel C. P., Pfc Co C
 Cooper, Mack F., Pfc Co B
 Coppedge, Erle W., Cpl Co M
 Corbin, Robert L., Cpl Hq 3d Bn
 Cordell, Howard M., T/4 Sv Co
 Corkum, William T., T/5 Hq Co
 Costello, Richard T., S/Sgt Co E
 Cottrell, Clarence A., S/Sgt Co M
 Couch, Virgil, Pfc Co M
 Cousens, James R., S/Sgt Co D
 Cowan, James H., T/Sgt Co B
 Cowan, Robert W., Pfc Co L
 Cox, Ralph, Pfc Co B
 Crabtree, Herman, Cpl Co D
 Craig, Joseph B., S/Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Craig, Robert J. (2nd OCL) At Co
 Crawford, Gail V., Sgt Hq Co 2d Bn
 Criswell, Glen M., S/Sgt Co D
 Crocken, Nelson J., Pfc Co A
 Crockett, Joseph M., 1st Lt Hq Co
 Cropper, Jr., Paul E., Pvt Co L
 Crouch, Sam J., Jr., Sgt Co M
 Crowley Jr., Francis A., Pfc Co B

Crowley, John A., S/Sgt Co G
 Crutchfield, Paul L., Pfc At Co
 Cubic, Cyril J., S/Sgt Co K
 Culpepper, Winfred, Pvt Co C
 Cunningham, Charles H., Sgt Co G
 Cunningham, James E., T/Sgt Cn Co
 Cupp, Loren T., Pfc Hq 3rd Bn
 Curbo, Lawrence W., S/Sgt Co F
 Curran, Robert F., Lt Col Hq 2nd Bn
 Cutlipp, Eric J., Pfc Co A
 Dahlberg, Lloyd O., S/Sgt Co H
 Daley, Joseph F., Pfc Co E
 Daniel, Walter A., Pfc Co A
 Davidson, George A., Pvt Co A
 Davis, Clifford, Pfc
 Davis, Harold G., S/Sgt M.D.
 Davis, Jr., Herbert C., Pfc Co E
 Davis, Jason W., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Davis, Luther H., Pfc Co F
 Davis, Preston G., Pfc Co K
 Davis, Robert F., Pfc Co L
 Davis, William F., Sgt Co H
 Dawson, William T., Pvt M.D.
 Day, Clifford G., Capt Sv Co
 DeBoer, John, Pfc Co A
 DeCourley, Jr., James C., Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Deeb, Abraham, S/Sgt Co A
 DeGrange, Edgar P., Pvt Co K
 Dell, Daniel E., Pfc Co K
 Della Gala, Henry A., S/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 DeMartini, Edward L., Jr., Pfc Co A
 DeMastrofrancesco, George, Pfc Co D
 Demel, Martin, Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Dempsey, William N. B., T/Sgt Hq 3d Bn
 Denniston, Jack H., Pfc AT Co
 Denton, Jack S., Pfc Co G
 Derrico, Arthur R., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 DeSantis, Michael, 2d Lt Co M
 Desautels, Alfred J., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 DeStadler, George H., Sgt Hq 2d Bn
 DeVitis, Angelo, Pfc Co K
 Dickey, William G., Pfc Co H
 Dickson, Clayton E., S/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Dieteman, Francis J., T/Sgt Hq Co 2nd Bn
 DiFulco, Carlo J., Sgt Co C
 DiLaurenzio, Hugo N., Sgt Co C
 Dina, Salvatore P., S/Sgt Co M
 Dirden, James O., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Dobensky, Theodore, Pfc M.D.
 Dobkin, Sidney M., Sgt Co B
 Dominguez, Paul, Pfc M.D.
 Donoho, Orville A., S/Sgt Co G
 Doonan, Charles H., T/Sgt Co H
 Dorich, John T., Pfc Co B
 Doriguzzi, Bruno V., T/Sgt Co B
 Dottl, Harold V., Pfc Co C
 Downing, Ross F., Pfc Co A
 Downs, William P., Pfc Co F
 Doyle, Kenneth J., T/Sgt Hq Co
 Dranchok, Frank, T/5 M.D.
 Drumm, James M., S/Sgt
 Drys, Charles W., Pfc AT Co
 Dubbelde, Merlin N., Sgt Co A
 Dudley, Martin E., Pfc Co B
 Dudzik, Raymond R., Pfc Co H
 Duerr, John L., T/5 Hq Co
 Dufrene, Ewing L., Pfc Co C
 Dunajecz, David J., Pfc Co D
 Dunn, William A., Pfc Co D
 Dutko, John, Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Dybas, Alexander J., T/3 M.D.
 Eagles, Kenneth E., Pfc
 Earle, Charles R., Sgt Co C
 Easley, George K., Pfc Co G
 Eastburn, John H., S/Sgt Co B
 Eckert, John D., Pfc Co K
 Eckhardt, Charles H., 1st Sgt Hq Co
 Edwards, Robert M., Pfc M.D.
 Edwards, John T., S/Sgt Co A
 Edwards, Richard H., Sgt Co L
 Einsmann, Matthew B., Capt Co G
 Eisenberg, Seymour H., Sgt Hq Co 3d Bn
 Eisinger, Francis J., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Eliot, Warren B., Pfc Co L
 Elliott, Robert W., Cpl Co H
 Ellis, Howard N., Pfc Hq Co
 Ellis, Victor L., Pfc Co F
 Elzufon, Eugene E., Pfc Co B
 Emond, Robert G., T/4 M.D.
 Engerbretson, Ellis A., T/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Enlow, William R., Sgt Co H
 Era, Harvey J., T/Sgt Co F
 Erdman, Charles R., Pfc Co L
 Erickson, Robert S., Pfc Co K
 Errichetti, Jerry J., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Esaldo, Anthony D., T/4 Co B
 Eschenbach, Albert E., III, Pfc Co E
 Estep, William L., Pfc Co A
 Eutsey, Harry T., Pfc Co F
 Evans, Ivan W., Pfc Co I
 Everett, Wiley J., Pfc Co C
 Fahrman, Lowell A., Pfc Co L
 Farina, Anthony, Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Farley, William R., Pfc Co B
 Farmer, James L., Sgt Co M
 Farrell, James M., Pfc Co A
 Farris, Cad, Pfc Co L
 Farris, Joseph G., Sgt Co M
 Fatheryar, Dominick T., 2nd Lt Co L
 Fauci, Vincent J., Pfc Co B
 Fave, John L., Pfc Co D
 Faw, Melvin L., Pfc Co F
 Fehling, Fred C., 1st Sgt Co G
 Feilbach, Richard H., Pfc Co L
 Feirstein, George, Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Feldman, Isadore I., T/5 M.D.
 Felix, Noel A., S/Sgt Co C
 Felsenfeld, Irving, Pfc Co E
 Felton, Lee M., S/Sgt Co I
 Ferger, Phillip J., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Ferguson, Jack, Pfc Co I
 Ferlazzo, Anthony J., S/Sgt Co B

Ferrara, Michael D., Pfc Co A
 Ferruzza, Michael J., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Ficarra, Dominick T., T/Sgt Co E
 Fields, James J., Pfc Hq Co 3d Bn
 Filley, Charles F., S/Sgt Co B
 Filosa, John M., Pfc Co H
 Finn, Jr., Frederick J., T/5 Hq 3d Bn
 Fischer, Richard, Pfc Co H
 Fisher, Kyle A., S/Sgt AT Co
 Fitzsimmons, Robert, 1st Lt AT Co
 Flavin, Charles M., S/Sgt Co G
 Fontaine, Howard F., T/5 M.D.
 Fontenot, Yves, Pfc M.D.
 Fonteyne, Henry C. G., T/4 Hq Co 1st Bn
 Ford, Boyd B., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Foster, John D., Jr., Pfc Co E
 Frasier, Frank S., T/Sgt AT Co
 Freccere, Frank J., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Francis, John W., Pfc Co K
 Franklin, Gerald F., 2nd Lt Co K
 Fraser, Robert E., S/Sgt Co A
 Freeman, Granville F., Sgt Co G
 Freese, William J., Pfc M.D.
 Friedman, Irving, Capt M.D.
 Frost, Richard B., S/Sgt Co L
 Fugate, Homer E., Pfc M.D.
 Fulk, James V., Pfc Hq Co
 Fuller, C. M., Pfc Co M
 Fuller, James H., Jr., Cpl Hq 1st Bn
 Furey, James T., Pfc Co L
 Furey, John A., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Furseth, Martin A., Pfc Co E
 Gallahan, Allen G., Pfc Co M
 Galliher, Roman E., Pfc Co A
 Galloway, William R., T/5 Co M
 Ganeau, Wilfred F., Capt Co M
 Garahan, Thomas H., Capt Co E
 Garcia, Eduardo, Pfc Co C
 Garrigues, Elmer C., T/5 Hq Co
 Garwol, Walter C., Pfc Co M
 Gatlin, Donald L., Pfc Co M
 Gauthier, Edward J., Pfc M.D.
 Gebhardt, Edward L., T/Sgt AT Co
 Geers, Arthur C., Sgt Co B
 Geiger, Russell E., Pfc Co K
 Gemmer, Arthur H., Pfc Hq Co
 Gendron, Emery O., Pfc Co L
 Gerhardt, Charles B., Pfc Co A
 Gerken, Frederick E., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Giannelli, Michael A., Sgt Cn Co
 Gibbs, Wilson E., Pfc Co C
 Gibson, Charles Pfc Co L
 Gieck, Raymond H., S/Sgt Co B
 Gigante, Joseph, S/Sgt Sv Co
 Gillingham, William G., S/Sgt Co B
 Gilman, Donald R., Pfc Co L
 Gilman, Marshall G., Major Regtl Hq
 Givens, Elmer R., 1st Lt Co M
 Glasser, Jack I., Pfc Co A
 Gluck, Jacob W., S/Sgt AT Co
 Godkin, James C., Sgt Co C
 Goldberg, Isidore, Pfc Co F
 Golderman, Julius, Sgt Co F
 Goldstein, Philip, Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Goncher, James M., Pfc Co K
 Good, John R., T/Sgt Co H
 Goodner, Ronald D., Pfc Co F
 Goranson, Russell W., Pfc o
 Gordy, Sanford N., S/Sgt Co C
 Gormley, William J., 2nd Lt Co D
 Gosselin, Marcel J., Pfc Co B
 Grant, George F., Pvt M.D.
 Gray, Charles R., Pfc Co B
 Grazul, Peter S., T/Sgt Co M
 Greaney, Joseph F., Pfc Co H
 Green, Tolbert E., Pfc M.D.
 Gresh, Clarence H., S/Sgt Co D
 Gribbin, Richard E., Cpl Hq Co
 Griffin, Clifford S. L., T/5 Co C
 Griffin, Robert A., Sgt Co B
 Griffith, Rowe V., Sgt Hq Co 1st Bn
 Grigsby, Frank W., Capt Co D
 Grimes, William E., Pfc Co G
 Grinavich, Anthony G., T/Sgt Co D
 Grove, Robert H., Pfc Hq Co
 Guagliano, Salvatore, T/5 Co I
 Guerry, John C., S/Sgt Co D
 Gustafson, Edward H., Pfc M.D.
 Guga, Edward J., 1st Lt Co M
 Gunder, Clifford E., Cpl Co H
 Gura, John, Pfc Co D
 Gurgiolo, Charles, Pfc Co L
 Gurlanick, Oscar, Pfc M.D.
 Haars, Richard A., Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Haas, Max, Pfc M.D.
 Hagee, Lowell G., T/5 Co B
 Hajjar, James G., T/5 Hq 1st Bn
 Halberg, Abraham H., T/5 M.D.
 Hale, Thomas W., Pfc Co C
 Hall, Chester L., Sgt Co H
 Hamelin, Edward J., 2d Lt Co A
 Hamilton, Charles S., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Hankins, Kenneth, Pfc Co A
 Hanna, John D., M/Sgt Sv Co
 Hannah, Roy L., Pfc Co E
 Hannigan, Jack P., 2nd Lt Co F
 Hansen, Alfred C., Pfc Co L
 Hansen, George J., Pfc Co I
 Hardage, Van D., Pfc Co G
 Harder, Robert K., Pfc Co K
 Hargardine, Claude B., Pfc Co C
 Harmen, Herman V., Jr., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Harp, Albert E., Pfc Co C
 Harrell, Henry S., T/4 M.D.
 Harrelson, Earl G., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Harrington, Aubrey H., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Harris, Frank W., Pfc Hq 3rd Bn
 Harris, James C., T/Sgt Co G
 Harris, John F., S/Sgt Hq Co
 Harris, Marcus L., Pfc Co D
 Harrs, William E., S/Sgt Co C
 Hart, Robert C., Sgt Co F

Harthun, Kenneth C., Pfc Co I
 Hartman, Joseph M., Pfc Co C
 Hatley, Ray B., S/Sgt Co H
 Haught, Warren E., Capt Co E
 Hausler, John H., Pfc Co C
 Harvey, Harold L., S/Sgt Co I
 Hayes, John T., Jr., Sgt Co M
 Haynie, McDonald C., Jr., T/5 Co A
 Hazen, James B., Jr., Pfc Co G
 Head, William J., Jr., Pfc Co B
 Heal, Wallace H., Sgt Co K
 Hediger, Paul L., T/Sgt Co K
 Heflin, Robert R., Pfc Co D
 Hegyes, John J., Sgt Co M
 Heikkila, Toivo J., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Henderson, Allen T., Pfc Co B
 Henderson, John H., Pfc Co E
 Henry, Dolan E., Pfc Co M
 Henson, William C., 1st Lt Co A
 Herland, Jack, T/3 M.D.
 Heroux, Henry A., T/5 Hq 3d Bn
 Herren, Perry G., Pfc Co C
 Herrle, Jacob N., Sgt Co I
 Herrmann, Jack A., Pfc Co G
 Heskett, Albert W., Pfc Co D
 Hicks, Wesley, Sgt Co M
 Hiers, Howard E., T/Sgt At Co
 Higgins, Horace A., Cpl Co A
 Higgins, Thomas J., 2d Lt Co G
 Hilliker, Stanley B., S/Sgt Co L
 Hilt, James B., Pfc Co H
 Hirons, John L., Sgt Co G
 Hitzeman, Richard Pfc Co L
 Hively, Ronald H., Pfc Co G
 Hobson, George Pfc M.D.
 Hodge, Frederick G., 1st Lt Co K
 Hoffman, William J., Pfc Co B
 Hoggatt, John E., Pfc Co E
 Hogue, Arthur R., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Holland, Harvey L., Pfc Co L
 Holland, Henry G., T/5 At Co
 Hollas, Wilbert F., Pfc Co G
 Holliday, Clayton L., S/Sgt Co D
 Holliday, Robert L., Cpl
 Hollister, Elwood D., Jr., Capt Sv Co
 Holloway, Jack H., Pfc Co I
 Holloway, James H., Pvt Co A
 Holmes, James C., T/Sgt Cn Co
 Holmes John A., Jr., S/Sgt Co B
 Holt, Jr., Felix T., 2nd Lt Co D
 Holt, Graddon L., Pfc Co K
 Holt, Harold J., Pfc Co K
 Honrath, Norbert G., Pfc Co L
 Hood, William O., T/Sgt Co B
 Hooker, Olen P., Pfc Co L
 Hopper, Virgil D., Pfc Co L
 Horler, Thomas W., 2nd Lt Co F
 Horn, Edward G., Pfc Co C
 Horning, Jr., William A., Pfc Co A
 Horrigan, Harold S., T/4 M.D.
 Horvath, Frank L., Pfc Co A
 Hoskins, Luther, Pfc Co E
 Houck, Jacob R., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Howard, Leland L., Pfc Co A
 Howell, Gordon B., Pfc Co G
 Hoyt, Earl D., Pfc Co D
 Hoyt, Nathaniel S., Pfc Co C
 Hudspeth, Ralph C., 2d Lt Hq 3d Bn
 Huffman, Robert R., Sgt Co A
 Huggins, Marvin, Pfc Co G
 Hummel, Charles F., Pfc Co I
 Hunt, Francis A., Pfc Co B
 Hunt, Raymond P., S/Sgt Co K
 Hunt, Richard E., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Hunt, Talmage H., Pfc Co F
 Hunter, John F., Pfc Co E
 Huntley, Richmond A., Pfc Co K
 Hurley, Andrew F., Pfc AT Co
 Hurley, Borromer W., 1st Sgt Co F
 Hust, William, S/Sgt Co L
 Hutsell, Wilbur L., Pfc Co A
 Imler, Jack D., Pfc Co I
 Incatasciato, Nunzio J., Pfc Co D
 Jackson, Thomas P., Pfc Co F
 Jacobs, Joseph R., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Jacobson, David A., Pfc Co C
 Jaegers, Joseph R., Pvt Co C
 Janater, William M., T/4 Hq Co
 Janes, Ernest L., Major Hq Co 3d Bn
 Janikian, Charles G., Pfc Co L
 Jansen, Walter H., 1st Lt Hq 1st Bn
 Jarosz, Joseph, Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Jedele, Paul W., Capt AT Co
 Jennrich, Edward W., Cpl M.D.
 Jepson, Paul N., Jr., Sgt Co B
 Jernigan, Marvin L., Jr., Pfc Co A
 Jerome, Leeman N., 1st Lt Co M
 Jim, Terry G., Pfc Co G
 Jobs, Ronald L., Pfc
 Johns, Melvin W., Pfc Co L
 Johnson, Charles R., Sgt Co A
 Johnson, Edward S., Capt Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Johnson, Ernest E., Pfc Co F
 Johnson, Harry E., 2nd Lt Co I
 Johnson, Howard J., Pfc Co H
 Johnson, James W. L., Sgt Co K
 Johnson, Jan E., Pfc Co I
 Johnson, Melvin C., Pfc Co D
 Johnson, Melvin M., 1st Sgt Co E
 Johnson, Morris M., Pfc Co A
 Johnson, Nils A., T/5 Hq Co
 Johnson, Oather E., Pfc Co I
 Johnson, Ralph A., Pfc Co F
 Johnson, Roy C., S/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Johnson, Samuel, Pvt Co G
 Johnson, Walter R., Capt Hq Co
 Johnson, Walter W., Pfc Co I
 Johnston, Almon H., Sgt Co D
 Jones, Darrell E., Pfc Co G
 Jones, Elmer L., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Jones, Eric W., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Jones, Jessie L., T/5 Co F

Jones, Kenneth J. S., 1st Lt Hq Co 1st Bn
 Jones, Mansell L., T/Sgt Co I
 Jones, Ralph J., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Jones, Randolph L., Capt Co K
 Jones, Wesley E., 2nd Lt Co L
 Jordan, Elmer D., Pfc Co L
 Jordan, Max E., Pvt Co K
 Jordan, Oscar W., Pfc Co L
 Josefsberg, Leonard, T/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Jacobus, Edward W., T/5
 Kallai, Louis J., T/4 Sv Co
 Kania, Joseph J., S/Sgt Co E
 Kanter, William E., 1st Lt Co F
 Kaplan, Abraham H., T/5 M.D.
 Karch, Robert J., S/Sgt Hq Co 3rd Bn
 Kaschalk, James R., Pfc Hq Co
 Kastner, Rexford P., M/Sgt Sv Co
 Kasun, John M., Pfc
 Kaszuba, Alexander J., T/4 Sv Co
 Katz, Charles, CWO Sv Co
 Kauffman, Donald E., Sgt Co H
 Keating, Bernard M., S/Sgt AT Co
 Keddie, James A., 1st Lt Co E
 Keefer, Richard N., Pfc Co F
 Keene, John B., Capt Hq Co 3d Bn
 Keil, Eugene C., Sgt Co G
 Kelley, Alfred H., T/5 M.D.
 Kelley, Freeman, Sgt Co M
 Kelley, Raymond D., Jr., Pfc Co L
 Kelly, Bartholomew F., Sgt Co H
 Kelly, Francis J., S/Sgt
 Kelly, James E., T/Sgt Co G
 Kelly, James J., S/Sgt Co H
 Kelly, Lester J., Jr., Sgt Co M
 Kelly, Paul E., Pfc Co H
 Kelly, Robert M., 2nd Lt Hq 2nd Bn
 Kennedy, Donald R., Pfc Co C
 Keener, Raymond B., S/Sgt Co F
 Keough, Thomas R., Cpl Co M
 Kerible, Albert P., Cpl M.D.
 Kerns, Joseph M., Pfc Co L
 Kerr, Merel H., S/Sgt Co L
 Kimball, Ralph H., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Kimmey, Roland C., S/Sgt Co A
 King, Dalton D., Pfc Co K
 King, Norris D., Pfc
 King, Wendell H., Pfc Co F
 King, William F., S/Sgt Co L
 Kirk, Walter S., Jr., Sgt Co E
 Kirchen, Solomon, Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Kislak, Nicholas, M/Sgt Sv Co
 Kitchens, James B., Pfc Co I
 Kitzmiller, Donald E., Pfc Co A
 Kleinwaks, Sidney, 1st Lt Sv Co
 Klevesahl, Fred C., Pfc Co D
 Kleiber, Clyde F., Pfc Co C
 Klosowski, Louis M., Pfc Cn Co
 Klubben, William S., Pfc Co A
 Kness, John M., Pfc AT Co
 Knight, William C., Sgt Co G
 Kocher, Robert C., Pfc Co G
 Kofod, Sheldon W., Sgt Co F
 Kopecky, Donald H., Pfc Co C
 Korchmar, Bennett, Sgt Co G
 Korn, Frederick C., 1st Lt Co D
 Kovalsky, John J., S/Sgt Co D
 Kowalewski, Stanley E., T/5 Co D
 Koy, Douglas J., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Krane, Francis J., Pfc Co G
 Krajcovic, Rudolph A., Sgt AT Co
 Kramer, Nicholas W., Pfc Co L
 Kraszewski, Leonard M., 2nd Lt Co M
 Krings, Frederick C., 1st Lt Hq 2nd Bn
 Kutzman, Paul J., T/5 M.D.
 Kuzmanski, Benjamin, T/Sgt Co F
 Laakso, Leo H., Pfc Co A
 Labar, Sherwood, Pfc Co A
 Lacey, Thomas A., 1st Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Lacy, William W., 1st Co H
 Lamb, William B., 2nd Lt
 Lamison, Rogers W., Pfc
 Lampert, Walter H., S/Sgt AT Co
 Lancaster, Walter E., Pfc Co M
 Landers, Malcolm C., Pfc Co A
 Langdon, Robert L., Pfc Co C
 Lange, Harlowe R., Pfc Co H
 Langer, Clarence A., T/5 Regt Hq Co
 Lanius, Harold J., Pfc Co B
 Lanza, Herbert H., Pfc Regt Hq
 LaRoche, Gerald A., T/4 Hq Co
 Larson, Arthur B., S/Sgt Co M
 Larson, Marvin L., 1st Sgt Co I
 Larson, Oliver V., Pfc Co C
 LaSelva, Patsy J., Sgt Hq 3d Bn
 Laskowicz, Joseph L., Pfc Co M
 Laurin, Richard K., Pfc Cn Co
 Laymon, Warren J. C., Pfc Co A
 Lazarus, Elliot J., T/5 Hq 1st Bn
 Leavy, Eugene T., Pfc Hq Co
 LeComte, Conrad M., Pfc M.D.
 LeCrone, Clarence L., Capt Hq Co
 Lederer, Theodore H., T/Sgt Co M
 Ledford, William E., Pfc Co F
 Lee, Clifford O., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Lee, Robert E., T/Sgt Co H
 Lefebvre, Leon, T/5 M.D.
 LeGassie, Robert S., Pfc Co D
 Legler, Bruno W., Cpl Hq 1st Bn
 Lehrer, Robert, Pfc Co E
 Leinbaugh, Wyman J., T/4 M.D.
 Lemmond, Lonnie H., T/4 M.D.
 Lemr, Fred C., Jr., 1st Lt Hq 3d Bn
 Leshner, Carl F., Sgt Co K
 Lester, Calvin C., Pfc Co F
 Levesque, William J., S/Sgt Co F
 Lewis, Benjamin C., Pfc Co I
 Light, Samuel J., Capt Hq 1st Bn
 Lippart, George F., Pfc Co F
 Liska, Robert C., Pfc Co G
 Litherland, Clarence D., Pfc
 Little, D. W., S/Sgt Co D
 Littlefield, William, S/Sgt Co I

Lobner, John F., Jr., S/Sgt Co B
 Lockman, Stephen J., 1st Lt AT Co
 Lofton, Doran A., Pfc Co G
 Logan, Burton B., Pfc M.D.
 Lohenitz, Michael, T/5 Hq Co
 Lollo, Alfred F., T/Sgt Hq Co 3d Bn
 Lomasney, Emmet W., Pfc Co H
 Lombard, Cyrus S., Sgt Co B
 Lonsberg, John P., 1st Lt Co F
 Lorber, Arthur D., Pfc Hq 2d Bn
 Lovan, Joe L., Pfc Co A
 Lovelace, Earl R., Pfc Co A
 Loy, Harley R., Pfc Co K
 Lozzi, Dante A., Sgt Hq 3d Bn
 Luna, Luis H., Pfc Co F
 Lundy, Glenn A., Pfc Co A
 Lustica, Sylvester J., 2nd Lt Co H
 Lydick, Robert A., Pfc Co E
 MacGregor, Lauchlin S., Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 MacNay, James B., 2nd Lt Co B
 Mallam, Robert A., T/5 Hq Co
 Manchester, Edwin V., T/Sgt Co E
 Mangeot, Adolph G., Pfc Co F
 Mangiaracina, Frank, T/Sgt Co C
 Manzi, John P., T/Sgt Co F
 Marcum, Joe L., Pfc Co F
 Marczak, Dimitri M., T/3 M.D.
 Marlatt, Robert, 1st Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Marley, John F., Pfc Cn Co
 Maro, Edward R., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Marone, Nick P., S/Sgt AT Co
 Marriner, Harry F., Pfc Co K
 Marshall, Joseph G., Pfc Co D
 Martens, Kurt K., S/Sgt Co D
 Martin, Edmund N., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Martin, Lynwood T., T/Sgt Co K
 Martin, Oscar H., Cpl Co D
 Martinez, Margarito, Jr., Pfc Co L
 Mason, Walter R., 2nd Lt Co C
 Mastrogiovanni, Richard R., S/Sgt Co G
 Matheny, Charles R., Pfc Co F
 Mathews, George C., Pfc Co B
 Matteson, Warren F., Sgt Co D
 Matthew, Melvin R., 1st Lt Co H
 Matthews, Clarence, Pfc Co K
 Mattingly, Joseph A., Pfc Co I
 Mattison, Francis H., Pfc Co I
 Matz, Harold L., Sgt Co E
 Maurer, Abraham, S/Sgt Co C
 Mavrinac, Albert A., S/Sgt Co H
 Mayorga, Francisco M., Pfc Co L
 McCallum, Clarence T., Pfc Co G
 McCarthy, John J., Capt Co B
 McClinton, Robert S/Sgt Co H
 McClure, Alan C., Pfc Co E
 McCourt, Robert G., Cpl Co A
 McCreless, Clarence J., T/5 Cn Co
 McCrum, Ralph C., Major Hq Co 1st Bn
 McCullough, Francis, 1st Sgt Co C
 McDaniel, James T., Pfc Co I
 McDonald, Bernard J., Sgt Co A
 McDonald, Brown, Jr., Capt M.D.
 McDonald, Lyle A., T/Sgt Co I
 McDonnell, Edward J., 2nd Lt Cn Co
 McFarland Duard E., Pfc Co A
 McFaul, Alexander A., S/Sgt Co E
 McInnis, James R., Pfc Co L
 McKinley, Charles F., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 McKissick, Clayton P., Pfc Co F
 McLallen, Charles F., 1st Lt Co D
 McLean, Howard W., Cpl Co H
 McMahan, R. V., Pfc Co G
 McMurphy, John D., T/5 Hq 3d Bn
 McMurray, Eugene P., 1st Sgt Co B
 McNamara, Thomas R., Pfc Co F
 McQuay, Charles C., T/Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Meade, Everard K., Jr., Capt Co G
 Meade, Sterling H., Pfc Co A
 Meadows, Willie M., Sgt Co L
 Meglio, Anthony R., T/Sgt Sv Co
 Mendoza, Remedios S., S/Sgt Co C
 Meyer, William J., Sgt Co M
 Mignerey, Harry F., Capt MC
 Mika, Bernie L., S/Sgt Co G
 Mikucki, Joseph J., S/Sgt Co M
 Mila, Edward H., Pfc Co F
 Miller, Alfred I., Pvt Co I
 Miller, John A., Pfc Co C
 Miller, William A., S/Sgt Co E
 Miller, William H., 1st Sgt Sv Co
 Mims, Jackson V., S/Sgt Co M
 Minge, Sam, Jr., Pfc AT Co
 Miniati, Edmund M., S/Sgt Co G
 Minkin, Myron H., Pfc Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Miraglia, Josiph M., Pfc Hq 3rd Bn
 Mitchell, Eugene H., Pfc Co L
 Mitchell, George E., Jr., Pfc Co L
 Mitchell, Glenn E., Pfc Co I
 Moisan, William J., Jr., Pfc Co G
 Moler, Buron L., Pfc Co L
 Momany, George A., T/5 Co G
 Monahan, Matthew F., S/Sgt Co I
 Monchino, Dominick R., S/Sgt Co F
 Monroe, William C., Pfc Co L
 Monser, John R., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Montagano, Michael, Cpl M.D.
 Montgomery, Ernest W., T/5 M.D.
 Moore, James W., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Moore, Lamar H., Pfc Co E
 Moore, Richard C., Pfc M.D.
 Moore, Robert P., Pfc Co M
 Moretto, Mito, Pfc Co H
 Morgan, Edward W., Jr., Cpl Co H
 Morgan, Edward W., J., Cpl Co H
 Morgan, Howard, Jr., Pfc Co A
 Morgan, William R., Sgt Hq 1st Bn
 Moriarty, Leo W., T/5 M.D.
 Morris, Joseph D., Pfc Co H
 Morris, Perry L. V., 1st Lt Co C
 Morris, Robert E., Pfc Co M
 Morrison, Alvis C., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Morse, Gordon E., Pfc Co L

Morton, Herbert, Pfc Co B
 Moscardini, Jr., Louis G., 1st Sgt Co L
 Mosley, Willie, Pfc
 Mottola, Anthony N., S/Sgt Cn Co
 Mowbray, Jr., Charles S., Pfc Co E
 Mullens, Willie J., T/4 M.D.
 Mulderrig, Michael W., Sgt Co I
 Muller, William A., S/Sgt Co L
 Mulvihill, Francis J., S/Sgt Co L
 Munson, Fred F., Pfc Co I
 Murphy, Kenneth, S/Sgt AT Co
 Murphy, Richard H., Sgt Co K
 Murphy, William G., S/Sgt Co D
 Murray, Charles W., Pfc
 Murray, Gordon D., Pfc Co G
 Murray, Joseph S., T/Sgt Co G
 Murray, Robert L., Cpl Cn Co
 Muscarello, Salvatore, Pfc Co H
 Muse, Grady F., S/Sgt Hq Co 1st Bn
 Mussari, Floyd R., Pfc Co A
 Myers, Lloyd S., Pfc M.D.
 Nale, Richard L., Pfc Co L
 Nance, Joe L., Pfc Co D
 Napoles, Henry, Pfc Co A
 Nappi, Peter P., Pfc Co G
 Narciso, Henry S., S/Sgt Hq Co 3d
 Nardone, George, S/Sgt Co B
 Neal, Carl E., Pfc Co B
 Nelson, Franklin L., S/Sgt Co M
 Nelson, Percy F., Pfc M.D.
 Nelson, William E., 1st Lt Co K
 Nenni, Herman, Pfc Co D
 Ness, Richard C., 1st Lt Co G
 Nettleton, David C., Pfc Hq Co 2n Bn
 Newman, Richard T., Co C
 Newport, William M., Pfc Co K
 Newsome, Elbert B., T/5 Co B
 Newton, Joseph B., 1st Lt Co K
 Nichols, William W., S/Sgt Co H
 Nicholson, John J., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Nickerson, George W., 2nd Lt Co E
 Nickerson, Irving J., Sgt Co K
 Niemas, Frank S., Sgt Co M
 Nigro, Robert E., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Noble, George A., S/Sgt Co F
 Nolan, John P., 1st Sgt Co C
 Noland, James T., S/Sgt Co H
 Norman, Russell W., Pfc Co G
 Norris, Dannie R., Pfc Co L
 Norris, Loyd, Jr., T/5 At Co
 North, Paul, Pfc Co F
 Novak, Richard F., Pfc Co E
 Novak, Stanley, Pfc Hq 3rd Bn
 Novinsky, Edward A., 1st Lt Co A
 Oaks, George R., Pfc M.D.
 O'Connell, Michael J., S/Sgt Co M
 O'Connor, John J., Pfc Co D
 O'Connor, Roderick W., Cpl Hq Co 1st Bn
 Odell, Dorris B., Major Hq 1st Bn
 Odenice, Charles L., 1st Lt Hq Co
 O'Brien, Howard C., T/5 AT Co
 O'Drain, Thomas A., Pfc Co A
 Oesterle, Eric C., Pfc Cn Co
 O'Leary, Timothy J., Pfc Co D
 Olejarsz, Alfred R., Pfc
 Olesen, Walter L., Pfc Co D
 Oliver, Charles E., 2d Lt AT Co
 Oliver, Clyde M., Pfc Co K
 Olson, Clarence E., 1st Lt Hq Co
 O'Malley, Clement C., T/5 Hq 2nd Bn
 Ophaug, Orville H., 1st Lt Cn Co
 Orel, William L., T/Sgt Co F
 Orisik, Frank, T/Sgt Co A
 Orosz, Victor F., Pfc Co B
 Osborne, Vernon E., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Ostrow, Stanley V., Pfc Co E
 Overman, Paul W., T/4 Co L
 Owens, John P., 1st Sgt Co D
 Padgett, Howell, Pvt M.D.
 Page, Wayne H., 1st Lt Cn Co
 Pahikainen, Niilo J. S., S/Sgt Co K
 Pajak, Leo, Sgt Hq Co 3rd Bn
 Pannell, William L., S/Sgt Co G
 Papadonis, James, Pfc Co L
 Parr, Thomas R., Sgt Co L
 Passero, Sam P., 1st Lt
 Paszkowski, Anthony J., T/Sgt Co I
 Paura, Michael J., S/Sgt Co G
 Payne, Burnus L., 1st Lt Co L
 Peabody, Jr., Harry O., T/Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Pearson, Wilbur L., Sgt Co L
 Pease, Russell E., T/4 Hq 2nd Bn
 Pena, Richard, Sgt Co L
 Pencek, Leonard D., 2nd Lt Hq 3d Bn
 Pepin, Jr., George J., Pfc
 Perkins, Douglas H., Pfc Co I
 Perkins, George T., Pfc Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Perna, Louis, Pfc Co A
 Perrin, Jr., Harry J., Pvt M.D.
 Perry, George, Jr., Pfc Co G
 Perry, Joe H., S/Sgt Co K
 Petch, James E., Pfc Hq Co 3d Bn
 Peters, Edward E., S/Sgt Co A
 Petrell, Roy H., Co F
 Petrie, Ernest A., T/5 Hq 2nd Bn
 Petrosky, Casimir R., Sgt Co L
 Petruzelli, Jack J., Pfc Co C
 Pfenning, Wilbur G., Pfc Co B
 Phillips, Herbert F., Pfc M.D.
 Pick, Sidney A., T/4 M.D.
 Pierce, Cecil J., Pfc Co B
 Pierce, Lucian M., Pfc Co L
 Pierce, William D., Pfc Co H
 Pietrocarlo, Joseph L., T/Sgt AT Co
 Pignataro, Joseph F., Sgt Co A
 Pikna, John F., Cpl Co D
 Piombo, Frank, Pfc Co E
 Pion, Marvin J., Sgt Co C
 Pirsic, Anthony J., T/4 M.D.
 Pitman, Joe L., Pfc Co F
 Pittman, John W., 2nd Lt Co E
 Plamp, John E., Jr., Pfc Co M

Plesa, Michael J., Cpl Co H
 Pletzer, Gottfried, Sgt Co E
 Poirrier, James A., Pfc Co G
 Polack, Nicholas, T/5
 Pole, Frank N., M/Sgt Regt Hq Co
 Pollitt, Donald F., 1st Lt Co H
 Pollock, Arthur E., Major M.D.
 Polis, Daniel T/Sgt Cn Co
 Polmanteer, Keith E., S/Sgt Co H
 Pondo, Nicholas, T/Sgt Co F
 Ponty, Herman P., 1st Lt Hq 2nd Bn
 Pool, Everett G., Pfc Co M
 Pope, Vernon L., Pfc Co K
 Portman, David F., Sgt Co I
 Porzio, John A., S/Sgt Hq Co
 Posey, Vernon J., Jr., Sgt Co M
 Pouliot, Gerald L., S/Sgt Co C
 Powers, William C., Pfc Co F
 Pozner, Irving, S/Sgt Co F
 Prenderville, George R., Sgt Co M
 Pressman, Irvin L., Pfc Co D
 Price, Harold A., S/Sgt Co D
 Price, Jr., James W., S/Sgt Co I
 Price, Murl P., Pfc Co L
 Priest, Hugh L., Pvt Co L
 Prisco, Joseph F., S/Sgt Co B
 Proft, Joseph E., S/Sgt Co M
 Provencher, Henry R., Cpl Co D
 Puckett, Robert R., 1st Lt Co D
 Pugh, Delmar A., 1st Lt Cn Co
 Pugh, Paul E., 2nd Lt Hq 2nd Bn
 Purse, William G., Jr., T/Sgt Co G
 Purvis, Charles R., 1st Sgt AT Co
 Putzu, Nicholas J., Pfc Co A
 Pykonen, William A., Pfc Co F
 Qualls, Jonnie C., Pfc Co L
 Rabinowitz, Morris, Pfc Co I
 Rachowicz, Stanley, Tec 5 Co G
 Racy, Julius J., Sgt Co F
 Ragan, Jr., Herbert S/Sgt Co K
 Ragonesi, Anthony M., Sgt Co B
 Rahn, Marvin E., Sgt Co I
 Raia, Domin'ck, T/4 Hq 1st Bn
 Raider, Steve W., Sgt Co H
 Rajevich, Nathan J., S/Sgt Co M
 Rajotte, Edwin J., 2d Lt Co K
 Ralston, Kenneth R., Sgt Co I
 Rambo, Marvin L., Sgt Hq 3d Bn
 Ramey, Raymond, Pfc Co G
 Ramos, Manoel D., S/Sgt AT Co
 Ranieri, Anthony, T/5 M.D.
 Ranieri, Diodato, Pfc M.D.
 Reaman, Leroy T., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Rece, Donald A., Pfc Co C
 Reddington, William J., Pfc Co B
 Reece, Charles E., Pfc Hq 2d Bn
 Reeves, Seab E. A., 1st Lt Co B
 Reiche, Robert C., Sgt Cn Co
 Reilly, John C., T/5 Hq 3d Bn
 Reinhart, Frank M., Sgt Co C
 Reneau, William E., Pfc Co M
 Reynolds, John A., Pfc Co G
 Rhea, Jack L., Capt Hq 3d Bn
 Rhodus, Ernest W., S/Sgt Co A
 Rich, Joseph R., Capt M.D.
 Richko, Mike Pfc Co E
 Rieth, Joseph J., Pfc Cn Co
 Rifemberrick, Hudson C., Cpl Co L
 Rimlinger, James L., 1st Lt Co C
 Riser, Rodney T., Pfc Co E
 Ritchey, Edward C., Pfc Co B
 Rizzo, Alfred J., 2nd Lt Co K
 Rizzolo, Joe V., Pfc Co L
 Roberts, Jack B., Pfc Co B
 Roberts, Willard H., S/Sgt Co B
 Robertson, Charles E., Pfc Co K
 Robinson, Claude O., T/5 Co C
 Rockwell, Robert H., Pfc Co G
 Rodin, Anthony J., S/Sgt Co D
 Rogers, Richard F., T/5 Hq 1st Bn
 Rollerson, Darrell D., Pfc Co K
 Rollins, Louis B., 1st Lt Co H
 Romero, Candelario R., Pfc Co H
 Romero, Paul V., 2nd Lt Co K
 Romero, William, Pfc Co L
 Ronan, Patrick J., S/Sgt
 Rosencutter, John F. W., Cpl Co M
 Rosenfeld, Charles, Pfc AT Co
 Rosenthal, Sidney B., Pfc M.D.
 Ross, Claude R., S/Sgt Co L
 Roswick, Seymour B., S/Sgt M.D.
 Rotko, Alex, T/Sgt Hq 2d Bn
 Roush, Leo R. E., Pfc Co E
 Routzon, Merle D., Sgt Co E
 Rowe, Richard M., Pfc Co D
 Rubano, Aldo T., Pfc Co F
 Rundell, Edmund L., Capt Hq 1st Bn
 Rush, Robert H., 2nd Lt Co G
 Russell, Charles L., S/Sgt Co E
 Russell, Donald E., Pfc Co C
 Russell, John L., S/Sgt Sv Co
 Russell, Richard M., Pfc Co I
 Ryan, William H., Sgt Co D
 Ryans, Robert F., S/Sgt Co C
 Sabia, James V., S/Sgt Co B
 Sabo, Robert J., Sgt Co G
 Sainz, Russell J., Sgt Co E
 Sales, Samuel, S/Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Santopietro, William M., Jr., Pfc M.D.
 Santora, Paul J., T/Sgt Co B
 Sargent, Daniel B., S/Sgt Co I
 Sass, Alfred C., Pfc Co F
 Sather, Gerald G., Sgt Co E
 Satko, Alfred, T/Sgt Co E
 Sauer, Richard W., T/4 Sv Co
 Sayles, Robert E., Pfc Co A
 Sawyer, Dwight L., Jr., Cpl Hq Co
 Scarborough, Leland D., Capt Cn Co
 Scarpitta, Anthony, 1st Lt M.D.
 Schaefer, Arthur J., 1st Lt Sv Co
 Schecter, George, Pvt M.D.
 Scheetz, William C., Sgt Co L

Scheller, John A., Jr., Pfc Co E
 Schellhammer, Ernest L., Pfc Co A
 Schiff, Allan, Pfc Co D
 Schlocker Irvin, S/Sgt Co L
 Schmidt, Carl J., Pfc Cn Co
 Schmidt, Richard E., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Schmuker, Lawrence L., Pfc Co B
 Schnall, Milton, 1st Lt Co G
 Schneller, Jr., A. H., Sgt Co A
 Schott, Jacob, Capt M.D.
 Schrader, Eugene A., S/Sgt Co C
 Schroll, George W., Pfc Co K
 Schuler, William P., Pfc
 Schultz, Lawrence F., Pfc Co D
 Schultz, William H., T/Sgt Co B
 Schwartzkopf, Richard E., Sgt Co C
 Schweitzer, Walter L., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Schwenck, William A., T/5 M.D.
 Scooco, Carmello F., Pfc Co H
 Seifried, Robert C., T/Sgt Co H
 Seiler, Fred J., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Selkowitz, Fred, T/Sgt M.D.
 Sells, Cecil O., 1st Sgt Hq 3rd Bn
 Senitta, George L., Pfc Co H
 Seweryniak, Walter P., Pfc Co A
 Sharar, Rudolph S., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Shaulinski, William J., Pfc Co D
 Shearer, John R., 2nd Lt Co L
 Shepherd, Robert F., Pfc Co B
 Sherman, Kenneth E., Pfc Co K
 Sherman, Vernon L., S/Sgt Co F
 Shlay, Howard A., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Shockey, Harold R., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Sieczkowski, Mathew C., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Sigman, Morris, T/4 M.D.
 Silk, Edward A., 1st Lt Co E
 Silverman, Hyman L., S/Sgt Co A
 Silvestri, Angelo D., Cpl Co D
 Simac, Frank R., Pfc Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Simko, Bert J., S/Sgt Co E
 Simmons, Woodrow W., 2nd Lt Co D
 Simpson, Herbert D., Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Simpson, William S., Jr., Pfc Co E
 Sinacore, Peter T., Pfc Co I
 Sinofsky, Albert J., 1st Lt Co C
 Siuba, Stanley A., S/Sgt Co A
 Skawinski, John J., S/Sgt Co I
 Skiba, Frank P., S/Sgt Co F
 Skolnik, Alex, Pfc Co E
 Skotarski, Daniel J., T/Sgt Co K
 Smith, Earl S., Sgt Co E
 Smith, Edwin D., Pfc Co A
 Smith, Frank J., Sgt Co L
 Smith, Freeman R., Pfc M.D.
 Smith, Harry J., Pvt M.D.
 Smith, Harry L., S/Sgt Co F
 Smith, Howard D., Capt Co F
 Smith, James L., Pfc Co L
 Smith, John D., Sgt Hq Co
 Smith, John L., T/Sgt Co F
 Smith, Roscoe E., Jr., Pfc Co A
 Smith, Veloid E., Pfc Co E
 Smith, Walter P., Jr., 2d Lt Co H
 Smithson, Carl W., T/Sgt Co D
 Smyth, Douglas S., T/3 M.D.
 Sneed, Robert V., T/Sgt Co E
 Snell, Raymond H., 1st Lt Co I
 Snodgrass, Boyd B., Pfc Co K
 Snowden, Ernest L., Pfc Co F
 Snyder, Richard W., Pfc Co K
 Solie, DeWayne O., T/5 Hq Co
 Solomon, Murray, Pfc Co K
 Somers, Robert R., Pfc Co G
 Sonitsky, Abraham, T/5
 Sorg, Eldon I., Pfc Co L
 Sowels, Wilber L., Sgt Co L
 Sowul, Joseph E., Capt Sv Co
 Spalter, Samuel, Pfc Hq Co 1st Bn
 Sparrow, Paul E., Sgt Co A
 Spear, Hanley F., S/Sgt Co B
 Spence, Mack, Pfc Co D
 Spiegelberg, Fred W., Capt Co B
 Spinney, Gordon E., T/Sgt Co K
 Sponder, Samuel S., Pfc Co G
 Sport, James H., Pfc Co I
 Squires, Donald J., Pfc Co D
 Sroka, Andrew R., Pfc Co M
 Stach, Robert K., Pfc
 Stahl, Leroy H., 1st Lt Co M
 Stahly, Reldon L., Pfc Co A
 Stalikas, Nicholas, 2nd Lt Co G
 Stall, Joe E., Pfc Co M
 Stankus, Julius R., S/Sgt Co H
 Stanley, Daniel J., Pfc Co A
 Stawiecki, Bernard B., T/4 Co M
 Stayton, Floyd E., Lt Col Hq
 Steele, Ira J., S/Sgt Co I
 Stefinovec, Gabrelle, Pfc Co H
 Stensberg, Donald E., Pfc AT Co
 Sterk, Gerrit, Pfc M.D.
 Stevenson, James E., T/4 Sv Co
 Stewart, Elliot B., Pfc Co E
 St. Laurent, Oscar A., S/Sgt Co F
 Stoddard, William E., 2nd Lt
 Stohr, John W., Pfc
 Stone, Elgie J., Capt Hq
 Stone, Howard A., Pfc M.D.
 St. Onge, Arnold W., Pfc Co D
 Stoner, Horace W., Pvt Co A
 Stookey, Daniel, Pfc Co D
 Story, Leonard A., S/Sgt Hq 2nd Bn
 Stoy, Herbert E., Pfc Co H
 Street, Kyle, Sgt Hq 3
 Strenk, Paul, Pfc M.D.
 Strickland, Robert W., Pfc Co H
 Strickler, Philip A., Capt Co A
 Strobel, Oscar K., Pfc Co I
 Stupak, Ralph P., S/Sgt Hq 3d Bn
 Styers, James A., Pfc
 Sulewski, Edward J., Pfc Co K
 Sullivan, Eugene J., Pfc
 Sullivan, James T., S/Sgt Co M

Summers, Edmund A., Pfc Co B
 Summers, Percy W., Pfc Co M
 Swaim, Alan D., Pfc Co G
 Swann, Jr., William T., S/Sgt Co A
 Swinyer, Paul G., Pfc Hq 1st Bn
 Swenson, Robert D., Pfc Co B
 Sympson, William P., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Tarbert, Carroll E., 2nd Lt Co C
 Taylor, Garland W., Pfc
 Taylor, Hilbert R., Sgt Co K
 Taylor, Kendall D., Pfc Hq Co
 Taylor, Johnny W., Pfc Sv Co
 Teitebaum, Samuel, 1st Lt Co L
 Thatcher, Archie H., Cpl Co M
 Thibodeau, Adrian, Pvt Co I
 Thomas, Charles F., Pfc Hq Co
 Thomas, Richard L., Pfc M.D.
 Tillett, Thomas J., S/Sgt Co H
 Todd, Dougad B., Pfc Co C
 Torbett, Jr., Conley C., Capt Hq 2d Bn
 Torsey, James L., S/Sgt Co L
 Touchton, Curtis E., T/4 Hq 3d Bn
 Townsend, Hubert C., Sgt Co D
 Townsend, Richard C., T/5 Co K
 Tramel, Oliver T., S/Sgt Co L
 Trant, Henry C., Pfc Co E
 Trilinsky, Milton, Pfc Co E
 Trinker, Gordon A., Pfc Co C
 Trostle, William, Jr., S/Sgt Co I
 Truitt, James K., 1st Lt Co E
 Tuccillo, Jr., Joseph T., 2nd Lt Co I
 Turmelle, Wilfrid J., S/Sgt Co H
 Turner, Don L., Pfc Co E
 Turner, Harry L., S/Sgt Co D
 Turner, Herbert L., 2nd Lt Hq 3d Bn
 Twynham, Theodore T., Pfc Hq Co 2nd Bn
 Tyler, Jr., Samuel, Capt Hq 2nd Bn
 Tyree, Karl T., Jr., Pfc Co D
 Tyree, Samuel J., Pfc M.D.
 Urbanski, John C., Pfc Co B
 Urresti, Alfred, Pfc M.D.
 Vaida, Mitchell, Pfc Co L
 Valenti, LaChance L., S/Sgt Co L
 Vampotic, Albert F., S/Sgt Co F
 Vanarsdale, Russell, Pfc Co E
 Van Dervort, George W., Pfc Co C
 Van Detta, Clement, T/5
 Van Duren, Jack C., Pfc Co F
 Van Pelt, George T., T/Sgt Hq 3d Bn
 Veach, Robert T., 2nd Lt Cn Co
 Vermillion, Daniel O., S/Sgt Co E
 Verner, Marvin E., Pfc Co C
 Vest, Carl A., Sgt Hq Co 3d Bn
 Vida, George, Pvt Co E
 Vidmar, Albert A., Pfc
 Visser, John E., 1st Lt Hq 2nd Bn
 Voelker, John E., Pfc Co D
 Volinsky, Albert, Sgt Co K
 Vullmahn, Christ, Pfc Co G
 Wade, Fred, Pfc
 Waggoner, Fred C., Pfc Co H
 Wahl, Edward J., S/Sgt Co A
 Waid, David D., Pfc Co D
 Waldie, James R., 1st Lt Co B
 Walker, Garnie C., Pfc Co G
 Walls, Roy C., Pfc AT Co
 Walsh, John M., S/Sgt Co I
 Walsh, John W., S/Sgt Co F
 Walters, George F. H., 2nd Lt Co M
 Wannamaker, Harry C., Pfc Co A
 Ward, Delmar R., T/5 Co A
 Ward, Joseph H., 1st Lt Co F
 Ward, Theodore A., Pfc Co K
 Warda, Edward P., Pfc Co A
 Wargo, William, T/Sgt Co C
 Warren, William W., S/Sgt
 Watson, Alexander M., T/4 Co M
 Watson, John B., 1st Sgt Co I
 Watson, Ralph E., Pfc Co D
 Wax, Bernard, Pfc Co C
 Wax, Stennis D., 2nd Lt Co C
 Weaver, Charles E., Sgt Co D
 Weaver, Morgan, T/4 Co M
 Weaver, Richard A., Pfc Co L
 Weaver, William O., Pfc Co C
 Webb, George W., Pfc Co G
 Webb, Paul N., Pfc Co B
 Weber, Gerald G., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Weckerman, Joseph J., T/Sgt Co K
 Weikert, Philip H., Pfc Co E
 Weil, Harold L., 1st Lt
 Weinstein, Daniel, Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Weisel, Harvey C., Jr., Lt Col Hq 2nd Bn
 Weiss, Alfred, Sgt Hq Co 1st Bn
 Weiss, Irving, Pfc Co B
 Wenstrup, John A., Pfc
 Wertz, Donald H., S/Sgt Co I
 Wessel, Albert W., 1st Sgt Co A
 West, Vernon C., T/5 M.D.
 Westfall, Carroll B., Pvt Co C
 Wharton, Phineas C., S/Sgt
 Wheeler, Donald W., Sgt Co I
 Whitaker, William J., S/Sgt Co H
 White, Cecil P., Pfc Hq Co
 White, Rommie C., Jr., Sgt Co I
 White, William G., S/Sgt Co F
 Whitesell, Clarence D., T/Sgt Hq 3d Bn
 Whitney, Larned S., Jr., Capt Sv Co
 Whitus, Robert H., Major Sv Co
 Whorton, Charles W., T/Sgt Co E
 Wilkens, George, 2nd Lt Hq Co 3d Bn
 Wilkie, James R., Pfc Co A
 Wilkinson, Robert L., Pfc Co B
 Willi, Jack C., Pfc Hq Co
 Williams, Billy J., Pfc
 Williams, Charles E., Pfc Co G
 Williams, Elijah J., Pfc Co G
 Williams, John C., Jr., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
 Williams, John G., Pfc Hq 2nd Bn
 Williams, Robert M., Lt Col Hq
 Williamson, Merrill E., T/5 Hq 1st Bn
 Wilson, William F., Jr., S/Sgt AT Co

Winder, John F., Pfc Co L	Yauch, William J., Pfc Co C
Windham, Honnoll C., Sgt Co H	Yeager, Dean M., Pfc Co C
Winston, Keith, Pfc M.D.	Yelton, Donald W., Pfc Co C
Wishinski, Anthony W., Sgt AT Co	Yoey, LaWayne W., Sgt Co D
Wisinger, Harold, Sgt Co D	Yonkers, Friend H., Pfc Hq Co 2nd Bn
Withers, Woodrow W., Pfc Hq 1st Bn	Young, Herbert L., Sgt Co G
Wolf, Raymond T., Pfc Co G	Yuhas, Michael, Pfc M.D.
Wolk, Gerald, Pfc Co A	Zagha, Marco, Pfc M.D.
Wood, Charles R., Pfc Co L	Zahler, Adolph L., Pfc Co B
Woodard, Harold E., T/5 AT Co	Zanoni, Basil P., 1st Sgt Co M
Woodbridge, Jardy B., Jr., 2nd Lt Co G	Zawisza, Frank A., T/4 M.D.
Woods, Thomas E., Sgt Co G	Zeiter, Leland L., Pfc Co M
Woolsey, Martin E., Pfc Co L	Zicari, Pasquale J., Cpl Co H
Wright, Freeman H., S/Sgt Hq 1st Bn	Zimmerman, William, Pfc Co H
Wright, Lee R., Pfc Co A	Zipperman, Nathan, T/5 Co I
Wynne, John H., Pfc Co A	Zmuda, Teddy M., Pfc Co I
Wynne, Jr., Walter J., Cpl Hq 3d Bn	Zugay, Nicholas A., Pfc Hq 3d Bn
Yardley, Richard C., 2nd Lt Co K	Zurbinsky, Sidney, Sgt Co H
Zychowski, Edward A., Pfc M.D.	

12. SOLDIER'S MEDAL

Anderson, Martin C., Pfc Co K	Ripper, James V., Sgt Co F
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13. COMBAT INFANTRY REGIMENT

HEADQUARTERS 100TH INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 447, U.S. Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 9

9 January 1945

EXTRACT

* * * *

Section V—DESIGNATION OF COMBAT INFANTRY REGIMENT

Under the provisions of War Department Circular Number 408, 17 October 1944, the 398th Infantry Regiment is designated a Combat Infantry Regiment.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL BURRESS:

RICHARD G. PRATHER,
Colonel GSC,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

BYRON C. DE LA MATER,
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General

14. FIRST DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION

3D BATTALION, 398TH INFANTRY

General Orders
No. 27

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C., 10 April 1945

The *3d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment*, is cited for outstanding performance in combat during the period 17 to 21 December, 1944 near Bitche, France. On 17 December, 1944 the 3d Battalion was assigned the mission of breaching the formidable fortifications of the Maginot Line west of the town of Bitche, France. The main line of enemy defense was Fort Freudenberg, a large fortification, and Fort Schiesseck, which had eleven adjacent units, each unit with a gun emplacement or a series of guns ranging from 47mm to 135mm which were mutually supporting and extremely difficult to attack. The walls of the fortifications were from three to ten feet thick and constructed of reinforced concrete. Some of the units had as many as five stories below ground level with underground railroads which were used for supply. With no terrain features for protection and only shell craters for cover, the 3d Battalion, taking advantage of a 45-minute barrage, moved into the attack. Under intense enemy artillery, mortar, automatic weapons, and small-arms fire, the 3d Battalion pressed the attack and, after fierce fighting, captured Fort Freudenberg along with units 10 and 11 of Fort Schiesseck. At this point the enemy increased their artillery and mortar fire, forcing the battalion to dig in for the night. At 0930 hours the following morning, 18 December, 1944, the attack was continued behind a rolling barrage laid down by supporting artillery. Fighting their way up the steep, barren slope of the difficult terrain, through heavy wire entanglements, the assault detachments, despite harassing enemy fire, rapidly wrested the remaining units of Fort Schiesseck from the enemy. The fighting aggressiveness, courage, and devotion to duty displayed by members of the 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment, are worthy of the highest emulation and reflect the finest traditions of the armed forces of the United States.

* * *

By Order of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General
The Adjutant General

15. REGIMENTAL COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION
FOR CITATION OF 3d BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS 398TH INFANTRY
APO 447 U. S. ARMY

4 January 1945

SUBJECT: CITATION OF UNIT

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army,
A. P. O. No. 758, U. S. Army. (Thru Channels)

1. Under the provisions of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that *3d Battalion, 398th Infantry* be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 17 to 21 December 1944, near Bitche, France.

2. *a.* On 17 December 1944, the 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry was assigned the mission of breaching the Maginot Line and securing the high ground northwest of the city of Bitche, France, to enable the Division to reach its objective which was the high ground north and northeast of Bitche, France.

b. The enemy had strong fortifications on the high ground northwest of Bitche which dominated the terrain confronting the Division. The main line of enemy defense was Fort Freudenberg and Fort Schiesseck which had eleven adjacent units, all mutually supporting. Each unit had a gun emplacement or series of guns ranging from 47mm to 135mm. The walls of the forts were three to ten feet in thickness, of reinforced concrete which could not be penetrated by large-caliber direct-fire weapons.

c. An unsuccessful attack on Fort Freudenberg and Fort Schiesseck on 14 December 1944 by another unit was followed by two days of precision adjustment by 105mm guns, 8" howitzers, 4.5" guns and 240mm guns. Fighter bombers strafed and bombed this area. The only effect was a hit on Fort Freudenberg which blew open the outside steel door.

d. At 1045 on 17 December 1944, after a 45-minute artillery preparation, Companies I and L crossed the line of departure which had been previously secured by Company K. They were immediately under heavy small-arms, automatic-weapons and observed artillery fire. Company L received direct fire from Fort No. 2 which was equipped with a 135mm gun in a disappearing turret. This fort had direct observation on the men in Company L from a distance of seven hundred yards. Despite this fire Company L continued a steady advance toward Fort

Freudenberg. At the same time Company I on the right was under direct fire from two 88mm guns located near Bitche. Their attack was continued toward Fort No. 10. Company K remained at the line of departure prepared to move forward on order. Company M supported the attack with both platoons of heavy machine guns from the high ground in the vicinity of the line of departure. The 81mm mortar platoon coordinated their fire with the artillery and cannon, covering Forts Freudenberg, Nos. 9 and 10, then lifting to other target areas on Fort Schiesseck as the attack progressed. Fort Freudenberg and Fort No. 10 were reduced and the attack continued toward Fort No. 11. Repeated enemy counter-attacks from northwest of Fort Freudenberg were repelled by a rifle platoon of Company L reinforced with a section of light machine guns placed to protect the left flank of the battalion. An enemy machine gun located in the turret of Fort No. 11 was delaying the attack. This was cleaned out by the aggressive action of the leading detachment of Company L and the attack continued under increasingly heavy enemy artillery and small-arms fire. At Fort No. 11 a steel door was blown up by a satchel charge set off by a bazooka after it had failed to explode. At the same time Company I was setting off explosives in Fort No. 10. In Forts Nos. 10 and 11 the enemy was forced to withdraw to the large subterranean tunnels. Due to heavy barbed-wire entanglements the attack was slowed down and orders given to organize an all-around defense and hold present positions. Company M placed one platoon of machine guns near Fort Freudenberg to protect the left flank and the battalion Antitank Platoon moved into positions to protect from tank attacks from northwest and northeast. During the night a fire fight broke out in the tunnel five stories below ground in Fort No. 11. Numerous casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The next morning, 18 December 1944, the attack was continued at 0930 behind a rolling barrage laid down by our artillery. Following this barrage at two hundred yards Companies I and L forced their way through deep barbed-wire entanglements. Both attacking companies were subjected to long-range machine-gun and direct artillery fire coming from the right rear. Fighting their way up the steep, bare eastern slope of the hill, under constant enemy observation, the assault detachments rapidly eliminated Units Nos. 1, 7, 8, 6, 4 and 5 of Fort Schiesseck.

During this action the company commander of Company I was killed but the company continued forward and took Units 4 and 5. Company L surrounded Units 2 and 3. At 1100, one platoon of Company K moved from the line of departure and attacked Fort No. 9. This fort had been by-passed by the leading companies and was harass-

ing them from the rear. Two other platoons of Company K had moved forward to Fort Freudenberg and Forts Nos. 10 and 11, with the dual mission of repelling counterattacks from west and east. Unable to force an entrance by explosives into many of the forts, the companies surrounded all the forts, consolidated their positions against counterattack and sent for engineer assistance. The battalion Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon equipped with one .50-caliber machine gun and one .30-caliber machine gun was sent to Fort Freudenberg to aid in protecting the battalion left flank. On 19 December 1944 at approximately 0800, fifteen enemy attacked positions around Fort Freudenberg. They were discovered by an observer in the fort and were covered by rifle and machine-gun fire until they were within one hundred yards of our positions. Riflemen and machine guns opened fire at the same time and the resulting volume of fire killed seven of the enemy. The remainder displayed a white flag and surrendered. On 19 December 1944 at approximately 1800 an estimated enemy force of 150 attacked out of the draw from the northeast. This attack was dispersed by small arms, automatic weapons, hand and white phosphorus grenades. The artillery field observer called for defensive fires and drew them within one hundred yards of our troops, resulting in scores of enemy killed and wounded. At the same time thirty enemy forced their way out of Fort No. 2 and attacked from the left rear. This attack was repulsed and the enemy driven off by riflemen guarding Forts Nos. 1, 7, 8 and 6. For the remaining three days the men firmly held their positions under constant artillery and mortar fire. Surrounding forts that could not be entered, they were constantly exposed to enemy fire but remained alert with explosives and grenades to prevent the enemy from remanning these installations. Many attempts by the enemy to infiltrate riflemen and machine gunners resulted in the killing and capturing of twenty enemy. Movement in the daytime without drawing fire was impossible. Ammunition and water had to be carried up at night. The battalion medical section worked constantly under fire to evacuate casualties as fast as possible. Their prompt action saved many lives and kept morale at peak level.

3. Sketches, showing dispositions of troops cited, supporting troops, enemy positions, and general terrain features are attached as Inclosure No. 3.

4. *a.* Nature of terrain: High open ground.
- b.* Enemy morale: Excellent.
- c.* Morale of our troops: Excellent.
- d.* Weather: Cold and clear.

e. Exact time and dates of action: The 3d Battalion attacked the forts at 1130, 17 December 1944, continued the attack the following day at 0930 to capture the forts and occupy the high ground on which the forts were built. On 19 December 1944 the 3d Battalion consolidated and reorganized and occupied the high ground until relieved.

5. *a.* Number of men assigned to 3d Battalion who took part in action: 38 officers; 692 enlisted men.

b. Casualties suffered by 3d Battalion were: KIA—1 officer and 15 enlisted men; WIA—120 enlisted men.

c. Approximate strength of supporting troops, and character of support rendered by other units was:

(1) 375th Field Artillery Battalion.

(2) Corps artillery which consisted of two batteries of 240mm guns, one battalion of 8" howitzers, one battalion 4.5" guns and four battalions of 105mm howitzers.

(3) Bombers of Army Air Corps.

(4) Company B, 325th Engineer Battalion.

6. *a.* Approximate strength of enemy: 125 Germans within the forts and three companies dug in around the forts.

b. Character of enemy fire and observation: The forts and their adjacent units had gun emplacements or a series of guns ranging from 47mm to 135mm, each having a 360-degree traverse making them mutually supporting and extremely difficult to attack. The enemy had complete observation of the sector the 3d Battalion was to attack.

c. Apparent enemy intention, or objective: Defend and hold the forts to the last man. (Reported by captured prisoners.)

d. Losses suffered by enemy: 150 German casualties.

7. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this recommendation.

8. Proposed Citation:

The *3d Battalion, 398th Infantry* is cited for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 17 to 21 December 1944 near Bitche, France. The battalion was assigned the mission of breaching the Maginot Line west of the town of Bitche, France. The strong enemy fortifications on the high ground west and northwest of the town were in such a position that they dominated the terrain. The main line of enemy defense was Fort Freudenberg, a large fortification, and Fort Schiesseck, which had eleven adjacent units, each unit with a gun emplacement or a series of guns ranging from 47mm to 135mm, which were mutually supporting and extremely difficult to attack. The walls of the fortifications were reinforced concrete from three to ten feet thick. Some of

the units had as many as five stories below ground level with underground railroads which were used for supply routes. Taking advantage of a forty-five minute barrage, the battalion moved into the attack at 1130 on 17 December 1944, with no terrain features for protection and only the craters made by the artillery fire for cover, which were under continuous enemy mortar, automatic weapons, small arms and heavy artillery fire. The battalion attacked with two companies abreast and after fierce fighting Fort Freudenberg along with Units Nos. 10 and 11 of Fort Schiesseck were captured. The enemy increased their artillery and mortar fire at this point forcing the battalion to dig in for the night. At 0930 on 18 December 1944, the battalion continued the attack taking the remaining units and Fort Schiesseck. The fighting aggressiveness, courage, and devotion to duty displayed by members of the battalion are worthy of emulation and reflect honor upon the armed forces of the United States.

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,
Lt. Col., 398th Infantry,
Commanding

16. SECOND DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION

3D BATTALION, 398TH INFANTRY

General Orders

WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 11

Washington 25, D. C., 30 January 1946

The *3d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment*, is cited for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 3 to 12 April 1945 in the vicinity of Heilbronn, Germany. After crossing the Neckar River by assault boat, the battalion secured a bridgehead and prepared to hold its position when intense enemy artillery and mortar barrages landed with almost pinpoint precision on the crossing site, making further use of assault boats impossible and isolating the battalion. Simultaneously wave after wave of hostile troops, an entire regiment in strength, counter-attacked, and the weight of the numerically superior foe forced the battalion to withdraw to the river's edge. Despite heavy losses, remnants of the battalion reorganized and, when the Germans stopped to dig in, attacked again and re-took most of the lost ground. Every night for 5 nights the enemy attacked, trying desperately to regain the east bank, but each time they were thrown back. On one occasion, after a 3-mile-long column of enemy troops and vehicles poured into the lines, the Germans charged with reckless and fanatical zeal, and succeeded in making a slight penetration. Committing its reserves, the battalion stopped the attack and reestablished its lines. By the individual heroism and intrepidity of the officers and men of this command, the depleted battalion held the bridgehead for 8 days and nights under continuous and savage shelling, enabling the division to push other troops across the river and insure the success of the vital operation. The accomplishment of the 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment, reflects the highest traditions of the Army of the United States. (General Orders 277, Headquarters 100th Infantry Division, 9 November 1945, as approved by the Commanding General, European Theater (Main).

* * *

By Order of the Secretary of War:

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

EDWARD F. WITSELL,
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General

17. REGIMENTAL COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION FOR CITATION OF 3D BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS 398TH INFANTRY
APO 447, U. S. ARMY

8 August 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, US Army
Thru: Channels

1. Under the provision of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that *3d Battalion, 398th Infantry* be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during period 3 to 12 April 1945, near Heilbronn, Germany.

2. *a.* At 2230 on 3 April 1945 the 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry was attached to the 10th Armored Division and given the mission of crossing the Neckar River between Neckarsulm and Heilbronn at 0300 to secure a bridgehead. The bridgehead area consisted of about 1200 yards of flat open ground, dominated by several high hills rising abruptly out of the valley that afforded excellent observation of the area on both sides of the river in and about Neckarsulm and Heilbronn. A ponton bridge was to be constructed at this point to cross an armored task force.

b. For several days the enemy had been retreating before an armored task force, leaving only undefended roadblocks, mines, and a few snipers to slow up the advance of our troops. This armored force had established a line on the west bank of the river and reported no enemy activity across the river. Aerial observation reports were all negative and from all indication the enemy had withdrawn farther to the south and east.

c. Without benefit of prior reconnaissance and with only a few hours to formulate plans, the following orders were issued. Company K, with one heavy machine-gun platoon from Company M attached, was to cross in the first wave. They were to swing to the right after crossing and secure the factory buildings on the outskirts of Heilbronn and continue to phase line 4. Company L with one heavy machine-gun platoon from Company M attached, was to cross in the second wave, swing to the left, secure the lumberyard and buildings near Neckarsulm, and continue to phase line 4. Company I was to cross in the third wave, be in reserve initially, and, as soon as Companies K and L were on phase

line 4, to pass through Company K and attack with Company L to take the final objective which was Castle Hill and the high ground overlooking the valley.

d. At 0300, 4 April 1945 Company K started the crossing. After getting across with practically no opposition, they quickly reorganized and continued the attack, reaching phase line 4 at about 0500. One rifle platoon had been left in the factory buildings to secure the right flank of the battalion. The company commander was then ordered to send a strong combat patrol to Castle Hill to determine if it was occupied. One rifle platoon with a mortar observer and a SCR-300 radio was sent to accomplish this mission. At 0710 the platoon leader reported via radio that his platoon was on top of the hill and was given the order to hold the hill and control the observation. Company L had sustained some casualties while crossing the river, enemy fire killing one officer and several enlisted men. However, they quickly reorganized and pushed aggressively forward until they had cleared the area around the canals and had searched the buildings in the lumberyard. About 0800 they reached phase line 4 and were ordered to hold their position. After crossing the river Company I reorganized in the vicinity of the power plant and prepared to move through Company K.

e. At 0900 the enemy began shelling the crossing site with heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire. Barrage after barrage landed with almost pin-point precision on the position used for crossing, making the use of the assault boats impossible and isolating the battalion on the east side of the river. Simultaneously hundreds of enemy troops launched a fierce attack on Companies K and L. It was later determined that the enemy used one full regiment in this attack which was designated to wipe out the battalion and destroy the bridgehead. Wave after wave of enemy troops hit their lines and in spite of the fact that our troops made the maximum use of every weapon, the superiority of the enemy was so great that the battalion was gradually forced back to the edge of the river. The platoon holding Castle Hill was immediately cut off from the rest of the battalion. The Germans, thinking the hill unoccupied, sent several small artillery observation parties up to establish observation posts and our forces captured 12 men and 2 officers before their presence was detected by the enemy. About 1200 this platoon was attacked in force but, in spite of the fact that they were vastly outnumbered, beat off attack after attack, inflicting many casualties on the enemy. At 1600 the platoon leader radioed that his position was entirely surrounded and that his ammunition supply was nearly exhausted. Immediately after this message was completed the radio was destroyed

and the entire platoon was either killed or captured. It was later revealed through interrogation of PWs that it took a force of 90 men armed with automatic weapons to overcome this one platoon. Meanwhile the enemy attack had wiped out one platoon of Company K, one machine gun platoon of Company M, and had completely isolated two platoons of Company L. The rest of the battalion reorganized its forces, established a defensive line in a ravine running almost parallel to river, and repulsed the rest of the savage enemy attacks. The Germans finally withdrew a short distance and began to dig in. At 1045 the battalion launched a determined counterattack with the reserve company and the remnants of the other two companies and drove the enemy back to phase line 3. Approximately 300 Germans had taken positions in the factory buildings on the right and the battalion suddenly found itself subjected to a deadly withering crossfire. The success of the mission depended on holding this ground so the battalion prepared a line along phase line 3. Shortly after the platoon on Castle Hill was captured the Germans established observation posts on the top from which they were able to direct very accurate artillery and mortar fire on our front lines, the river crossing, OP, and all of our other installations. This fire continued without let up for 6 days. At 0230 on 5 April 1945 the enemy attacked in force, first on the left of the defensive position and then on the right, but due to the volume of fire laid down by the battalion with its final defensive fires, the attack failed to dislodge the battalion from its positions. Every night for five nights the enemy attacked, desperately trying to regain the east bank, but every attack was thrown back. On the night of 6 April a 3-mile-long column of enemy troops and vehicles were seen moving into Neckarsulm. Air and artillery were laid on this force but failed to keep it from entering the town. At 0200 the next morning all the battalion positions were subjected to heavy concentrations of enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket fire. At the same time the enemy started a large-scale attack. Coming forward with fanatical zeal and disregarding the casualties being inflicted, they managed to make a slight penetration. Committing its reserve, the battalion stopped the attack and restored its lines. About 30 PWs were taken during this fight. Due to the increased enemy action it was impossible to construct a bridge across the river but the battalion was ordered to hold the position so that other units could cross and bring more force to bear on the enemy. For 8 days and nights the depleted battalion held the bridgehead under constant artillery fire and unable to move during the day due to the excellent observation that the enemy had on the entire area. All rations and supplies had to be taken across the river in assault boats

and hand carried to the front lines, always under the cover of darkness. The battalion A&P platoon organized these carrying parties as well as putting out trip flares and antitank mines forward of our front lines. The battalion medical section very courageously evacuated the many wounded over the open fire-swept terrain across the river to the battalion station. The intrepid actions of the officers and men of this battalion in this engagement enabled the division to push other regiments across and intensify the attack on the enemy. Had the battalion failed to hold the bridgehead a much more costly river crossing would have necessarily had to be made and the offensive in this sector might have been delayed indefinitely. On 12 April, while another unit attacked Heilbronn, the 3d Battalion jumped off in an attack to the south, capturing Neckarsulm and advancing unchecked until they were placed in reserve.

3. Sketches, showing dispositions of troops cited, supporting troops, enemy position, and general terrain features are attached as Inclosure No. 3.

4. *a.* Nature of terrain: Flat open ground at river rising about 1200 yards inland abruptly to high hills.

b. Enemy morale: Excellent.

c. Morale of our troops: Excellent.

d. Weather: Cold with intermittent rain.

e. Exact time and dates of action: The 3d Battalion crossed the river at 0300 on 4 April 1945. Held the position until 1800 on 12 April 1945, when they attacked from the position to take Neckarsulm.

5. *a.* Number of men assigned to 3d Battalion who took part in the action:

45 Officers

861 Enlisted Men

b. Casualties suffered by 3d Battalion were:

MIA—3 Officers, 59 Enlisted Men

KIA—3 Officers, 19 Enlisted Men

WIA—1 Officer, 48 Enlisted Men

c. Approximate strength of supporting troops and character of support rendered by other units was:

(1) 375th Field Artillery Battalion

6. *a.* Approximate strength of enemy: One division in area near Heilbronn and Neckarsulm.

b. Character of enemy fire and observation: During this engagement the enemy used 105 and 155mm Artillery, 210mm rockets, heavy

and light mortars, and 20 and 40mm flak wagons. They had complete observation over the entire area.

c. Apparent enemy intention, or objective: To allow the battalion to cross the river and destroy it.

d. Losses suffered by enemy:

Killed and wounded—430.

Captured—359.

7. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this recommendation.

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, 398th Infantry,
Commanding

18. REGIMENTAL COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION FOR CITATION OF 1ST BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS 398TH INFANTRY
APO 447 US ARMY

15 September 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, US Army
Through: Channels

1. Under the provisions of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that the *1st Battalion, 398th Infantry*, be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during period 7-11 April 1945 near Odheim, Germany.

2. *a.* The 1st Battalion, 398th Infantry, was given the mission to continue the attack south toward Heilbronn to assist the 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry, to establish a bridgehead across the Neckar River.

b. Enemy resistance in this sector consisted of two battalions of the 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, an assault company of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the 2d Company of the Battle Group Nord. The strength of this enemy force was approximately eleven hundred men. The enemy's defensive positions were on the commanding ground between the Jagst and Kocher, which afforded them excellent observation and excellent long fields of fire. The terrain was ideally suited for the defense.

c. After the 398th Infantry Regiment had gotten well within the German border, the enemy had been in complete rout, offering little or no resistance. Reaching the Neckar River, all bridges had been found blown, as had been the case at previous water barriers, but still there was no indication of enemy resistance in view. Tenth Armored Division continuing its advance in the vicinity of Heilbronn, key rail and communications city at the head of the redoubt in southern Germany, called for infantry to establish a bridgehead and probe the area on the opposite side of the Neckar River. The 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry, was dispatched from Wimpfen, crossed the river without incident, but, on moving inland, met with a sudden and furious barrage of artillery, mortar, automatic and small-arms fire. The enemy had shown his hand. Unobserved, he had quietly lain in wait behind numerous and strong defenses along the east bank of the river, watching every move of the battalion. At the opportune moment he poured intense fire into the 3d Battalion inflicting heavy casualties and pinning down forward

elements. The advance came to a dead halt. Large numbers of fanatic SS troops followed artillery barrages up with vicious counterattacks with the intention of cutting the bridgehead force into small pockets and annihilating its defenders.

On the morning of 7 April 1945, the 1st Battalion with attached units of one platoon, Company B of the 325th Engineer Battalion; one platoon of the 781st Tank Battalion and a platoon of the 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion, struck out from Untergriesheim in an encircling movement toward Odheim with the objective of hitting the enemy at the flank and rear at Heilbronn to relieve the pressure on friendly units fiercely engaged with the SS troops.

The approaches to Odheim were covered first by the Jagst River, over which the 325th Engineers hurriedly threw a bridge, expediting the fanning out of the tanks and tank destroyers toward the objective. Behind the Jagst were many commanding hill positions, notably Hill 233 on the left and 215.8 to the right. Further to the rear and directly between the two hills rose Hill 210.9 forming a perfect triangle, and peering down into the draw between 215.8 and 233. Beyond this natural defense lay Willenbach Farms, an open, flat expanse, offering no means of protection from the intense fire that was to come from the woods to the right and left, and from the high ground behind the next obstacle, the Kocher River.

Companies B and C, without artillery preparation, spearheaded 1st Battalion's drive from the north of Heilbronn. Company C started up the long incline of Hill 233 under intermittent artillery fire and had almost reached the top when sudden and intense automatic fire from caves at the crest of the hill drove the men to the ground. With the volume of fire increasing and supplemented by equally heavy fire from the adjacent hill, the position became untenable. Company C withdrew to the base of the hill under the protecting fire of Company D's heavy machine guns and moved around into the draw of the two hills, while Company B resumed the attack on 233. Company B, with a platoon of Company D attached, succeeded in occupying the hill after a fierce fire fight, amid artillery fire coming in from a new source of strong positions along a road immediately to the front. Two tanks received direct 88mm hits and were knocked out. However, Company C overwhelmed the positions along the road and fought on to Willenbach Farms, where the intensity of artillery and automatic fire compelled a withdrawal back into the draw. The SS followed and again took up its lost positions along the road. In the meantime, Company A was called from its reserve position and proceeded around to the right to protect Company C's flank, as it extended precariously out into Willenbach

Farms. Slowly it went about the process of cleaning out Hill 215.8 after a furious fight with the defenders entrenched in caves. At the end of the day the two hills were secured by Companies A and B. Company C dug in between them in the draw. Casualties were heavy. Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon and also Antitank Platoon of Headquarters Company were called on to act as riflemen and fill in the gaps left by the wounded and killed. What was left of the tank and tank destroyer platoons took up positions atop the hills and fired round upon round into the entrenched enemy. Company D set up its 81mm mortars in batteries behind the hills and lobbed shells into the area before the lines. The numerous enemy positions were heavily pounded with high explosive shells.

The next morning Companies B and C attacked, supported by the heavy weapons of Company D, and with the mobile power of the tank destroyers and the remaining tanks, but again met with furious and unrelenting artillery and small-arms fire. Company B advanced two hundred yards, but C was held in the draw after a valiant attempt on the enemy's dug in positions along the side of the road. Patrols missioned to feel out a weak spot in the enemy's defense could not get as far as sticking their heads out of foxholes without inviting fire from all directions to the front.

It was evident now the defenses of Heilbronn extended to this area and the enemy at this point intended to hold the sector at all costs. The 1st Battalion had to get through not only to relieve the pressure at Heilbronn, but rolling up the enemy's flank at this point would eliminate the entire defense system along the Neckar River, permitting a breakthrough into southern Germany. The enemy was keenly aware of the situation and fortified the sector with approximately a regiment of SS troops determined to hold, kill or be killed.

It was impossible to get through any farther. Time artillery fire was called for to eliminate the positions along the road to the front. All day and the following night the 375th Field Artillery Battalion engulfed the stubborn and determined enemy with concentrations of time fire. On the third day continuous patrolling was carried on, but despite the severe shelling some enemy units remained at their posts to combat the patrols.

On 10 and 11 April the battalion, well below strength, was ordered to attack and secure a line along the north bank of the Kocher River. With Company A continuing its mission of protecting the battalion's flank, Company B started out to the left of Hill 210.9, and together with tanks and tank destroyers, swept across the enemy positions along the road and continued on into the open terrain toward the

Kocher River. Company C moved out toward Willenbach Farms and Odheim without too much difficulty until it had gotten about halfway. Then from the high ground on the south bank of the Kocher River came direct 88mm fire, catching the company out in the open. At the same time heavy small-arms fire came from a patch of woods to the right. Company A moving on the flank of Company C engaged the enemy in the woods. Company C also closed in, having the alternative of remaining in the open under direct artillery fire, or seeking the shelter and concealment of the woods held by the enemy. Moving towards the automatic fire, the men ran into an area heavily planted with electric mines. Company B coming within sight of the Kocher River, encountering comparatively little resistance, suddenly found itself the target of direct artillery and rocket fire. And from Hill 230.1 and the woods to the left came curtains of automatic fire. Company B pushed on to take the hill after tanks neutralized the fire from the woods and the tank destroyers pounded the source of the rockets and the 88s. Company C, its ranks shattered succeeded in circumventing Odheim and reaching a position to the east of the Kocher River.

Again movement was halted. Remnants of Companies B and C, together with Company D and mobile support, punched away at the Kocher River defenses, but the continued heavy and direct 88 fire, in addition to the rocket barrages, thwarted a breakthrough. The Air Corps was called on to silence the SP weapons in the hills on the other side of the Kocher, and with pinpoint accuracy silenced many of the guns. The battalion and attached units then launched an all-out offensive to crack the Kocher River line, and completed the breakthrough. Behind a rolling artillery barrage supplied by the 375th Field Artillery Battalion, the remaining 1st Battalion infantrymen rose from their positions and linked together with the supporting armor to advance over the fire swept terrain and effect a decisive close with the enemy. Some of the SS men seeing the long thin line advance without faltering despite the intense retaliatory fire sprang from their positions and attempted to flee. The tankers cut them down with bursts of machine-gun fire, while the riflemen alternately threw grenades and fired their M1s at close range. The enemy was routed from holes, from behind trees, houses and cellars, and were either killed or captured. Others preferring to be killed, after they had emptied their weapons at the closing-in infantrymen, deliberately stood out in the open and fired before crumpling up under a volley of BAR fire.

The infantry cracked through to the banks of the Kocher River, completing the breakthrough on the flank of the Neckar River defenses. With this vital sector so zealously defended smashed, 1st Battalion was

relieved by fresh units of the 398th Infantry Regiment. But enemy opposition melted away, and resistance along the entire Neckar River collapsed, permitting the drive to continue into southern Germany unchecked.

3. Sketches, showing disposition of troops cited supporting troops, enemy positions, and general terrain features are attached as Inclosure 3.

4. *a.* Nature of terrain: The terrain, rolling and open, was ideally suited for defense. It afforded the enemy excellent observation and fields of fire.

b. Enemy morale: Excellent.

c. Morale of our troops: Excellent.

d. Weather: Clear and warm.

e. Exact time and dates of action: The 1st Battalion was committed on 7 April 1945, continued the attack until 11 April 1945.

5. *a.* Number of men assigned to 1st Battalion who took part in action: 46 officers, 854 enlisted men.

b. Casualties suffered by 1st Battalion were:

KIA—1 officer and 25 enlisted men.

MIA—1 officer and 4 enlisted men.

WIA—32 enlisted men.

c. Approximate strength of supporting troops, and character of support rendered by other units was:

(1) 375th Field Artillery Battalion

(2) 1 Platoon, Company B, 325th Engineer Battalion

(3) 1 Platoon, 781st Tank Battalion

(4) 1 Platoon, 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion

6. *a.* Approximate strength of enemy: Two battalions of the 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 2d Company of the Battle Group Nord and 17th Panzer Grenadier Division (one assault company). This included the approximate total of eleven hundred soldiers.

b. Character of enemy fire and observation: The enemy's fire consisted of 88mm artillery, 210mm Nebelwerfer, 50mm mortars, automatic-weapons and small-arms fire. The enemy had complete observation of the sector the 1st Battalion was to attack.

c. Apparent enemy intention or objective: To hold the ground on this side of the Kocher River at all cost.

d. Losses suffered by enemy: All causes, approximately 600.

7. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this recommendation.

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, 398th Infantry.
Commanding

19. REGIMENTAL COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION
FOR CITATION OF 2d BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS 398TH INFANTRY
APO 447 US ARMY

10 August 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army,
A. P. O. No. 758, U. S. Army (Thru Channels)

1. Under the provisions of Circular 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that the *2d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment, 100 Infantry Division*, be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 5 April 1945 to 11 April 1945, near Heilbronn, Germany.

2. On the morning of 4 April 1945, the 2d Battalion moved into Hoenstadt, Germany, and relieved elements of the 63d Infantry Division there with the understanding that a bridgehead was to be established across the Neckar River as soon as possible so as to effect a drive to the high ground to the east of the city of Heilbronn. Patrols were sent out to reconnoiter the river bank and it was decided that the best crossing site was near the village of Offenau. A small combat patrol was organized and under cover of darkness it crossed the broad stream without meeting any opposition. Our move had evidently taken the foe by surprise before he had a chance to prepare defensive positions along the river and so the following morning a platoon from Company F started across to secure the far shore. When they reached mid-stream, they were suddenly fired on by a lone machine gun dug in on the bank some distance away. The stream of bullets splashed into the water a short distance from the boats, but the men escaped without injury and continued on. The automatic weapon was silenced a short time later by our artillery fire. Upon reaching the far shore, the men quickly spread out, occupied Offenau and set up defenses for the crossing site. Engineers began the construction of a footbridge immediately and completed it at 1500 hours that afternoon. The remaining elements of the battalion then crossed over and prepared to continue the attack. Both Companies F and G spent the night in Offenau and Company E moved on into the village of Duttenberg. At 0500 hours the following morning, 6 April, the three rifle companies assembled in Duttenberg and prepared for an assault crossing of the Jagst River, which flowed through a small valley half a mile away. They picked up engineer as-

sault boats in the village and carried them to the banks of the stream. Company E was on the left flank, Company G in the center and Company F on the right. The leading platoons from each company pushed off at approximately the same time and reached the far shore without meeting any opposition. The men quickly unloaded and began running across the one hundred and fifty yards of open terrain towards the railroad embankment, which bordered the high ground and wooded area directly ahead. As the riflemen moved across the grassy field they were suddenly fired on by enemy machine gunners and riflemen entrenched in the woods on both flanks. Some of the men hit the ground immediately, but the majority of them continued on until they reached the embankment, which offered some protection. Seeing what had happened, the men left on the Duttenberg side immediately formed a skirmish line and began firing back at the foe. However, it became apparent that if we were to hold the bridgehead already established, the remaining units of the companies would have to cross over and continue the attack. A patrol from Company E discovered a small dam across the river a short distance upstream and it was decided that both Companies G and E would be able to infiltrate across the narrow wall and make a run for the embankment. Two sections of heavy machine guns were emplaced and they attempted to pin down the enemy while the riflemen forced their way across the stream. Although one of the guns was knocked out of action, the other three continued to deliver a steady stream of covering fire and both companies reached the far shore. However, Company F was receiving fire from three sides and it was impossible for them to fight their way ahead. The commanding officer decided to continue on down the river, hugging the bank as long as possible, until they got within the city of Jagstfeld. After reorganizing Company E was ordered to continue on down the tracks to the village of Heuchlingen. As they moved out the 81mm mortar platoon began laying smoke shells along the railroad to partially conceal their movements. At the same time they fired high-explosive shells into the small patch of woods on the right in an attempt to keep the Germans in their dugouts. The mortar fire was so close that our own men were in constant danger of being wounded by shrapnel, but it was the only way that the foe could be effectively pinned down. Later in the day one platoon from the company was cut off while trying to outflank the enemy positions and forced to fight its way back to Duttenberg under cover of darkness. Company G started across the flat farmland northeast of Jagstfeld at approximately 1100 hours, but they soon ran into the enemy's main defense line and were stopped dead. By 1500 hours the company's effective combat strength was cut down to less

than seventy men and those that remained were ordered to pull back to Heuchlingen for the night. At 1800 hours Company F reached the outskirts of Jagstfeld and succeeded in occupying the first row of houses. They halted here for the night and prepared to continue on in the morning. The following day all three companies moved into Jagstfeld and began the slow task of clearing the town. The stubborn defenders had converted every house into a miniature fortress and our advances were measured in yards. No matter how desperate their plight, the foe refused to surrender and had to be routed from their positions by assault teams armed with bazookas, rifle and hand grenades. When all other means of dislodging them failed, the homes in which they had taken refuge were set on fire and machine guns emplaced to cover all exits. This bitter type of street fighting lasted for four days, during which only forty enemy were captured, but an estimated one hundred and fifty were killed. Finally, on the afternoon of 10 April the leading scout of Company F reached the edge of Jagstfeld and observed the Kocher River flowing below. The enemy had apparently withdrawn to the other side and so our forces prepared defensive positions overlooking the river bank and prepared to spend the night. For the first time in a week the riflemen were able to sleep without being hit by a counter-attack or combat patrol. The following day, 11 April, patrols were sent to reconnoiter the river for a crossing site. Company F discovered a small footbridge near the village of Waldau and it was decided to attempt a crossing that night. At 2200 hours during a heavy rain storm, a patrol started across, but they were forced back by intense small arms and machine-gun fire. At 0200 hours the patrol started out again and succeeded in reaching the far bank without being detected. The single outpost guarding the bridge was quickly eliminated and the remaining elements of the company rushed across. They moved into Waldau and cleared the village, completely surprising twenty-five enemy there and capturing them without a fight. Company E followed and moved on toward the village of Neckarsulm. Company G came last and seized the high ground in front of Waldau before the main force of enemy was aware of what had happened. A Bailey bridge was constructed in a matter of hours and elements of the 10th Armored Division rushed across to exploit the breakthrough.

4. a. The terrain surrounding the Neckar River was flat farmland. The Jagst River flowed through a small valley with approximately two hundred yards of flat land on either side. Between the Jagst and Kocher Rivers the land rose sharply and there were a few patches of woods.

b. The enemy defending the area were SS men and Hitler Youth. They fought with a fanatical determination and refused to surrender no matter how desperate their plight. They had been warned by their commander that any men who withdrew or any civilian who hung up a white flag would be shot immediately.

d. During most of the action the weather was warm and clear. However, during the night of 11 April there was a heavy rain storm.

e. The action took place between 5 April 1945 and 11 April 1945.

5. *a.* Six hundred men assigned to the 2d Battalion took part in the action.

b. Six of our men were killed, three taken prisoner and fifty-two wounded.

c. The battalion was supported by one platoon from the 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion, one platoon from the 781st Tank Battalion and the 375th Artillery Battalion. During the actual river crossing the artillery rendered very effective support, but during the fighting for Jagstfeld our forces were too close to the enemy for any thing except mortar fire. The armored vehicles were used extensively within Jagstfeld, but they were of little value during the river crossings as it was impossible to get them over the streams until bridges had been built.

6. *a.* Five German rifle companies were definitely identified within the battalion sector. It is estimated that they numbered between seven hundred and seven hundred fifty men.

b. The enemy occupied positions on the high ground in front of our forces and had excellent observation over the entire area. The line companies were subjected to mortar fire, small arms, machine guns, rockets and flak. The village of Duttenberg, where battalion headquarters was located during most of the action, was subjected to direct fire from a self-propelled 155mm artillery piece.

c. This line was the enemy's last defense positions in Central Germany. They intended to hold us back as long as possible in order to enable the final completion of their last defense line farther south.

d. During the entire engagement eighty enemy were captured, an estimated two hundred killed, a flak wagon destroyed and an undetermined number wounded.

7. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this recommendation.

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, 398th Infantry,
Commanding

20. DIVISION COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION FOR CITATION OF 398TH COMBAT TEAM

HEADQUARTERS 100TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Office of the Commanding General

APO 447, U. S. ARMY

1 September 1945

SUBJECT: French Award

TO: Commanding General, USFET, APO 887, U.S. Army
Through Channels

1. It is recommended that the 398th Infantry Regimental Combat Team be cited in French General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period 3 April 1945 to 11 April 1945, near Heilbronn, Germany.

2. On 3 April 1945 the 398th Infantry Regiment, after three weeks of rapid advances which had carried our forces over 150 miles, from the Maginot fortress city of Bitche to the banks of the Neckar River deep inside Germany, was ordered to establish a bridgehead across the river above the city of Heilbronn and then continue on toward the south. For several days the enemy had been retreating before an armored task force, leaving only undefended roadblocks, mines and a few snipers to delay us. This armored force had established a line on the west bank of the river and reported no enemy activity on the other side. Aerial reports were negative and from all indications the enemy had continued their withdrawal. Plans were quickly formulated for the crossing and all three rifle battalions moved into position along the stream. The 3d Battalion was to make the initial landing and the other two were to be prepared to exploit the breakthrough. At 0300 hours 4 April Company K, under Capt. William E. Nelson, started across the broad stream in engineer assault boats and reached the far shore without meeting any opposition. The company quickly reorganized and continued the attack, reaching the first objective at 0500. Lt. Col. Ernest L. James, the battalion commander, then ordered the company to send a strong combat patrol to Castle Hill, high ground directly ahead which offered a commanding view of the entire valley, to determine if it was occupied by the foe. One rifle platoon with a mortar observer and SCR-300 radio was sent to accomplish this mission. At 0710 Lt. Alfred J. Rizzo, the platoon leader, reported that he was on top of the hill and he was ordered to hold the ground. In the mean-

time Capt. Samuel Teitelbaum of Company L had succeeded in getting his men across the river and after clearing the area around the canal and lumberyards, he was ordered to dig in. Company I, commanded by Capt. Lloyd C. McNally, crossed last and after reorganizing prepared to pass through Company K.

At 0900 the enemy began shelling the crossing site with heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire. Barrage after barrage landed with pinpoint precision, making the use of assault boats impossible and isolating the entire battalion on the east bank of the river. At the same time an entire regiment of Hitler Youth and SS troopers launched a fierce counterattack against Companies K and L. In spite of the fact that our forces fought tenaciously, making the maximum use of every available weapon and inflicting extremely heavy casualties on the foe, the fanatical enemy gradually forced the battalion back to the river's edge and the platoon holding Castle Hill was immediately cut off. At 1200 the enemy staged an all-out assault against the beleaguered platoon, but our men resisted the attack and held their positions. During the next four hours wave after wave of Germans charged forward, but each attack was repulsed. Finally, at 1600 hours Lt. Harry W. Abregart, the 81mm mortar observer, reported that the platoon's supply of ammunition was exhausted and it would be impossible to hold out any longer. Immediately after this message the radio was destroyed, but it was later learned through the interrogation of prisoners that over 125 enemy had been killed while trying to dislodge this small group of men. Meanwhile the attack had wiped out one platoon of Company K, one machine-gun platoon of Company M, and had completely isolated two platoons of Company L. The remaining units of the battalion formed a defense line in a ravine running almost parallel to the river and repulsed the rest of the savage assaults. After capturing Castle Hill the Germans established a forward observation post there and for the next six days accurately adjusted artillery, rocket and mortar fire on our front lines, command posts and the crossing site.

With the 3d Battalion's advance effectively stopped, Col. Robert M. Williams, the Regimental commander, ordered the 2d Battalion to attempt another crossing farther upstream in an attempt to outflank the stubborn enemy. After making a personal reconnaissance of the river bank Lt. Col. Harvey C. Weisel, the battalion commander, decided that the best site was near the village of Offenau. On the morning of 5 April S/Sgt. William LeVesque of Company F led a small reconnaissance patrol across the river and into the village without meeting any opposition. The remaining elements of the company quickly followed and

established defenses for the crossing site. Company B, 325th Combat Engineer Battalion, under Capt. John J. Upchurch, began the construction of a footbridge and completed it by 1500 hours. The remaining units of the battalion then crossed over into Offenau and prepared to spend the night. The Neckar River had been crossed without too much difficulty, but before the 2d Battalion could begin the drive towards Heilbronn in earnest two more rivers, the Jagst and the Kocher, had to be crossed. Under cover of the pre-dawn darkness the following day the three rifle companies moved into Dutttemberg, procured engineer assault boats and carried them to the banks of the river, which flowed swiftly through the center of a small valley half a mile away. At 0500 the first wave started across the river, but before reaching mid-stream they were greeted by a deadly volley of fire from hostile machine guns, mortars and riflemen entrenched on the far shore. The battalion was forced to withdraw slightly, but a short time later, under cover of an extremely heavy mortar and artillery barrage, Companies E and G moved ahead a second time, forced their way across the swift stream and continued on until they reached the railroad embankment which bordered the wooded area and high ground directly ahead. Skillfully deploying his men, Capt. George H. Adams, Commanding Officer of Company F, led them down the river, hugging the bank for protection from the hostile fire until they reached the outskirts of the city of Jagstfeld. They seized a row of houses on the edge of town and prepared to spend the night there. At noon Company E and Company G continued their attack. Two platoons of Company E under Capt. Thomas H. Garahan began moving down the railroad tracks toward the small village of Heuchlingen. The terrain was perfectly flat and offered little protection from the German gunners, who were dug in on the right flank. As the leading scout moved out the 81mm mortar platoon began laying smoke shells along the tracks in an attempt to screen the company's movements. At the same time the 375th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Raymond Renola, laid a heavy barrage on the hostile positions. The 3d Platoon was placed under the command of Lt. John W. Pittman and ordered to approach the village from the rear. The main body of the company reached their objective by mid-afternoon and after two hours of bitter house-to-house fighting, during which thirty enemy were killed and twenty captured, Heuchlingen was cleared. However, Lieutenant Pittman's platoon had traveled less than three hundred yards when they were completely surrounded and subjected to withering crossfire from machine guns and rifles. The platoon fought off the foe for almost six hours and finally under cover

of darkness withdrew back to the river and into Heuchlingen. A few minutes after Company E moved out, Company G, under Capt. Matthew B. Einsmann, began moving across the flat farm land north of Jagstfeld towards the village of Waldau on the Kocher River. However, the company had only traveled a short distance when they ran into the enemy's main defense line and became pinned down by fire from three sides. The company engaged in a bitter fire fight, but finally at 1800 hours, the effective combat strength reduced to less than sixty men, Captain Einsmann was ordered to pull back to Heuchlingen for the night.

Early the following morning the 1st Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Ralph C. McCrum crossed over on the bridge at Offenau and prepared to continue the attack on the 2d Battalion's left. At dawn Companies E and G moved into Jagstfeld and along with Company F began the slow and costly process of clearing the town house by house. At the same time Company B, commanded by Lt. William C. Henson and Company C, commanded by Capt. Joseph L. Rimlinger, began an attack against the foe a short distance upstream. Both units moved out without the usual artillery preparation and immediately met fierce resistance. By the end of the day they had seized Hill 233 and dug in there. During this action Pfc. Mike Colallilo of Company C was credited with single-handedly killing twenty-five Germans and silencing three machine gun positions. At dusk Company A under Lt. William C. Henson moved forward with the other companies and the entire battalion dug in on the high ground they had seized for the night. At midnight the enemy staged determined counterattacks against all three battalions, but they were successfully repulsed. The next morning April 8 the 2d Battalion continued on farther into Jagstfeld and the 1st Battalion moved on towards Hagenbach. Both continued to meet fierce resistance and only gained a few yards during the entire action. The 3d Battalion, still clinging tenaciously to its precarious positions, repulsed three more attacks. On the 9th and 10th the 1st and 2d Battalions remained on the offensive, but again their gains were limited to short distances. On the evening of the tenth it was discovered that the enemy was planning to withdraw across the Kocher River and occupy prepared positions on the other side. Both battalions immediately began an all-out offensive, which took the foe completely by surprise and proved very costly for him. Both organizations reached the Kocher River on the morning of the 11th and the 1st Battalion was then relieved by the 2d. Later in the afternoon Major Robert F. Curran, Regimental S-3, came forward to look over the area and it was decided

to attempt a crossing immediately. At 2200 hours during a heavy rain-storm a small patrol from Company F started across to see if the village of Kochendorf was occupied, but the group was forced back by intense small-arms fire. The bank was subjected to a four-hour artillery and mortar barrage and again at 0200 hours the patrol started across. The barrage had completely disorganized the enemy and the group reached the far shore without meeting any opposition. The remaining elements of the company quickly followed and occupied Offenau before the Germans could reorganize and offer opposition. The next morning both the 2d and 3d Battalions jumped off in the attack and after joining at Neckarsulm continued on unchecked. After nine days of the bitterest type of fighting, the heroism and courage displayed by every member of the combat team resulted in the breaking of the enemy's last organized defense line and the beginning of the onslaught which culminated in the capture of Austria and the Alps.

3. *a.* Nature of the terrain: The terrain was rolling and open, ideally suited for defense.

b. Enemy morale: Excellent

c. Morale of our troops: Excellent

d. Weather: Warm and clear during most of the action.

e. Time of action: 3-11 April 1945.

4. Casualties:

MIA—4 officers, 66 enlisted men.

KIA—4 officers, 50 enlisted men.

WIA—3 officers, 134 enlisted men.

5. Strength of enemy: One full division in the Heilbronn area.

6. *a.* Character of enemy fire: The enemy used 105 and 155mm artillery pieces; 210mm rockets; heavy and light mortars; 20 and 40mm flak wagons plus numerous machine guns and anti-tank guns. They occupied high ground ahead of our forces and had excellent observation over the area.

b. Apparent enemy intentions: This was the Germans' last organized defense line and they intended to hold it at all costs.

c. Losses suffered by the enemy: 1,669 killed and wounded.

W. A. BURRESS,

*Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding*

21. MERITORIOUS SERVICE UNIT PLAQUE

HEADQUARTERS 2D BATTALION 398TH INFANTRY
APO 447, U. S. ARMY

May 7, 1945

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.

TO : Commanding General, 100th Infantry Division,
APO 447, U.S. Army

1. In accordance with the provisions of Section 1, War Department Circular 345, dated August 23, 1944 it is recommended that the 2d Battalion Headquarters Company, 398th Infantry Regiment, be awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.

2. During this period of combat operations the various platoons of 2d Battalion Headquarters Company performed all their duties in an exemplary manner. The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon has cleared dozens of hostile minefields, roadblocks and barbed wire entanglements. The Antitank Platoon has continually rendered effective support to the rifle companies. They have, on several occasions, destroyed houses used by the enemy as observation posts and strong-points, making an attack by riflemen unnecessary. The Communication Platoon has laid over nine hundred fifty miles of wire, most of it under fire.

During the period from November 8 to November 20, while we were fighting for the city of Raon l'Etape, supplying the rifle companies became a major problem. The few mountain trails that did exist had been made impassable by late autumn rains and were useless to our forces. Each morning during the period members of the Antitank and Communication Platoons carried sorely needed food and ammunition forward, assuring the riflemen of a steady flow of supplies. At the same time the A&P Platoon was engaged in clearing paths through the numerous minefields that infested the area and the Intelligence Section manned forward observation posts overlooking the foe's positions.

In early December, while engaged in bitter fighting for Puberg, Souche and other villages of Northern Alsace and later in the month while assaulting the Maginot Forts surrounding the city of Bitche, each platoon performed their assigned tasks in a superior manner. Between December 31 and January 5 the battalion command post was located in the village of Holbach. Both flanking units had been forced back

by determined enemy attacks and we were in danger of being cut off from other units of the Division. The entire company dug defensive positions and prepared to hold the village at all costs.

Between January 15 and March 10, the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon strung barbed wire fences in front of the companies, laid many minefields and numerous trip flares. The Antitank Platoon established gun positions with the forward squads and stood ready day or night to repel any armored thrust.

Since that time, during the second assault on Bitche, the push into Germany, the crossings of the Jagst and Kocher Rivers, Headquarters Company and especially the Wire Section of the Communication Platoon had worked day and night to establish supply and communication lines and keep up with the rapid advance of the rifle companies.

3. This recommendation is also based on the following:
 - a.* The superior military courtesy displayed by all members of the command indicate a high standard of discipline.
 - b.* The appearance of personnel, installations and equipment has always been clean and neat.
 - c.* The entire company has always received and executed all orders promptly and cheerfully.
 - d.* There have been no venereal disease cases in the organization during the entire period.
 - e.* No members of the organizations have been AWOL.
 - f.* There have been no convictions by courts-martial.
 - g.* There have been no men punished under the 104th Article of War.
4. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth.

HARVEY C. WEISEL, JR.
Lt. Col. 398th Infantry.
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS 398TH INFANTRY
APO 447, U. S. ARMY

May 8, 1945

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of Meritorious Service Unit
Plaque.

TO : Commanding General, 100th Infantry Division
APO 447, U. S. Army

1. In accordance with the provisions of Section 1, War Department Circular 345, dated August 23, 1944 it is recommended that the Headquarters Company, 398th Infantry Regiment, be awarded the Meritorious Service Plaque.

2. During the period of combat operations of this regiment (from November 6, 1944 to April 30, 1945), all platoons of Regimental Headquarters Company performed their various missions in a superior manner. The communication platoon has consistently maintained a telephone wire network far larger than that specified in training literature, and has laid more than 1200 miles of wire, often under hostile artillery and mortar fire. The I & R Platoon has made countless reconnaissances over dangerous and difficult terrain, very frequently under enemy fire of all kinds. The enemy information that the platoon has obtained has been of great value to the planning of successful operations of this regiment.

During the fight for the area in the vicinity of Bertrachamps, France, from November 8, 1944 to November 10, 1944, the I & R Platoon spent two days and one night on a high plateau in the vicinity of Bru, France, observing the enemy. They were under heavy hostile sniper and 88 fire. The weather was bitterly cold and snowy, the night extremely dark. There were Germans on the plateau, and no supporting troops were within easy calling distance. Nevertheless, the I & R Platoon courageously and determinedly stayed at their posts and obtained the desired information.

While the I & R Platoon was on the above mentioned plateau, the communication platoon wire teams laid wire up to the I & R Platoon positions by hand in the bitter cold and repeatedly repaired breaks in the long line in the dead of night.

When the Regimental Command Post was located in the town of Enchenberg, France, from December 20, 1944 to January 5, 1945, it was in grave danger of being cut off from the rest of the friendly forces

by hostile flanking action from the right. In this situation the company prepared defensive positions to hold the town, and when the command post was finally forced to move, the withdrawal to Montbronn, France, was accomplished quickly and efficiently.

During the rapid advance across western Germany after the Rhine crossing, the communication platoon worked night and day laying and maintaining extremely long wire lines (in one case eighteen miles), and the I & R Platoon reconnoitered many untraveled roads without regard to possible mine fields, so as to insure the roads for our columns.

3. This recommendation is also based on the following:

- a.* Headquarters Company has always maintained a high standard of discipline as evidenced by superior military courtesy.
- b.* Appearance of personnel, installations and equipment of Headquarters Company has been outstanding.
- c.* Personnel have always received and executed orders cheerfully and promptly.
- d.* There have been no venereal diseases in this company during the entire period.
- e.* No members of this organization have been AWOL.
- f.* There have been no convictions by courts martial.
- g.* There have been no men punished under the 104 AW.

4. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth.

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,
Lt. Col. 398th Infantry,
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION
398TH INFANTRY

May 15, 1945

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.

TO : Commanding General, 100th Infantry Division,
APO 447, U.S. Army

1. In accordance with the provisions of Section 1, War Department Circular 345, dated August 23, 1944, it is recommended that the *Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 398th Infantry*, be awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.

2. During the six-month period that the 398th Infantry has been in combat, Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, has amassed an enviable record for performance and competence in organization, facilitating the success that this battalion has achieved in combat.

The 1st Battalion Antitank Platoon displayed a remarkable adaptability to the unusual requirements of fighting in the Vosges Mountains and similar difficult terrain where there was an absence of large numbers of German tanks. Besides furnishing the battalion with the primary antitank protection, this platoon served as litter bearers and ammunition bearers under hazardous conditions. Manning front line positions during the defense of Lemberg from January 29 to March 13 the guns fired both harassing indirect fire and direct fire, eliminating a number of enemy dugouts. In the two attacks at Bitche, from December 14-23 and March 15-16, the platoon gave close support to the line companies, firing at pill boxes of the Maginot Line, and in one instance killing one enemy soldier, wounding another, and forcing eight more to surrender. At Untergriesheim from April 7-11 the Antitank Platoon went into the line as riflemen to plug up a large gap between our battalion and the 63d Division on our left flank. Here the 1st Battalion was being opposed by a regiment of fierce resisting SS troops. For the entire campaign the Antitank Platoon has proven itself capable of meeting all the situations that it has confronted.

The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon of the 1st Battalion has done a commendable job of keeping the battalion supplied with ammunition at all times and under all conditions. It has constructed and maintained roadblocks, has built roads in the battalion sector, and has constructed defensive positions and placed wire entanglements across the front of the lines on numerous occasions. In addition to its regular duties it has been called upon to serve as a rifle platoon, litter bearer squad, and a

reconnaissance patrol. During the period of the attack on Wingen on December 4 Company A had lost contact with other units of the battalion and the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon was called upon to go out with ammunition and rations and to reestablish contact with Company A. In attempting to locate Company A the platoon encountered heavy artillery and mortar fire. After continuing the advance for several hundred yards under fire they were pinned down and forced to dig in. This position was held for several hours without the protection of any friendly units. On December 14, while the attack on Forts Freudenberg and Schiesseck of the Maginot Line was in progress, this platoon served as riflemen to cover the withdrawal of the battered assault companies. All during the period that this battalion was in action the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon has done an efficient job of clearing the mines and roadblocks, often under enemy observation and artillery and small-arms fire to facilitate the advance of the assault units of this battalion.

The Wire Section of the Communications Platoon has done an outstanding job of laying and keeping in repair wire lines between the battalion command post and the line companies and attached units. During every attack wire teams have been assigned to the assault companies, and their work in laying wire quickly despite intense fire has been a great aid in keeping contact within the battalion. During several long moves, especially this Division's drive south toward Stuttgart, the Wire Section has worked day and night to lay wire from Regimental to battalion headquarters, often traveling over roads which have never been cleared of mines and through areas never cleared of German troops. In the drive toward Stuttgart the Radio Section also assumed a vital role. The complex problem of keeping contact between the battalion commanding officer, tanks, tank destroyers, and three rifle companies, often headed for three different objectives, was solved largely through the untiring effort of radio operators and repairmen, who were on the job day and night. During the attacks of December 14 on Bitche, January 9 on Rimling, March 15-16 on Bitche, and April 7-11 on Odheim, the Radio Section had operators who worked under concentrated enemy shelling at the forward battalion observation post. The Message Center vehicles have played an important part in reconnoitering unknown areas in addition to their primary job of carrying papers and messages to the Regimental Message Center. Near Affaltrach on April 15 and Murhardt on April 20 their drivers were called upon to travel through territory never cleared by rifle troops, and in several cases were fired upon by small groups of enemy riflemen. In the early stages of every move, Message Center vehicles have been used to con-

tact company command posts before wire communications were laid. In every case the three sections of the Communications Platoon, using whatever means best fitted for the situation, have worked so efficiently that at no time has the tactical operation of the battalion been impeded because of lack of communications.

The S-1 Section of battalion headquarters has done an outstanding job of handling the administrative duties of the battalion. Through untiring effort and adaptability to any situation, it quickly learned to cope with the unusual requirements of combat. It has turned out painstaking reports, investigations, and other work under conditions which made such work nearly impossible. Even during the Vosges Mountain campaign, when battalion command posts consisted of a large foxhole, or at best a tent, the S-1 Section was commended for its high standard of efficiency.

The S-2 and S-3 Sections have worked in close cooperation with each other to handle the intelligence and operational problems of the battalion. During attacks the S-2 Section has men at the forward observation post, while the S-3 Section generally operates a forward command post, close enough to the attacking companies to handle instantly any problems that might arise. The S-2 Section has handled interrogation and guard of all prisoners taken by this battalion, and the information obtained in this manner has often made easier the taking of many of this battalion's objectives. During the period January 29 to March 13, when the 1st Battalion was on line near Lemberg, France, and again from January 9-19 near Rimling, the S-2 Section led several reconnaissance patrols into enemy territory, and worked in close harmony with the S-3 Section, which planned the highly-successful raids by the 1st Battalion Raider Platoon.

The Battalion Maintenance Section, operating in two independent, self-sufficient teams of one motor sergeant and two mechanics each under the battalion motor officer has unstintedly proven its value to the unit by keeping the organic and attached vehicles rolling. On numerous occasions the motor sergeants and mechanics have retrieved disabled vehicles under intense enemy artillery and mortar fire in the most undesirable terrain and weather conditions and at all hours of the day and night. On two specific occasions, December 14 near Bitche and again on December 16 near Bitche, maintenance personnel have made their way through known minefields to repair and retrieve disabled vehicles. During the last seven months in which the average vehicle traveled six thousand miles, there have been many long and tedious convoys composed of from fifty to one hundred and fifty vehicles under

the supervision of the Battalion Motor Transportation Officer assisted by the motor sergeants. Of all of these movements the most notable was from Misonthal, France, to Lemberg, France. Starting at 1500 and traveling without a reconnaissance over muddy, mine-infested roads, the convoy encountered artillery and mortar fire at roadblocks necessitating turning around on small mountain trails. The motor movement arrived at its destination at 0100 the following day only after fourteen vehicles had been pulled out of holes and some snatched from precarious positions near sharp cliffs. In every inspection since this unit has been in combat the Maintenance Section has been rated excellent.

Throughout the entire campaign of the 100th Division in the European Theater of Operations all of the sections of this company have performed their duties individually and collectively in a manner that is a credit to the Division and the Army of the United States.

3. *a.* During the period of service in France and Germany this company has been complimented on many occasions for its military courtesy and discipline by members of this and other divisions.

b. Through inspections and encouragement of personal pride in the unit the appearance of the men, the temporary installations, and the equipment of this company has been commendable.

c. Both the orders from within the unit and from higher echelon have been received and executed in a spirit of cooperativeness and enthusiasm.

d. Venereal disease rate in this company for the six-month period for which the award is recommended is as follows:

5 November 1944—	5 December 1944—	0
5 December 1944 —	5 January 1945 —	0
5 January 1945 —	5 February 1945 —	0
5 February 1945 —	5 March 1945 —	1
5 March 1945 —	5 April 1945 —	1
5 April 1945 —	5 May 1945 —	0

—
Total—2

e. There have been no men A.W.O.L. during this period.

f. There have been no convictions by courts-martial during this period.

4. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this recommendation.

RALPH C. MCCRUM,
Major, 398th Infantry,
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS 100TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 447, U. S. ARMY

4 March 1945

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 59

* * *

Section V—AWARD OF MERITORIOUS SERVICE UNIT PLAQUE

By direction of the President, and under the provisions of Section I, Circular Number 345, War Department, 23 August 1944, the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque is awarded to the *Service Company, 398th Infantry Regiment*, for superior performance of duty and the achievement of a high standard of discipline during the period from 21 October 1944 to 12 February 1945.

* * *

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL BURRESS:

RICHARD G. PRATHER,
Colonel GSC,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

BYRON C. DE LA MATER,
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION
398TH INFANTRY
APO 447, U. S. ARMY

May 24, 1945

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.

TO : Commanding General, 100th Infantry Division,
APO 447, U.S. Army

1. In accordance with the provisions of Section I, War Department Circular 345, dated August 23, 1944 it is recommended that the Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment, be awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.

2. Throughout the Vosges Campaign from November 6, 1944 to December 17, 1944 all units of Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 398th Infantry Regiment, worked untiringly to support the tactical operations of this battalion. After crossing the Merthe River, in the engagement to take the high ground in the vicinity of Raon L'Etape, the battalion was cut off from the use of vehicles in maintaining communications and supply to the advancing rifle companies. The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon hand-carried rations and ammunition for miles over mountainous terrain to keep the battalion supplied. As the antitank guns were not being used during this engagement the Antitank Platoon assisted in this difficult task. The Communications Platoon kept communications established with the leading elements in spite of the fact that they had to be hand-carried and laid over difficult terrain infested by bypassed enemy snipers.

During the bitter fighting to take the strongly fortified Forts Freudenberg and Schiesseck of the Maginot Line northwest of Bitche, France, on December 17-21, 1944 every man in Headquarters Company did important work to support the battalion's struggle breaching these strongpoints. The Intelligence Section continually operated the battalion command post while under constant artillery and mortar fire. The Antitank Platoon moving their guns over open terrain under observation of the enemy, supported the leading elements by firing on pillboxes and covered the flanks against mechanized attack. The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon made numerous trips over a road subjected to artillery, mortar, and sniper fire to keep the assaulting units supplied with ammunition and supplies. The drivers operated their vehicles over unswept roads under artillery and mortar fire, and the

maintenance section worked day and night to keep the vehicles in operation.

For six (6) weeks, during February and March, 1945, the battalion was occupying defensive positions in the vicinity of Lemberg, France. During this period the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon went out at night, between the two front lines, to construct defensive barbed wire entanglements across the entire front, and the Antitank Platoon went into front line positions to act as riflemen.

On April 4, 1945 the battalion was given the mission of establishing a bridgehead across the Neckar River in the vicinity of Heilbronn, Germany, so that a treadway bridge could be constructed on which it was planned to move an armored unit across. The battalion established the bridgehead but due to the intensity of the hostile artillery and many large scale counterattacks, the bridge could not be constructed. The Communication Platoon constructed an underwater cable to maintain the communication lines across the river and the wire crews repeatedly risked their lives to repair the wire lines which were constantly being destroyed by the enemy artillery. The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon supplied the battalion, using assault boats, while under enemy observation and subjected to constant hostile mortar and artillery fire. The Antitank Platoon moved their guns across on infantry support craft and provided the battalion with the only protection that they had against mechanized attack.

During this entire period, the administrative section worked tirelessly to keep accurate company and battalion records, in training replacements, handling awards, disseminating information and coordinating the movement of hot food up to the troops.

The success of this battalion in combat has been in a large measure due to the superior support provided by the Battalion Headquarters Company. The outstanding work done by the entire personnel of this company reflects high credit on the Army of the United States.

3. This recommendation is also based on the following:

- a. The personnel of this unit have on all occasions displayed a high standard of discipline as evidenced by their excellent military courtesy.
- b. The appearance of the personnel, installations, and equipment of this organization has always been excellent.

* * *


4. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this recommendation.


ERNEST L. JANES,
Lt. Col., 398th Infantry,
Commanding

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN



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OPERATIONS OF THE 398TH INFANTRY
1944-1945

10 0 20 40

SCALE: 1/500,000

